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Many Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) models use Performance Shaping
Factors (PSFs) to incorporate human elements into system safety analysis and to
calculate the Human Error Probability (HEP). Current HRA methods rely on dif-
ferent sets of PSFs that range from a few to over 50 PSFs, with varying degrees of
interdependency among the PSFs. This interdependency is observed in almost every
set of PSFs, yet few HRA methods offer a way to account for dependency among
PSFs. The methods that do address interdependencies generally do so by varying
different multipliers in linear or log-linear formulas. These relationships could be
more accurately represented in a causal model of PSF interdependencies.
This dissertation introduces a methodology to produce a Bayesian Belief Net-
work (BBN) of interactions among PSFs. The dissertation also presents a set of
fundamental guidelines for the creation of a PSF set, a hierarchy of PSFs developed
specifically for causal modeling, and a set of models developed using currently avail-
able data. The models, methodology, and PSF set were developed using nuclear
power plant data available from two sources: information collected by the Uni-
versity of Maryland for the Information-Decision-Action model [1] and data from
the Human Events Repository and Analysis (HERA) database [2], currently under
development by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Creation of the methodology, the PSF hierarchy, and the models was an it-
erative process that incorporated information from available data, current HRA
methods, and expert workshops. The fundamental guidelines are the result of in-
sights gathered during the process of developing the methodology; these guidelines
were applied to the final PSF hierarchy. The PSF hierarchy reduces overlap among
the PSFs so that patterns of dependency observed in the data can be attribute to
PSF interdependencies instead of overlapping definitions. It includes multiple levels
of generic PSFs that can be expanded or collapsed for different applications.
The model development methodology employs correlation and factor analysis
to systematically collapse the PSF hierarchy and form the model structure. Factor
analysis is also used to identify Error Contexts (ECs) – specific PSF combinations
that together produce an increased probability of human error (versus the net effect
of the PSFs acting alone). Three models were created to demonstrate how the
methodology can be used provide different types of data-informed insights.
By employing Bayes’ Theorem, the resulting model can be used to replace
linear calculations for HEPs used in Probabilistic Risk Assessment. When additional
data becomes available, the methodology can be used to produce updated causal
models to further refine HEP values.
A DATA-INFORMED MODEL OF PERFORMANCE SHAPING
FACTORS FOR USE IN HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
by
Katrina M. Groth
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Ali Mosleh, Chair/Advisor
Professor Kent Norman, Dean’s Representative
Professor Jeffrey Herrmann
Professor Linda Schmidt





At the beginning of the dissertation writing process, I had high hopes of writing
thoughtful, clever acknowledgments that express how truly grateful I am for the
many people who have helped make this dissertation possible. However, with the
deadline for submission fast approaching, I’ve realized that people would rather see
me graduate than to find “just the right words” to thank them. It’s impossible to
thank every individual who has shared time, experience, wisdom, and friendship
with me over the course of this research, but I greatly appreciate everyone who has
helped me through this process.
First and foremost, I’d like to thank my advisor, Professor Ali Mosleh, and the
members of my dissertation committee: Professor Kent Norman, Professor Jeffrey
Herrmann, Professor Linda Schmidt, and Dr. Y. James Chang. It’s not often that
all of the committee members show a genuine interest in the dissertation topic, yet
I was fortunate enough to find five individuals who provided valuable insight and
feedback. I would also like to express my appreciation to Professor Michel Cukier
for his attendance in my defense.
I’d like to thank Erasmia Lois and Y. James Chang from the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for guidance and support during this research, and
the US NRC Division of Research for the financial support that made this disserta-
tion possible. Thank you to Ronald L. Boring, Bob Richards and Dave Gertman, for
mentoring and encouragement. Thank you to all of the experts who attended the
International HRA Context Workshop, for taking the time to share your knowledge.
Thank you to April Whaley and Pat McCabe at the Idaho National Laboratory, for
helping demystify the HERA database and for turning lemons into lemonade.
I would also like to recognize my research colleagues the University of Mary-
land, Center for Risk and Reliabilty: Zahra Mohaghegh, Reza Kazemi, Danielle
Chrun, and Yuandan Li. I’d like to extend thanks to the following people for assis-
tance with data analysis, which could not have been accomplished without any of
them: Yuandan Li, Daisy Wise Rutstein, and Robert Mislevy at the University of
Maryland; Cindy Gentillon and Dave McGrath at the Idaho National Laboratory;
Russell Almond at the Educational Testing Service; Michelle Gonzales at the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Thank you Heidi Butler and Prachi Kulkarni, for providing timely feedback on
my many rough drafts and for helping me prepare for my defense. Thank you to my
family, for making sure I never lost sight of the light at the end of the tunnel, (and
for pushing me out of the way when I thought the light was attached to a train).
Finally, I would like to sincerely thank my advisor, Professor Ali Mosleh, for
giving me the opportunity to work on so may interesting projects, and for having
the patience to let me try several approaches before finding the one that worked,
even if he knew the right approach all along. This research would not have been
possible without his vision, guidance, and patience. I am awed by his ability to read
people, to synthesize thoughts, and to pave a path forward (beyond the conditional
probability forest). And to think, all this time I thought he was the one driving that
train. He is truly a different kind of engineer and an extraordinary mentor, and it’s
been an honor to work with him.
ii
Table of Contents
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
List of Abbreviations ix
1 Overview of Dissertation and its Contributions 1
1.1 Dissertation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Chapter 1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Chapter 2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Chapter 3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Chapter 4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 Chapter 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 Chapter 6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.8 Chapter 7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Introduction 10
2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Significance of Human Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Human Reliability Analysis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 Performance Shaping Factor Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 PSF Use in Current HRA Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2.1 THERP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2.2 SLIM-MAUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2.3 CREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2.4 SPAR-H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Current Problems in HRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Data Collection Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.2 Modeling Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.3 PSF Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 Model-based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Performance Shaping Factor Hierarchy and Principles 31
3.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1.1 Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) Database . . 32
3.1.2 Information-Decision-Action Model Events . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.3 Relationship between IDAC and HERA PSFs . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.4 PSF and Data Source Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Data Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.2 Process to Develop PSF Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.2.1 PSF Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Fundamental Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
iii
3.3.1 Single Unit of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.2 Direct Influences on the Actor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.3 Consistent Sub-event Parsing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.4 Definitional Orthogonality for PSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.5 Value Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3.6 PSF Metrics and Behavioral Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.7 Summary of Fundamental Properties of PSF Sets . . . . . . . 61
4 Definitions of Proposed Performance Shaping Factors 63
4.1 Organization-based Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1.1 Training Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1.2 Corrective Action Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1.3 Other Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.4 Safety Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1.5 Management Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1.5.1 Staffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1.5.2 Task Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1.6 Workplace Adequacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.1.7 Problem Solving Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.1.7.1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.1.7.2 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.1.7.3 Necessary Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Team-based Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2.1 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2.2 Direct Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.3 Team Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.4 Team Cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2.5 Role Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Person-based Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.1 Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3.1.1 Attention to Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.1.2 Attention to Surroundings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.2 Physical and Psychological Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.2.1 Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.2.2 Alertness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.3 Morale/Motivation/Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.3.1 Problem Solving Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.3.2 Information Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.3.3 Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.3.4 Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3.4 Knowledge and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3.5 Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.6 Familiarity with Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.7 Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 Machine (design)-based factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
iv
4.4.1 Human-System Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4.2 System Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Situation-based Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5.1 External Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5.2 Hardware & Software Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5.3 Task Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5.4 Time Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5.5 Other Loads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5.5.1 Non-task Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5.5.2 Passive Information Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5.6 Task Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.6 Stressor-based Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.6.1 Perceived Situation Severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.6.2 Perceived Situation Urgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.6.3 Perceived Decision Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5 Methodology for Development of a Causal Model of Performance Shaping
Factors 110
5.1 Bayesian Belief Network Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.1.1 BBN Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.1.2 BBN Quantification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.1.3 Analyst Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Model Development Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.1 PSF Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.2 Directed Arcs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2.3 Error Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2.4 Quantification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3 Quantitative Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.1 Tetrachoric Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.2 Factor Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.2.1 Communality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3.2.2 Number of Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3.2.3 Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.4 Assessment of BBN Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4.1 Regression Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4.2 Linear Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.2.1 One Parent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.4.2.2 Two Parent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.4.2.3 Three Parent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.5 Summary of Model Building Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6 PSF Model Development and Insights 139
6.1 6-Bubble Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.2 Mixed Expert/Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.3 9-Bubble Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
v
6.3.1 PSF Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3.2 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3.3 Model Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.3.4 Error Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3.5 Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.4 Model Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.5 Application in Quantification of Human Error Probabilities . . . . . . 165
7 Conclusions 169
7.1 Research Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.2 Model Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.3 Future Research Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.3.1 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.3.2 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.3.3 Model Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
A Sample HERA Event 177
B PSF Mapping 206
C Quantitative Analysis in R 210




2.1 PSFs used in the THERP method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 PSFs used in the CREAM method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 CREAM activity types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Multipliers for CREAM PSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 Comparison of HERA database PSFs to IDAC model PSFs . . . . . . 37
3.2 Proposed PSF hierarchy for use in HRA causal models. . . . . . . . . 48
5.1 Conditional probability table for node b with single parent a . . . . . 113
5.2 Equation systems for a child, C, with a single parent . . . . . . . . . 133
5.3 Equation systems for a child, C, with two parents . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.4 Equation systems for a child, C, with three parents . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.1 Correlations among the high-level PSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2 Tetrachoric correlation table for the new set of PSFs. . . . . . . . . . 146
6.3 The 9 PSFs used in the final causal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4 Tetrachoric correlation values used to develop the structure of the
9-Bubble Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.5 Factor analysis results for the 9 PSF groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
D.1 Raw data used to develop the 9-Bubble Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
vii
List of Figures
2.1 CREAM guidance for HEP estimation based on the state of 9 PSFs . 19
3.1 Information flow between PSFs in the IDAC model . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 The IDAC model augmented with additional PSFs and metrics from
HERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Direct influence of system and organizational context on performance 54
5.1 Sample BBN diagram for five nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 The basic elements of a causal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Dichotomous variables with and without an underlying continuous
distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.5 Possible causal relationships between two PSFs (A and B) and an
outcome (X). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.1 The “6-Bubble” model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.2 The Mixed Expert/Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.3 The “9-Bubble” model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.4 Possible effects of Error Contexts on occurrence of HFE given an
accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
viii
List of Acronyms and Notation
• BBN - Bayesian Belief Network
• BFA Bayesian Factor Analysis
• BOP - Balance of Plant
• EC - Error Context
• EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator
• FA - Factor Analysis
• HEP - Human Error Probability
• HERA - Human Events Repository and Analysis
• HFIS - Human Factors Information System
• HMI - Human-Machine Interface (aka HSI)
• HRA - Human Reliability Analysis
• HS - Human Success Event (in HERA)
• HSI - Human-System Interface (aka HMI)
• LOOP - Loss Of Offsite Power
• LTA - Less Than Adequate
• NPP - Nuclear Power Plant
• NRC - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• PFA - Principal Factor Analysis
• Pr(a) - Probability of a
• Pr(a). - Probability of not a
• Pr(a|b) - Probability of a given b
• PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment / Probabilistic Risk Analysis
• PIF - Performance Influencing Factor (aka PSF)
• PPA - Physical and Psychological Abilities
• PSF - Performance Shaping Factor (aka PIF)
• XHE - Human Failure Event (in HERA)
• |X| - The absolute value of X.
ix
Chapter 1
Overview of Dissertation and its Contributions
1.1 Dissertation Overview
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a systematic approach to reducing the
likelihood and consequences of human errors in complex systems. It is the aspect of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) used to incorporate human risks into system
safety analysis. HRA is an essential component of risk-informed decision making in
industries such as nuclear power, space exploration, and aviation.
There are many HRA methodologies that can used to identify and analyze the
causes and consequences of human errors. HRA methods also offer a way to assess
Human Error Probabilities (HEPs). Many HRA methods use Performance Shaping
Factors (PSFs), also called Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs), to represent the
causes of human errors and to calculate HEPs.
The term PSF encompasses the various factors that affect human performance
and change the likelihood of a human error. There are more than a dozen HRA
methods that use PSFs, but there is not a standard set of PSFs used in the meth-
ods. This dissertation introduces a hierarchical set of PSFs that can be used for
both qualitative and quantitative analysis in the next generation of HRA methods.
The PSF hierarchy will allow analysts to combine different types of data and will
therefore make the best use of the limited data in HRA.
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There are many possible combinations of PSFs that can be linked to human
error event. This dissertation introduces a methodology to develop a model that
characterizes the interdependencies among the PSFs. The proposed methodology
uses factor analysis to discover patterns of variance and suggests Bayesian techniques
to link these patterns to human error. The result is a systematic way to select PSFs
and define their interrelationships with respect to human performance in different
aspects of human-machine interaction.
This research is expected to influence how the HRA community gathers data
and how the community uses the data available now. Because of data limitations
and the dynamic nature of HRA, the importance of this work is rooted in the
methodology for creating the model and not necessarily in the models presented.
The methodology allows the initial models to be updated as additional data becomes
available. Ideally, future models will be incorporated into HRA methodologies to
produce more accurate HEP estimates.
For applications outside of the nuclear industry, the model may have to be
adapted to contain the correct PSFs associated with each industry. For example, in
space exploration, the set of PSFs may contain factors related to reduced gravity.
This methodology presents the concepts that can be used to create a model, but
a complete set of PSFs for every industry is outside the scope of this research.
The resulting BBN model is limited to commercial nuclear power applications, but
given the generic nature of the majority of the PSFs, the methodology is applicable
to most human-machine interaction tasks. This dissertation provides guidance for
adapting the models for specific applications outside of commercial nuclear power.
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The products of this research can be summarized as follows.
• Four events analyzed in HERA and a data coding scheme for information from
the HERA database [2];
• A set of fundamental principles/guidelines for development of future PSF sets and
refinement of PSFs used in current HRA methods;
• A hierarchical set of PSFs that aggregates knowledge from the PSFs in the HERA
database and from multiple HRA methods;
• Data-driven insights about the relationships among the PSFs and between PSFs
and human error events;
• A novel application of factor analysis to identify patterns among PSFs linked to
human error events;
• The concept of Error Contexts (ECs) that links patterns of PSFs to the probability
of error;
• A methodology to construct a Bayesian Belief Network causal model of PSF
interdependencies using expert judgment and available data;
• A Bayesian technique for estimation of HEPs from the causal models.
1.2 Chapter 1 Summary
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the dissertation and a review of the
contributions of the research. Chapter 2 gives background material and discusses
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the current state of HRA. Chapter 3 introduces the data sources used in this research
and provides details about how data was organized. Chapter 3 also introduces a set
of fundamental requirements / guidelines for systematically identifying and defining
PSFs. The full PSF hierarchy developed using these guidelines is also presented
in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides comprehensive definitions and examples for the
PSFs in the hierarchy. Chapter 5 contains the methodology suggested to develop
BBNs and Chapter 6 presents three models created by applying different aspects of
the methodology. Chapter 7 summarizes the major points in the dissertation and
suggests directions for future research.
1.3 Chapter 2 Summary
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the research topic, including the back-
ground and motivation for the research. It provides a brief introduction to current
HRA practices and discusses the current challenges in the industry. The chapter
contains a discussion of a few relevant HRA methods, their PSF sets, and their
methodology to calculate HEPs.
1.4 Chapter 3 Summary
Chapter 3 introduces a new PSF hierarchy suitable to be used in both qual-
itative and quantitative analysis. The PSF hierarchy is intended to be used in
next-generation HRA analyses and models. The chapter also introduces a set of
fundamental principles that must be met by any set of PSFs used in HRA.
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Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of why the HRA field needs new set of
PSFs and why the set needs to be hierarchically organized. Chapter 3 then describes
HERA and additional data sources used in this research and explains how data was
reorganized for use in the analysis. This research is the first application of the
data provided in the Human Events Repository and Analysis (HERA) database, so
Chapter 3 also introduces a data collection scheme to translate HERA data into a
form suitable for quantitative analysis.
The PSF fundamental principles are properties of the ideal PSF set for use
in HRA. These guidelines were developed from insights gathered during develop-
ment of the data collection scheme. The fundamental principles have implications
in terms of how the HRA field defines and uses PSFs. Two of the principles, def-
initional orthogonality and value neutrality, are properties of the individual PSFs.
Consistent sub-event parsing and a clearly defined unit of analysis, are properties
of the analysis methodology. The addition of behaviors/metrics bridges the divide
between the individual PSFs and the methodology. The introduction of the set of
necessary principles represents the first attempt to create a standard set of rules for
development of a PSF set.
The full PSF hierarchy is introduced at the end of the chapter. The PSF
hierarchy presented is the first set of PSFs designed for use in a causal model. The
PSF set combines PSFs from the data sources with PSFs from many current HRA
methods to create a super-set that is suitable to be used in both qualitative and
quantitative analysis. The PSF set is organized in a hierarchy that can be collapsed
and expanded to suit different analysis goals.
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1.5 Chapter 4 Summary
Currently there is no standard terminology used in HRA methods. Various
HRA methods may use different terminology for similar concepts or similar ter-
minology for different concepts. One goal of the PSF set provided is to define a
standard set of terms that can be used by next generation HRA methods. In Chap-
ter 4, the PSFs included in the new PSF hierarchy are defined to ensure consistent
interpretation of the PSFs. The chapter provides a comprehensive definition for
each PSF, a list of similar terms used in current HRA methods, and examples from
the available data.
The PSF set contains several elements that improve upon the PSFs used in
current HRA methods. The term “Fitness for Duty” is present in many HRA
methods, yet in the nuclear industry it has a strong negative connotation that
implies that the worker willfully disregards rules and/or lacks concern for safety (e.g.,
alcohol use, sleeping at the control panel, etc). The PSF set contains Physical and
Psychological Abilities (PPA), which encompasses what many HRA methods intend
to capture in Fitness for Duty, but does so without the negative bias associated
with the term. PPA includes impairment, which is rarely seen in a power plant, but
it also includes factors that may contribute to reduced cognitive functioning, but
which are unavoidable consequences of hiring human workers (e.g., fatigue, circadian
rhythms, physical fitness, and emotional states).
The PSF set is linked to metrics and behaviors, such as compliance and pri-
oritization, that are observable indicators of unobservable PSFs. These behaviors
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are included in some HRA methods as a “Work Practices or Processes” PSF, but
this is not a true PSF, rather a set of visible behaviors. The inclusion of behaviors
linked to in the PSF hierarchy is expected to produce more consistent interpretation
among HRA experts and increased reproducibility of HRA results.
1.6 Chapter 5 Summary
Chapter 5 proposes a methodology for developing and quantifying a data-
informed Bayesian Belief Network of PSFs. Chapter 5 covers the mathematical
techniques that are used to systematically collapse the hierarchy to determine the
optimal PSFs for use in a model. It discusses how correlation and factor analysis
are used to develop the model structure and how the quantitative techniques can
be used to create a mixed model based on expert judgment and available data. The
methodology also considers the special challenges involved with using binary data.
Chapter 5 also introduces the concept of Error Contexts (ECs). ECs are
groups of PSFs that together contribute to greater increases in HEPs than would the
individual PSFs acting alone. The patterns of variance that form ECs are identified
through a novel applications of factor analysis, which has not previously been used
to identify patterns in observed human performance data and link them to error.
These error contexts are incorporated into the model and subsume some of the links
established by correlation analysis. Model quantification is accomplished through
frequency estimates, regression analysis, or by developing conditional probabilities
from correlation values and marginal probabilities.
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The methodology presented is a novel assembly of mathematical techniques
used to produce causal models of error. The flexible methodology allows analysts to
develop different types of models by applying different combinations of the analysis
techniques.
1.7 Chapter 6 Summary
Chapter 6 presents three models for understanding how specific PSFs work
together to produce human errors. Each model represents a different application of
the methodology introduced in Chapter 5. The first model presented is a high-level
model that covers how the six main aspects of the socio-technical system interact
to produce error. This “6-Bubble” model aggregates the available data into the six
components of the socio-technical system in order to maximize use of the available
data. The “6-Bubble” model visually displays correlations among the six categories.
The second model, the “Mixed Expert/Data Model” (MEDM) is a more com-
prehensive model of PSFs that includes the causal relationships among over 30 of
the PSFs. The MEDM was created by applying quantitative analysis to the PSFs
that had sufficient data to be included in the analysis. The remainder of the model
was created using expert information. This model is provided to demonstrate how
the methodology introduced in Chapter 5 can be used to improve upon or validate
existing expert models.
The third, “9-Bubble” model contains a reduced set of PSFs with connections
to specific Error Contexts; this model is quantified based on available data. Chapter
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6 also provides guidance on how to gather additional data to improve the quality of
the probability estimates. The models presented offer an alternative to using linear
or log-linear calculations to estimate HEPs. These models are the first HRA models
developed to quantify relationships among the PSFs.
1.8 Chapter 7 Summary
Chapter 7 covers many possible directions that this research could take. It
discusses several potential next steps for the research. Chapter 7 also discusses






In recent years, several high-profile accidents and incidents involving human
error have pushed the study of human performance into the spotlight. A fatal
runway overrun occurred in August 2006 in Lexington, KY occurred when the pilot
attempted to take off from the incorrect runway. Human errors on the part of
the pilots and the air traffic controller contributed to the crash [3]. Poor safety
culture at NASA contributed poor decision making in the 2003 Columbia space
shuttle accident, A combination of inexperienced personnel, insufficient management
oversight, and poor communication contributed to misunderstanding of the severity
of the impact of the foam tile that ultimately resulted in loss of the shuttle and
flight crew [4]. Unfortunately, these are not isolated incidents. Human error is a
leading contributor to accidents and near-misses in many industries. An estimated
80% of industrial accidents are attributable to human error. This statistic holds
beyond the nuclear industry; examples can be found readily in offshore oil drilling
[5], marine [6], finance [7], etc.
Humans play a role in every aspect of complex systems. They design and
manufacture the hardware, software, and interfaces between human and the sys-
tem. Humans are also responsible for the operation and maintenance of these sys-
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tems. Humans play a substantial role in ensuring system safety [8]. Therefore it is
important to include human elements in risk assessment of complex systems.
2.2 Significance of Human Error
Failures in complex systems, such as nuclear power and aviation, must be
extensively studied due to the potentially catastrophic results of such failures. The
primary reason for studying risk is the preservation of resources and lives. The desire
to preserve human life is self-explanatory, but failure of any engineering system can
have a wide range of additional consequences for the system owners, operators,
designers, and even the public at large. In many systems there may be financial
consequences; the cost of repairing or replacing the system may be high and a
company could have reduced earnings while a system is out of service. In addition
to current profits, a company may face future financial consequences, suffer from a
lack of public confidence, and lose opportunities for growth. An inopportune system
failure could cause a company to lose its initial investment in the system, lose system
data, or lose the window of opportunity for system performance (e.g., canceled space
shuttle launches). A successful HRA program can prevent or reduce many of these
consequences by reducing opportunities for human actions to lead to failure.
2.3 Human Reliability Analysis Overview
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is an aspect of risk analysis concerned
with systematically identifying and analyzing the causes and consequences of human
11
errors. It is used to incorporate human risks into system safety analysis as part of
an informed approach to reducing overall risk. HRA is an essential component of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for complex systems such as nuclear power
plants. HRA is used to understand and assess how humans affect system risks, with
the ultimate goal of reducing the likelihood and consequences of human errors.
There are numerous HRA methods available that provide guidance for iden-
tification human errors and assessment of Human Error Probability (HEP). Of the
various HRA methods, some are concerned primarily with systematic identifica-
tion of observable behaviors, some attempt to quantify the probability of human
error based on the situational context, and others attempt to model the human
and the human’s interactions with the system [9]. Different HRA methods view
human error as the cause of an event, the event itself, or as the outcome of an event
[10]. Human-system interactions can be broken down into separate facets related
to the human, machine & situational characteristics. First generation HRA meth-
ods considered human behavior and machine performance as the two main factors
in human-system interactions, and both elements were generally treated as deter-
ministic processes. More recently, the effects of the human decision making and
the relationship between the situation and human cognition have been incorporated
into system analysis.
As systems are becoming more complex, the associated system failures are be-
coming more complicated. The increasing number of machines and people involved
in systems necessitates a way to represent inputs to human cognition. To accom-
plish this, many current HRA methods use Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) to
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describe many aspects of the human-system interaction. PSFs are used to repre-
sent the situational contexts and causes affecting human performance in different
systems.
2.3.1 Performance Shaping Factor Overview
Loosely defined, a Performance Shaping Factor is any factor that enhances
or degrades human performance and thus has an impact on the likelihood of error.
In HRA, PSFs are used to represent the various factors that influence individual
behavior and decision making. PSFs are used to represent how the situation, ma-
chine, organization, and personal characteristics influence individual performance.
Currently there is no standard set of PSFs used in HRA methods, but most sets
use PSFs identified in human performance literature. Personal factors include fa-
tigue [11], motivation [12], attitude [13], attention [11], personality [11], experience
[14, 11] and knowledge [14, 11]. Additional factors include management [15], teams
[15, 16], communication [14, 17], leadership [18], safety culture [19], training [14, 11],
environment [12], ergonomics [20], time [21] and workload [15].
PSFs are used to meet multiple goals in HRA and the study of human per-
formance. PSFs are used to pin-point positive or negative influences on human
performance and to predict conditions that lead to human errors. Several HRA
methods use the state (level of influence) of the PSFs to estimate HEPs or to gain
qualitative insight about the scenario. PSF states are defined on different scales
depending on the selected method, but they generally range from low to high influ-
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ence. HRA methods generally provide guidance as to how to assess the state of a
PSF through direct measurement or extrapolation.
2.3.2 PSF Use in Current HRA Models
Many HRA methods use PSFs to estimate HEPs [10, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. This
section contains a brief review of four HRA methods that offer specific guidelines to
assess HEPs for use in PRA models. THERP [22] was one of the first HRA methods
used in the nuclear industry. SLIM-MAUD [23] allows users to define the PSFs to
be used in quantification, and CREAM [10] includes limited causal modeling in the
structure. SPAR-H [24] is currently used for HRA analysis in over 70 nuclear power
plants in the United States.
2.3.2.1 THERP
THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) [22, 27] was initially
developed and used by Sandia National Laboratories in 1961 for defense related
HRA analyses. It was used to perform HRA in one of the first applications of PRA
in the nuclear industry, WASH-1400 [28].
The list of PSFs in THERP is presented in Table 2.1. However, only three
of the identified PSFs are used in HEP calculation. These are: tagging levels (of
components or controls), experience, and stress.
THERP is used to calculate the probabilities of the following types of errors:
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Table 2.1: PSFs used in the THERP method
• Screening and detection of system abnormalities (Screening Tables1 20-1 and 20-
2).
• Diagnosis and identification of the causes of system abnormalities (Diagnosis Ta-
bles 20-3 and 20-4).
• Omitted actions, including actions in procedure preparation, use of a specified
procedure (i.e., administrative control), execution of a procedure step, and pro-
viding an oral instruction (Tables 20-5 to 20-8).
• Writing down incorrect information (Table 20-5).
• Acting on a wrong object; this includes reading from an unintended display, acting
on an unintended control, and unintended control actions (e.g., turn a control the
1Table numbers in this section refer to tables in the THERP documentation [22]
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wrong direction) (Tables 20-9 to 20-14).
THERP models a number of types of Errors of Omission (EOOs) and Errors
of Commission (EOCs). EOOs modeled in THERP relate to actions in procedure
preparation, use of a specified procedure (i.e., administrative control), execution of
a procedure step, and providing an oral instruction (in Tables 20-5 to 20-8). The
EOCs modeled in THERP include writing down incorrect information (Table 20-5)
and acting on a wrong object (Tables 20-9 to 20-14).
With respect to cognitive error modeling, THERP uses available time to de-
termine the probabilities of diagnosis failure. No further breakdown in terms of
specific cognitive or decision errors is offered.
THERP is used to calculate HEPs through a number of steps:
1. Determine probability of human error. Construct the HRA Event Tree
(ET). For each branching point of the HRA ET, use the HEP search scheme to
identify the likely human errors and the corresponding nominal HEPs as well as
the uncertainty bounds.
2. Identify factors/interactions affecting human performance. Assess the
effect of the tagging levels, experience, and stress on the HEPs as well as the
uncertainty bounds of the HEPs.
3. Quantify effects of factors/interactions. Assess the levels of task dependen-
cies based on the five-level dependency scale specified by THERP. Such depen-
dencies would affect the task HEPs.
16
4. Account for probabilities of recovery from errors. Assess the possible
recovery branches in the HRA ET and assess the success probabilities.
5. Calculate human error contribution to probability of system failure.
Determine the success and failure consequences within the HRA ET and calculate
the final HEP of the HRA ET.
2.3.2.2 SLIM-MAUD
SLIM-MAUD (Success Likelihood Index Method using Multi-Attribute Utility
Decomposition)[23] does not have a fixed set of PSFs used in calculating HEPs,
rather it allows the analyst to identify PSFs based on the situation being analyzed.
The quantification steps of SLIM-MAUD are as follows:
1. Modeling and specification of PSFs. Experts identify the PSFs relevant to
the event of interest.
2. Weighting the PSFs. Experts weight the effect of each PSF.
3. Rating the PSFs. Experts assess the state of each PSF.




(NormalizedWeight(PSFi) · State(PSFi)) (2.1)
5. Conversion of the SLIs to probabilities. Equation (2.2) is used to calculate
the HEPs in SLIM-MAUD.
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Log(1−HEP ) = a · SLI + b (2.2)
Using at least two sets of known HEPs and SLIs as reference points, the constants
“a” and “b” can be obtained. Using the same equation (2.2) and replacing the
SLI by the SLI of the task of interest, the HEP of the task can be calculated.
6. Calculation of uncertainty bounds. Perform sensitivity analysis by changing
PSF weights and ratings to determine the upper bound and lower bound of SLI
in turn determining the upper bound and lower bound of HEPs.
2.3.2.3 CREAM
CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method) [10] was devel-
oped for general applications and is based on the Contextual Control Model (CO-
COM) [29] which, from the information processing perspective, has emphasized the
identification and calculation of cognitive errors. The method has been used in two
recent NASA PRAs (Space Shuttle, and an earlier version of the International Space
Station).
CREAM provides detailed instructions for both predictive and retrospective
analyses. For the predictive task analyses, a number of “basic human activities”
are identified (e.g., monitoring, comparing, and execution). Each task can be de-
composed into a number of such basic human activities. Each basic human activity
corresponds to a few likely error modes; this provides the mechanism for predictive
task analysis. The method provides a list of nine PSFs (Table 2.2) and there is
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Figure 2.1: CREAM guidance for HEP estimation based on the state of 9 PSFs
an implicit causal model for relating the PSFs to certain modes of response. For
retrospective analyses, CREAM provides a number of tables that allow analysts to
trace back the root causes of a human error.
Table 2.2 contains the CREAM PSFs. CREAM provides a two-level approach
to calculate HEPs: a basic method and an extended method. CREAM also provides
simple rules to determine the HEP range of a task based on the combined PSFs’
states.
The basic method can be used for task screening. The type of “control mode”
is identified by through Figure 2.1 and the nine PSFs’ values/states are assessed
using Table 2.2. The HEP ranges for the four types of control modes are:
5E − 6 < HEP (Strategic) < 1E − 2
1E − 3 < HEP (Tactical) < 1E − 1
1E − 2 < HEP (Opportunistic) < 5E − 1
1E − 1 < HEP (Scramble) < 1
The extended method is for performing more detailed HEP assessments. The ex-




























Fewer than capacity Not significant
Matching current capacity Not significant
More than capacity Reduced
Available time
Adequate Improved





Adequacy of training and
preparation
Adequate, high experience Improved







Table 2.2: PSFs used in the CREAM method
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1. Describe the task or task segments to be analyzed and perform task
decomposition that breaks the task into a number of subtasks. Each
subtask can be matched to one of the fifteen pre-specified cognitive activities (see
Table 2.3).
2. Identify the type of cognitive activity for each sub-task.
3. Identify the associated human function of each sub-task. Four types of
human functions are identified: observation, interpretation, planning, and execu-
tion.
4. Determine the basic HEPs for all sub-tasks. A number of failure modes
are identified. Each failure mode is associated with a basic HEP and uncertainty
bound (see Table 2.3; the uncertainty bounds are not shown in the table).
5. Determine the PSFs’ effect on the sub-tasks’ HEPs. Adjust the base
HEPs by multiplying by the adjustment factors based on the states of the PSFs
(see Table 2.4).
6. Calculate the task HEP based on the HEPs of sub-tasks.
2.3.2.4 SPAR-H
The SPAR-H (Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis)
method was developed to estimate HEPs for use in the SPAR PRA models used
in commercial nuclear power plants. SPAR-H is used as part of PRA in over 70
US nuclear power plants. SPAR-H also is the main model behind the Human Event
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Table 2.3: CREAM activity types
Reliability Analysis (HERA) HRA database sponsored by Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission.






• Ergonomics/Human machine interface
• Fitness for duty
• Work processes
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Table 2.4: Multipliers for CREAM PSFs
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The effect of a PSF is a function of the PSF’s state, the type of error (i.e.,
diagnosis or action), and the operation phases in which the task is performed (i.e.,
at power operation or low power/shutdown operation). The SPAR-H method does
not offer an explicit causal model, although a diagram is provided to suggest inter-
dependencies among the various PSFs.
SPAR-H is used to quantify HEPs through the following steps:
1. Determine the plant operation state and type of activity. Two distinc-
tive plant states, at-power and low power/shutdown, and two types of activities,
diagnosis and action, are modeled. Four HEP worksheets are provided to be used
for calculating the HEPs of the following four different combinations:
• At-power operation and diagnosis activity
• At-power operation and action activity
• Low power/shutdown operation and diagnosis activity
• Low power/shutdown operation and action activity
2. Evaluate PSF states to determine the multipliers. Check the states of
each PSF on the HEP worksheet. The state of each PSF is associated with an
HEP multiplier value (see [24] for specific values).
3. Calculate HEP using equation provided in the worksheets. Two equa-
tions are provided; the choice of equation depends on the number of negative
PSFs. Equation 2.3 is used to calculate the HEP for situations with fewer than 3
negative PSFs. Equation 2.4 is used if there are 3 or more negative PSFs.
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where Si is the state of PSF i. For diagnosis tasks NHEP = 0.01 and for action
tasks NHEP = 0.001.
HEP =
NHEP · PSFcomposite
NHEP · (PSFcomposite − 1) + 1
(2.4)
2.4 Current Problems in HRA
Despite advances in all areas of probability, there is still a great deal of uncer-
tainty about how to best estimate HEPs. This is linked to three problems plaguing
HRA: inadequate data collection, inadequate use of data and inadequate modeling.
However, these issues are not completely independent. Inadequate data collection
limits the effectiveness of models, and inadequate modeling impacts how data is
collected. Models are only as good as the data that goes into creating them. With-
out accurate models, though, HRA lacks the framework to influence how data is
collected. The data problem is of primary importance in HRA, yet the field remains
trapped in circular logic [30].
Understanding the relationship between the human and the machine is dif-
ficult with uncertain data and models limited by the data. In order to develop a
new model, it is necessary to examine data collection problems and learn from the
limitations of older models.
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2.4.1 Data Collection Limitations
Despite the fact that human error is a leading contributor to industrial error,
major industrial accidents and near misses are still exceedingly rare. While acci-
dent rarity is beneficial to society, it creates difficulty for risk analysts as there is
insufficient statistical data available. Several factors contribute to the difficulty of
collecting accurate data; data scarcity, availability, uncertainty, and relevance each
introduce different limits. Serious human error events are rare, and comprehen-
sive data is not usually collected on near misses; this leads to the problem of data
scarcity. Additionally, in many industries data is not readily available to analysts
because of security concerns. Limited amounts of data leads to problems with data
relevance. Real world data is not available for every incident of interest, so analysts
must use simulator data or data from other events or industries. The data that is
gathered from these events may be only partially relevant to many research tasks.
Machine performance is relatively easy to observe and measure; determining
the time between failures or the number of failures per month is generally straightfor-
ward and objective. Measuring human behavior is more subjective and qualitative,
and depends heavily on analyst judgment and analysis goals. This results in avail-
able data being found in various forms, which limits the amount of data that can
be inserted into traditional models.
In different industries there are varying amounts of expert estimates, data
from HRA models, and failure/success counts. Each of these forms of data comes
with its own set of limitations. Expert data is subjective and varies between experts
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and across industries. Expert data depends heavily on how it’s collected and the
goal of the data collection [31]. Expert data also depends on the context in which
it’s collected; situational factors and group dynamics may influence the decisions of
experts. Additionally, human performance data gathering techniques are subjective
and may vary among experts and industries. This leads to data specificity and
significant problems with level of abstraction.
In addition to modeling uncertainty, experimental data and observed data are
limited. Experimental data is often incomplete because there are limited opportuni-
ties to gather success/failure counts. These problems are compounded by difficulty
defining and counting the number of opportunities for failure - we typically notice an
action only there has been a failure, which results in uncertain numbers of successes.
Additional problems are introduced by disagreement among experts about the level
of abstraction at which data should be gathered.
Simulator studies are also associated with a variety of issues. Simulators may
not be an effective measure of actual performance for many reasons. There is diffi-
cultly replicating exact event conditions in simulators and tests. There is potential
for skewed results because simulator participants may not treat the activity as se-
riously as a real event. Outside factors that are not controlled for may influence
the results, and simulators tend to lack unpredictable events outside of those antic-
ipated in procedures. Additionally, among simulator researchers there is disagree-




HRA models are subject to the same limitations as the data that goes into
them, plus an additional set of limitations associated with modeling. Theoretical
model that are at least partially based on data are limited by the quality of the
information used to create them. Models are also limited because of the nature of
modeling; models are not exact replicas of the data. Current models are heavily
dependent on expert judgment; data is not frequently used to develop and validate
models. Lack of overlap between human performance models in different industries
results in a more limited pool of data available for creation and validation of HRA
models.
Many models treat human behavior as strictly binary: either a success or
failure. However, human actions cannot accurately be viewed in binary; people
don’t always completely fail or completely succeed [34, 35]. Other models treat hu-
man behavior as random, neglect to include interdependencies between aspects of
human performance, or simply aggregate the effect of many factors without consid-
ering importance, observability, or measurability of the factors. Attempts to include
dependency results in increasingly complex models that are subsequently more dif-
ficult to develop. Additionally, increasingly complex models are being developed as
HRA industry shifts from action errors (reduced in past decades due to improving
ergonomics) to cognitive errors. These modeling techniques lead to additional lim-
itations as better data is needed to fit complex models. This results in difficulty
validating models without additional data.
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2.4.3 PSF Limitations
In addition to data and modeling issues that affect the entire field of HRA,
there are further limitations specific to the use of PSFs. Currently there is not
a “one-size-fits-all” PSF set, nor are most PSFs used in HRA defined specifically
enough to ensure consistent interpretation across methods. Since there is no defini-
tive set of PSFs used in HRA, different sets of PSFs are used in different methods.
There are few rules governing the creation, definition, and usage of PSF sets.
Additional limitations of the PSFs are discussed in depth in Chapter 3 as
justification for the fundamental guidelines introduced in the chapter. The PSF
limitations in Chapter 3 are discussed with respect to the available data, but the
issues are not unique to the data sources. The HERA database [2] contains elements
from a number of HRA methods, and the IDAC model aggregates PSF information
from over a dozen HRA methods. The limitations in the observed data are in part
due to the limitations of the HRA methods used to build the databases. Problems
with PSF interdependencies and PSF usage in HRA methods and models are also
discussed in Chapter 3.
2.5 Model-based Approach
The remainder of this dissertation discusses a model-based approach to ad-
dressing many of the limitations facing HRA. Results presented through the dis-
sertation were developed as part of the process of building a data-informed causal
model of PSF interdependencies.
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The HRA field needs a new model because available data is in several different
forms and current methods do not integrate this data. A Bayesian model would
allow analysts to combine data from several sources. Current methods fail to ad-
dress explicit dependency in human action data quantitatively. Human actions are
complex and are never completely independent. Likewise, human failures are not
random, and should not be treated as such in models. This necessitates the study of
the dependencies between PSFs and what effect this will have on human reliability
models. A causal model can be used identify the multiple causes of an event and to
trace the common factors that multiply influence events.
Despite limitations associated with modeling and the data feeding the models,
there is still a valid case for creating a model. It is difficult to directly measure
cognition and thus it is necessary to use models to represent human mental process-
ing. Models are often used to address these mental processes in relation to different
situational contexts. A model is useful because there is limited and indirect data
which could be used to inform HEP quantification, and there is very little potential
for significant increases in data quantity in the foreseeable future.
30
Chapter 3
Performance Shaping Factor Hierarchy and Principles
The research plan involved selecting a set of PSFs from an existing HRA
method and to use these PSFs in the causal model. However, after working with
HERA data coders to understand the HERA framework, it became apparent that
HRA needed a set of PSFs developed specifically for use in a causal model. Insights
gathered during the event analysis process were used to develop an improved PSF
classification. This chapter begins with an overview of the sources of data used in
this research and a discussion of the limitations of current data. The second part
of the chapter details the data classification process used to develop the final PSF
set. The third part of the chapter presents a set of fundamental principles that PSF
sets should meet to increase reliable interpretation by different experts. The full
PSF hierarchy is explained at the end of this chapter. Definitions of the PSFs in
the hierarchy are provided in Chapter 4.
3.1 Data Sources
There were two sources of data used in this research: the Human Events
Repository Analysis (HERA) database [2] and worksheets from an application of
the Information-Decision-Action (IDA) model [1]. These data sources were selected
because they contained detailed information about the factors that influenced single
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human errors in a risk significant incident at a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). There
are additional databases that gather information about human errors in NPPs (e.g.,
HFIS [36], H2ERA [37]), but they gather information about the factors that influence
all human performance throughout an entire risk-significant scenario rather than
single human errors within the scenario. The information provided by such data
sources is too high level to be used to develop a model of PSFs affecting a single
human error.
3.1.1 Human Event Repository and Analysis (HERA) Database
The Human Events Repository Analysis (HERA) database was developed by
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Idaho National
Laboratory (INL). It is the first database designed to collect detailed information
about the factors that affect human performance in commercial NPPs. The database
contains retrospective analyses of risk significant NPP operating events that contain
at least one human error. The information is gathered from Licensee Event Reports
(LERs), Inspection Reports (IRs) and Augmented Inspection Team reports (AITs).
All data encoded in the HERA database are coded on two forms: Worksheet A
and Worksheet B [38]. Worksheet A contains a detailed time line of sub-events, i.e.,
the successes and failures of hardware, human tasks and organizational elements.
The term event is used to describe one entire risk significant incident at a NPP. The
entire span of a reportable incident is one event (e.g., one LER would be treated as
one event). A sub-event is a single human task, equipment actuation or failure, or
32
external state that occurs during an event. Each event is comprised of dozens to
hundreds of sub-events.
Worksheet B is completed for tasks involving human failure or success1. It
contains information about the context of the task and detailed information about
what influenced human behavior and how human behavior contributed to the sce-
nario. Human sub-events are classified as either a human success sub-event (HS) or
a human failure sub-event(XHE)2. A fully coded HERA event contains one Work-
sheet A and multiple Worksheet B forms; one such event is provided as Appendix
A.
The 11 PSFs used in the HERA database were modeled after the PSFs sug-
gested in the NRC’s Good Practices for HRA [39]. The HERA database expands
the PSFs from [39] by including specific “PSF details,” which provide additional
information about the state of each PSF. There are over 250 PSF details that cor-
respond to positive or negative influences on the human; the entire set of PSFs and
PSF details can be found in the sample Worksheet B in Appendix A. During HERA
coding, the analyst reviews the list of PSF details and selects the details that are
relevant to the sub-event. The analyst uses the PSF details to provide additional
1Worksheet B can be completed for any human sub-event. Analysts make very few inferences
about the events, so human performance information coded in Worksheet B is rooted in the data.
However, this requires that the data sources must contain sufficient detail to allow a detailed
analysis without expert inference.
2The goal of this research is to create a model of influences that affect the likelihood of human error.
For this reason, the analysis is limited to data points that correspond to human error sub-events
(XHE). Analysis of the HS sub-events is a topic for future research.
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information about the state of the PSF. The state of the PSF generally corresponds
to the state of the PSF details: if mostly positive PSF details are checked, the PSF
state is “adequate”; if mostly negative PSF details are checked, the PSF state is
“less than adequate” (LTA). If no PSF details are checked for a PSF, the state of
the PSF is “nominal” or “indeterminate.”
3.1.2 Information-Decision-Action Model Events
The Information-Decision-Action cognitive model [1, 40] is used to analyze
the behavior of NPP operators during abnormal operating conditions. The IDA
model separates PSFs into internal and external PSFs. However, the focus of the
IDA model is on human cognition, so the external PSF list is not comprehensive.
An updated version of the IDA model, IDAC (Information, Decision, and Action in
crew Context, [41]), expands the IDA PSFs to include a more comprehensive set of
external factors and an expanded map of information flow. The IDAC PSFs and
information flow scheme are presented in Figure 3.1.
Four events were analyzed in depth in Mosleh, Smidts, and Shen [42] using the
Information-Decision-Action model. The IDA events were suitable to be included
with the HERA data because they were broken into sub-events at the same level of
abstraction as the HERA events. The 4 IDA events were broken down into 9 human
error sub-events (similar to HERA XHEs). Each sub-event contains several data
sheets that provide classification information and root cause analysis that includes
cognitive factors. The data sheets include information gathered from site visits
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and operator interviews. Contextual information, provided by Mosleh et al. in the
analysis documentation, was used to assign values to external PSFs that were not
included in the IDA model.
3.1.3 Relationship between IDAC and HERA PSFs
HERA and IDAC use different PSF sets, so it is necessary to understand
how the PSFs from each source relate to the PSFs from the other. The mapping
was done based on the definitions for the PSFs provided by each source. In Table
3.1, the IDAC PSFs are mapped onto the HERA PSFs. All 11 HERA PSFs are
included in the left hand column. A subset of the IDAC PSFs is included in the
right hand column. The IDAC PSFs that are not included in the chart were could
not be mapped onto HERA PSFs because HERA does not contain an analogous
concept. Most of the PSFs excluded from this chart are internal PSFs that cannot
be documented in the data sources used in HERA analyses.
Data from both sources was converted into quantitative form using the same
approach. Each negative PSF state was assigned a value of one. A nominal/indeterminate3
PSF was assigned a value of zero. Positive PSFs states were also assigned a zero
value. Of the 158 XHE sub-events analyzed, only one contained a positive PSF
state.
3We have treated nominal and indeterminate PSF sets as equivalent, uninformed states. An inde-
terminate PSF state indicates that the PSF does not deviate from the nominal PSF state.
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Figure 3.1: The IDAC model provides a logical flow of information from the scenario
to the final human performance. The mental state box details the internal cognitive
activities involved in interpreting the external information. Information flows from
the bottom of the model to the top of the model along the defined paths.
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HERA IDAC
Available Time Time Load; Pressure
Stress/Stressors Pressure; Conflict; Frustration; Uncertainty
Experience and Training Knowledge and Experience; Familiarity with situation
Task Complexity Complexity; Task Load
Ergonomics and HMI HSI; Environment
Procedures and Documents Procedure quality, availability; Resources
Fitness for Duty Fatigue; Abilities
Work Processes
Attention; Memory; Safety Culture; Tool Availability;
Bias
Communication Communication quality; availability
Environment Environment; Work environment (physical)
Team Dynamics Team cohesion; Team coordination
Table 3.1: PSFs used in the HERA database (left column) and the IDAC model
(right column)
3.1.4 PSF and Data Source Limitations
This section contains insights gathered during the author’s experience coding
events for HERA. The implications of these insights are presented in data classifi-
cation and fundamental principals at the end of this chapter.
The HERA database provides raw human performance data in a taxonomy
suitable to be used by many HRA methods. It contains detailed information about
factors that influenced performance in single human errors. The information in
the HERA database is intended to be used by multiple HRA methods. While this
is beneficial for the HRA community, it makes analysis difficult because there is
no implied structure. During the data-coding process it became apparent that the
limitations of current HRA methods were reflected in the HERA database. The lack
of structure in HERA, combined with HRA limitations, created several problems,
including unintentional dependency, in the data.
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The PSFs used in the HERA database were modeled after the PSFs suggested
in the NRC’s Good Practices for HRA [39]. In the HERA database, there are a num-
ber of specific PSF details that correspond to each PSF. Further examination of the
PSF details reveals that the details were aggregated from several HRA sources (e.g.,
[24, 43, 36] without reclassifying them into any particular structure. Combining
these various PSFs without adding structure resulted in considerable overlap be-
tween some of the PSF details within and between categories. One example of this
involves supervision. One of the Work Process PSF details is “Inadequate supervi-
sion / command and control.” The same supervisory effect is also detailed in Team
Dynamics as “Supervisor too involved in tasks, inadequate oversight.” For sub-
events where supervisor participation was inadequate, Team Dynamics and Work
Processes will have a perfect correlation. The presence of this detail in both Work
Processes and Teamwork suggests that the two PSFs have a relationship, but having
nearly identical PSF details makes it difficult to quantify this relationship because
it obscures the information provided by related-but-different PSF details.
in the HERA database, all of the PSF details were grouped at the same level
under a PSF. The lack of structure introduced several additional analysis problems
related because PSF details from different methods were designed to capture differ-
ent amounts of detail. This resulted in partial overlap between PSF details within
the same category. This is not problematic on the single PSF level, but this skews
analysis when analysis is done at the level of PSF details. One example of this is
part of the Experience and Training PSF. One PSF detail is “Training LTA,” and a
second detail is “Simulator Training LTA.” Most analysts would consider “Training
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LTA” to be a superset including “Simulator Training LTA,” but the HERA struc-
ture does not make this explicitly clear since both PSF details are listed at the same
level. For a sub-event involving simulator training, some HERA analysts might se-
lect both “Simulator Training LTA” and “Training LTA,” but other analysts might
only select “Simulator Training LTA.” This inconsistency has the potential to skew
analysis of the PSF details.
Another complicating factor is the result of using PSF details from HRA meth-
ods that do not differentiate among the multiple causes that can result in the same
outcome. Many PSF details do not explicitly differentiate between influences caused
by organizational factors, team factors, or person factors. One eExample includes
”necessary tools / materials not provided or used.” From the machine perspective,
it does not matter why the worker used the incorrect tool, but for the identification
of the root causes of a failure, the difference between an organization not providing
the correct tools and a worker not using the correct tools is crucial. Lumping the
provision and use of tools into a single detail limits the ability of the analyst to
identify relationships between PSFs on an individual level versus an organizational
level. Differentiating between personal factors and organizational factors could offer
insight into organizational priorities, personnel training, and safety culture.
Some of the PSF details in HERA that were gathered from HRA methods were
actually behaviors, which created difficult for event analysts (see section 3.3.6). Cer-
tain PSFs are very difficult to observe, yet most PSF sets lack representation for the
visible behaviors that suggest the presence of a PSF. For example complexity cannot
be measured directly but characteristics of complex problems, such as ambiguity,
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can be observed. Some PSF sets blur the line between behaviors and PSFs, or they
include behaviors as a PSF, e.g., Work Processes. A related problem is the lack of
differentiation between PSFs, human failure modes, and human failure mechanisms.
The problem here is that person A’s failure mode becomes a PSF for person B’s
error. It is difficult to differentiate between a failure mode, a failure mechanism,
and a PSF if the sub-event is not defined carefully.
In addition to some factors being unobservable, other factors are not frequently
observed, so they are underrepresented in the data. Two HERA PSFs that are par-
ticularly underrepresented in the data are Environment and Fitness for Duty. The
environment in a control room very rarely changes, so there are limited chances
to observe control room errors in a degraded environment. With maintenance or
balance of plant (BOP), activities the environment may be subject to greater vari-
ability, but it is still scarcely observed, in part due to the fact that the environment
inside the entire NPP is controlled to some degree (e.g., maintenance workers are
generally protected from rain, wind, etc. when working inside of a building). Simi-
larly, HRA experts generally agree that Fitness for Duty is a significant contributor
to system risk, but it is so rare in practice that it’s difficult gather data on; to
include it in the model we need to use expert judgment.
Fitness for Duty (FFD) has additional data collection problems because of the
connotation of the term. FFD is a loaded term in NPPs; unfit for duty implies that
a worker intentionally did something (e.g., came to work intoxicated) to compromise
plant safely. However there are many factors that affect a worker’s cognitive and
physical abilities that are unavoidable consequences of employing human workers
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(e.g., circadian rhythms, emotions, illness, personal issues).
Additional difficulties were encountered because the definition of “human er-
ror” used in HRA is broad. It includes errors committed by single individuals and
by groups; in this dissertation these are respectively referred to as“person-errors”
and “group-errors.” Some of the available data is coded about a single person mak-
ing an error, but some of the data is a committee made the wrong decision. It is
difficult to use such information in the same model.
It is important to note that the HERA database is still under development
and event coding continues. While the 25 events in HERA provide a wealth of
information about human performance, the number of events is not sufficient to
provide conclusive evidence about any relationships between PSFs. Between the
IDA and HERA events, there are 158 detailed analysis for human errors (XHEs)
among the 29 HERA and IDA events.
The data from these worksheets is dependent within the same event, so the-
oretically there are only 29 independent data points. With 29, or even 158, data
points there is not sufficient data to ensure that each PSF is represented proportion-
ally to its impact on human performance. However, given the possible consequences
of human errors in nuclear power plants, it is important to try to learn from any
amount of data. The remainder of this dissertation discusses indications of corre-
lation and not necessarily firm relationships. Given the data limitations it is not
possible to definitively state that certain PSFs correlate, only that they correlate
based on the available data. These correlations must be reinforced with expert in-
formation. As events are added to the HERA database over the coming years it will
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become possible to produce more informed conclusions.
3.2 Data Classification
3.2.1 Approach
None of the PSF sets used by current HRA methods was suitable for use in a
causal model because current PSF sets were designed to be assessed by experts, not
to be quantified in a model. One of the major issues with many sets was overlap
among PSFs. When an expert is assessing the PSFs, the expert can mentally adjust
for overlapping definitions. However, in a model it is necessary to either capture this
mental adjustment explicitly or to remove the overlap. There were also additional
problems with the available PSF sets. Some sets were not comprehensive, i.e., they
contained too little information about some external or internal PSFs. Other sets
included too many factors that could not be measured; many sets lacks any metrics
that should be used to measure the PSFs, and some included specific behaviors as
PSFs (e.g., “Work Conduct”).
The final PSF set for use in causal modeling was developed by aggregating
information from multiple PSF sets and then refining them into a single set that is
comprehensive, orthogonal, and measurable. The aggregated PSF information was
merged with the expansive list of HERA PSF details and then reorganized into a
structured PSF hierarchy.
We selected the IDAC model as the initial framework for reorganizing the data
because IDAC offers a hierarchical structure and logical flow of information. Using
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IDAC allows us to take advantage of the substantial research done to create the
IDAC model. In the IDAC model the PSFs are designed to be defined orthogonally,
but not necessarily independent. The IDAC model offers qualitative links between
PSFs that can be seen as the beginning of a directed model. The PSFs in HERA
lack the logical flow of IDAC, and this logical flow is necessary for the formation of
a directed model.
The IDAC model has limitations, though. It was developed to focus specifi-
cally on operating crews, so it lacks information relevant to maintenance activities,
etc. However, the HERA database provides information about personnel and organi-
zational factors inside and outside of control room operations. The HERA database
provides PSF details that can be used to extend the IDAC framework to situations
beyond operating crews. Many of the PSFs present in IDAC are rooted deep in hu-
man cognition, so they present challenges for data collection. IDAC is also limited
in the external PSFs it collects, particularly the organizational factors.
By combining the IDAC structure with the PSF details and observable metrics
from HERA we can maximize the use of the data. This is illustrated in the aug-
mented IDAC model in Figure 3.2. HERA provides informative data about human
performance plant-wide, but is largely limited to observable PSFs available in docu-
mentation. The expanded IDAC structure can be used to introduce influences that
are not captured in the HERA data. The resultant augmented model adds infor-
mation about external influences and observable metrics from data to the cognitive
flow provided in the IDAC model.
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Figure 3.2: The PSF set was developed by integrating additional external PSFs
identified by HERA, into the IDAC causal model. Suggested behavioral indicators
were added to provide a link between observable metrics and unobservable PSFs
that may manifest in behavior.
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3.2.2 Process to Develop PSF Hierarchy
Reorganizing the data was an iterative process. We began with the PSF struc-
ture provided in HERA, performed analyses, adjusted the structure based on the
results, and re-analyzed the data. We repeated this process with each subsequent
arrangement of PSFs until a suitable structure was found. Shortcomings in the orig-
inal HERA database that were identified during event coding were used to impose
additional structure on the data for quantitative analysis. The current database
does not have observed data about every PSF detail, but by understanding the
relationships among PSF details, more information is “learned” from related PSF
details. The addition of a hierarchical structure allows us to maximize the use of
the data by propagating data through the model.
We approached the mapping with the intention of dividing the PSFs in a way
that linked each PSF with a single aspect of the socio-technical system similarly to
how they are grouped in THERP[22], with the flow of the IDAC model. The top level
of the hierarchy contains six categories: machine-based, person-based, team-based,
organization-based, situation-based, and stressor-based. This division ensures that
each PSF is defined with respect to a specific aspect of the socio-technical system,
which can help identify the root causes of a human error and supports definitional
orthogonality.
The categorical division is particularly critical in differentiating between in-
adequate personnel, team, and organizational influences. The necessity for this
division can be most readily seen in the difference between direct supervision and
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management. Direct supervision represents a direct influence on personnel perfor-
mance because it comes from the immediate supervisor of the worker. Because of
the more frequent and personal interaction with the direct supervisor, it is impor-
tant to differentiate this from management. Management has a more indirect effect
on a person’s performance because the worker is more removed from management.
Management can be seen as intangible, as “the man” passing down orders through
a chain of command. The direct supervisor is at the bottom of this chain of com-
mand and does not necessarily agree with the management’s decisions or emphasize
management directions to the worker. In this division, the HERA PSF Work Pro-
cesses – Supervision is separated into distinct entities in both the team-based and
organization-based categories.
The six categories overlap with several of the IDAC groups. The Machine-
based group corresponds to the IDAC Conditioning Events category. Team-based
corresponds to Team-Related Factors and Organization-based corresponds to Orga-
nizational Factors. The Situation-based group maps onto the IDAC Environmental
Factors and the Stressor-based group replaces the IDAC Strains and Feelings. The
Person-based group encompasses the majority of the remaining IDAC groups.
Development of the hierarchy proceeded in a top-down manner, wherein we
organized the data into progressively more specific groups. The aggregated PSFs and
HERA PSF details were first assigned to the six high-level PSF categories. The PSF
definitions in IDAC were compared to the HERA PSF details, and similar concepts
were aggregated into the second level of PSFs. This procedure was repeated for
each (second-level) PSF to develop a third layer of PSFs. The hierarchy was then
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modified based on information gathered during three international HRA workshops
at the NRC [44].
Table 3.2 contains the full set of PSFs obtained by dividing the list of PSFs
and PSF details among the second and third levels of the hierarchy. This structure
is more orthogonally defined than the original HERA structure and is more con-
crete/observable than the IDAC PSFs. It is reflective of many PSF sets currently
used in HRA and of expert information from literature and the NRC workshops.
3.2.2.1 PSF Hierarchy
As can be seen, person-based factors from IDAC are strongly represented in
the PSF list. However, this list uses HERA to expand on the IDAC factors, es-
pecially in the team and organizational arenas. The IDAC PSFs for Emotional
Arousal have been redistributed among the Stressors. Based on the information
provided in the HERA source documents it is very difficult to differentiate between
the four types of stress in IDAC. Given that most data gathered in the near future
will be retrospective analyses like those in HERA, it is most practical to evaluate
situational factors that induce stress instead of attempting to quantify stress. Even
simulator events in HERA are unable to differentiate between types of stress due to
the unavailability of this kind of information.
HERA provides an excellent medium for eliciting information about team and
organizational factors that affect performance. Since the IDAC model was devel-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































comprehensive set of organizational PSFs. The combination of HERA and IDAC
allows a model that expands on the IDAC PSFs in a focused manner. Alarm-related
IDAC PSFs have not been included in the new set of PSFs because the IDAC model
is crew-specific and HERA is designed to capture information about all plant per-
sonnel. The information captured by alarm-related PSFs in IDAC is captured by
the situation-based and stressor-based PSFs in the hierarchy.
Some PSF details could be mapped directly to the IDAC-style PSFs without
reading comments. The Available Time PSF detail “time pressure to complete
task” was mapped directly to Time-Constraint Load which is defined in IDAC as “a
strain resulting from the feeling of not having sufficient time to solve the problem.”
The remaining Available Time PSF details were mapped onto Task-Related Load
because limited time is objective and is based on task characteristics whereas Time-
Constraint Load is based on the operator’s perception.
Approximately 40% of the PSF details in HERA could potentially be linked to
more than one PSF in the new structure. For these PSF details, we analyzed each
sub-event comment and assigned individual sub-events to the correct PSF detail. A
handful of PSF details were excluded from the mapping because we had no basis for
mapping them onto a PSF. These details were so vague or ambiguous that we were
unable to link them to any PSF, and they have not been used in any of the HERA
events, so there were no event comments that allowed us to better understand the
intent of the PSF. For excluded PSF details, we decided that the degree of overlap
between many of the PSF details was sufficient to ensure that the intent of the PSF
detail was included in the new framework.
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The full PSF hierarchy (Table 3.2) is a comprehensive, structured superset
of PSFs used in HRA in the nuclear industry. The proposed PSF set in Table
3.2 combines PSF information from most current HRA methods through the PSF
details in HERA (gathered from multiple HRA methods), the PSFs identified in
the IDAC model (based on literature and analysis of 13 HRA methods), and PSFs
identified by the set of international experts during the expert workshop [44]. Table
3.2 also includes elements that are visible behaviors or metrics used to indicate
the state of an unobservable PSF; these are indicated in italics in the table. The
use of information itself is not a PSF, but it is a measurable indicator of a PSF,
Morale/Motivation/Attitude. Several other factors are also visible manifestations of
underlying PSFs. The list of visible behaviors and metrics is not fully developed,
rather it incorporates behaviors explicitly identified in current PSF sets and those
identified during the expert workshop [44].
The chart in Appendix B illustrates how PSFs used in current HRA map onto
the new PSF hierarchy. The chart links specific PSFs from the Good Practices for
HRA [39] to individual PSFs in the proposed PSF hierarchy. It also explicitly maps
the superset of PSFs identified by the HRA experts [44] onto the new PSF hierarchy.
The PSFs in the hierarchy are defined in Chapter 4
3.3 Fundamental Principles
During development of the PSF set it became apparent that the “ideal” PSF
set would adhere to several principles. These principles are the result of insights
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gathered during data coding and the PSF classification process. The principles are
presented as guidelines for development of future PSF sets, refinement of current
HRA methods, and for expansion of the proposed PSF hierarchy to more detailed
levels.
3.3.1 Single Unit of Analysis
While most errors in NPPs are at some level a team-based error, most HRA
methods are designed to evaluate errors committed by a single person. In this
respect, team-based errors can be broken down into multiple individual “person-
errors.” For example, one individual may be assigned the task of adjusting the
coolant flow rate, but team members work together to make the decision to adjust
the coolant flow rate, and they are expected to intervene if an error is committed.
Setting the wrong coolant flow rate is then actually two person-errors: the individual
mistakenly sets the wrong coolant flow rate, but each team member also errs by not
promptly correcting the individual’s error.
This treatment of error is consistent with what is done in the available data.
In the HERA database, team errors are broken down into two person-errors, as in
the following example.
Licensee Mechanic (LM) #2 incorrectly re-assembled valve 2MS-0093. LM2
stated that he missed critical steps regarding operation of the spindle lifting
device because he was focusing ahead to the step which would set the nozzle
ring height. ([45], XHE1).
51
LM1 failed to identify the missed procedural steps. As the experienced member
of the team, he should have recognized the spindle lifting device steps had been
missed. ([45], XHE2)
The implication of this unit of analysis is that, for a single sub-event, the team
affects the individual’s performance. Over a longer period of time the individual will
affect the way that the team functions, but when we consider a single moment, the
team more strongly influences the individual than vice versa.
The human may be a member of a team, but we should focus sole on errors
committed by one person, not errors in team decision making. Teams cannot exist
outside of the individual members of the team, so it is not possible to model the
team without modeling the individuals. So while each team will have a unique
team “personality,” it will be more beneficial to HRA to improve models of a single
individual before attempting to model the team.
3.3.2 Direct Influences on the Actor
The team can influence the individual through two channels: the direct su-
pervisor or the teamwork. The group interactions are related to the characteristics
of each team member, but it is not necessary to know the state of each individual’s
person-based PSFs to be able to assess the quality of team interactions. So the way
that the team members influence an individual is through the team, and therefore
we are not interested in the personal factors affecting each team member, only how
these personal factors manifest in team interactions.
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Teams and organizations are both composed of individuals, and each member
of the team and organization has a unique combination of the person-based PSF
states. Thus, the factors affecting performance of a team can be seen as the combi-
nation of all of the team PSFs plus the individual PSFs of each team member. So
the person-based PSFs of each team member have a “trickle up” effect on the team.
These influences may trickle back down to affect individual team members, but the
magnitude of this effect tends to be small. Figure 3.3 shows how an individual’s
performance is affected by the overall state of the machine and the organization.
These states are the aggregated effect of the performance of other workers however,
the personal PSFs affecting these workers have only a limited effect on the individ-
ual’s performance. The PSFs affecting the other workers become salient when they
manifest in a specific failure mechanism, which forms the conditioning event that
contributes to an error by a second person. For example, an operator may make an
error because the procedure contains an incorrect step. The PSFs that contributed
to a procedure writer’s error do not affect the operator, only the error made by the
procedure writer affects the operator.
The direct supervisor has a different influence on the individual than other
team members. The direct supervisor holds a dual role as a team member and a
leader, but we are only concerned with the supervisor’s PSFs that affect the individ-
ual that we are analyzing. As a leader, the direct supervisor provides instructions
and directions to the team members. As a team member, the direct supervisor
works together with the other members to complete tasks, but not necessarily in
a supervisory capacity. Therefore some of the person-based factors of the direct
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Figure 3.3: The PSFs included in an analysis must directly influence the individual’s
behavior. PSFs that influence the behavior of other workers form the system and
organizational contexts for the individual’s behavior. [46]
supervisor may affect the individual team member through leadership and personal
interactions. Characteristics of the supervisor such as fatigue will affect the way the
supervisor interacts with an individual, but we’re only interested in how these inter-
actions affect the person; therefore we’re not interested in the fatigue PSF, only in
the supervisor’s behavior (i.e., the leadership PSF) as it directly affects the behavior
of the individual. Likewise, the personal characteristics of members of management
will not directly affect the performer, but certain behaviors exhibited by the man-
agers may affect the worker. Therefore management behaviors are included as part
of the organizational PSFs, while management attention, etc. are not.
When evaluating the state of PSFs contributing to an error, it is necessary
to focus on the period of time immediately around the error. It is necessary to
consider what inputs the actor receives and if the actor would act differently if
the inputs were changed. In the case of a broken pump, it is highly likely that
the operator would have committed the same error regardless of the cause of the
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broken pump. If we extend the analysis to include the causes of previous errors,
we will collect too much information that is unrelated to the performance of the
actor. The size of the analysis will snowball if each error includes the PSFs that
affected the every previous human error. By including the causes of previous errors
we collect too much information that is unrelated to the performance of the actor.
We need to avoid collecting information that does not directly influence the error
we are evaluating. The PSFs that contribute to an error are generally not included
in subsequent sub-events since they manifest in the context of these subsequent
sub-events.
3.3.3 Consistent Sub-event Parsing
The division of events into sub-events for analysis is critical for understanding
the relationship between the PSFs. Consistent sub-event parsing is necessary to
ensure that the PSF information collected is at the same level of abstraction. It
would not be helpful to compare every PSF that influenced the performance of
workers throughout the duration of a reported accident event with the PSFs that
influenced the behavior of a maintenance worker who selected the wrong type of
screwdriver.
One of the big issues in HRA data collection is related to sub-event parsing, or
the selection and application of task analysis rules. One of the greatest difficulties
in task analysis deciding where to stop. The lack of a systematic procedure for
determining when to stop creates many issues in HRA. There is much disagreement
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among experts about stopping, and this leads to different data sets being broken
down to different levels of abstraction. Current task analysis techniques often use
one of four stopping rules [47]:
1. The causal path can no longer be followed due to missing information;
2. A familiar cause is found to explain the path;
3. A cure is available;
4. Responsibility can be allocated to a person.
Selection of a stopping rule is based on analyst preference, the purpose of the
analysis, and the context. These stopping rules present issues about nature of
error/control and where to place blame.
The events in HERA are parsed into sub-events based on 4 questions:
• Actor - Is there a different person/crew performing the action?
• Goal - Is there a different goal for this action?
• Means - Does this action use different equipment, a different task, or a different
system?
• Outcome - Are there different consequences for the actions?
Thus, tasks such as turning a dial are typically not considered since it is a part of the
goal “set the coolant flow rate.” The sub-event breakdown of an entire event can be
found in the event time line (Worksheet A, Section 4) in Appendix A. The analyses
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described in the remainder of this dissertation rely on events that are parsed into
sub-events using these four rules. Additional data points included in this analysis
must follow the same sub-event parsing rules, but the greater implication for HRA
is that data for any purpose must be parsed in a consistent way.
Additional event parsing guidance for HERA is provided in [48]. Generic
guidance for task analysis in HRA can be found in [47].
3.3.4 Definitional Orthogonality for PSFs
Current PSF sets are not suitable for construction of a causal model due to
overlap between PSFs within the same set. This overlap is due in part to inherent
dependency and interaction between the PSFs, but the overlap also exists because
the PSFs are not uniquely defined. In order to gain better understanding of the
inherent dependencies and interactions among the PSFs it is necessary to ensure
that the PSFs are separately defined entities, i.e., that they are orthogonal4.
Definitional orthogonality should not be confused with independence; the dif-
ference between them is significant. Independence is something that can be observed
in quantitative analysis, whereas definitional orthogonality is a qualitative assess-
ment of the way the PSFs are defined. Definitional orthogonality implies that the
factors do not overlap in their definitions, and therefore each PSF observation can
be clearly and consistently placed into a single category. However, these categories
can still influence each other. Independence implies that the factors do not overlap
4When discussing PSFs the term orthogonal refers to how the PSFs are defined. It should not be
confused with mathematical orthogonality.
57
and also do not interact with each other. Model elements must be orthogonally
defined to remove overlap between the definitions of the elements and thus focus on
how the elements interact instead of overlap.
Overlapping PSFs introduce error into the calculations because some elements
are double-counted. This leads to over-estimation of the influence of certain PSFs
and also skews the relationship between the PSFs. This skewed relationship masks
the way the elements interact together to produce different influences. Thus, to
properly capture the relationships among PSFs, each PSF must be defined orthog-
onally. This also ensures consistent interpretation of PSFs among experts.
3.3.5 Value Neutrality
The Good Practices for HRA NUREG suggests that the PSFs are to be mea-
sured on a scale from weak to strong representing either a positive or negative
influence on the situation. In the HERA structure, the PSFs are sorted into sepa-
rate sections for positive influences and negative influences. However the structure
is not parallel – there are fewer positive PSF details than negative details, which
gives the database a negative slant.
One way to eliminate this inequality is to use PSFs that are value neutral.
The value neutral PSFs will ensure that there is an equal opportunity for PSFs to
be selected as positive or negative. It will also allow future analyses to replace the
binary scale used to evaluate PSFs with additional levels of discretization or even a
continuous distribution of the influence.
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Value neutral PSFs are defined in such a way that the each PSF could be
checked as either positive or negative depending on the situation. The same PSF
may change from a negative influence to a positive influence based on the context of
the scenario, and it is difficult to capture this with a biased set of PSFs. PSF details
such as “Procedures Less than Adequate” can be made value neutral by restating
the detail as “Procedure Adequacy,” which allows the analyst to indicate a positive
or a negative influence.
3.3.6 PSF Metrics and Behavioral Indicators
One of the shortcomings of many HRA methods is the lack of differentiation
between factors that shape performance and behaviors that indicate the state of
these factors. Many HRA methods include a “Work Conduct” or “Work Practices”
PSF, which often contains a behavior that indicates the state of an internal (cogni-
tive) PSF rather than the true state of the PSF.
The HERA framework was designed to capture exclusively PSFs, not behav-
ioral indicators of the PSFs. However, several behaviors are included in the list of
PSF details in HERA, but they are interpreted in a manner consistent with captur-
ing only PSFs and not behaviors. For example, based on current coding guidelines,
the PSF detail “Procedural adherence LTA” would only be marked in an error sub-
event if a previous sub-event contained non-compliance.
To clarify, assuming the following hypothetical operations situation. Sub-event
1: A maintenance worker skips a procedure step and fails to reconnect a temperature
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sensor to the display. Sub-event 2: Operator notice that the temperature is out of
the normal range and (incorrectly) disables a system without looking at back-up
sensors.
“Procedural adherence LTA” would not be indicated for the first sub-event
because improper adherence to the procedure is a behavior exhibited by the mainte-
nance worker. “Procedural adherence LTA” would be indicated for the performance
of the operator, though, because maintenance worker’s behavior caused the broken
sensor, which contributed the operator’s error. For the operator, it does not really
matter why or how the maintenance worker erred, because all the operator registers
is a conditioning event: “I have 2 conflicting sensors.” The reason that the pump is
broken is of no consequence to the operator and also does not provide additional in-
formation for the HRA analyst. However, the behavior “Procedural adherence LTA”
is relevant to understanding the PSFs underlying the performance of the mainte-
nance worker. It could be an indicator of LTA personal morale/motivation/attitude,
which is otherwise unobservable.
PSFs can be completely observable, partially observable, or unobservable. Tool
Availability can be observed by anyone: either there is a screwdriver on the table
or there is not a screwdriver on the table. in contrast, we cannot observe how an
individual views the level of complexity of a situation because we cannot directly
measure their knowledge. However, we can partially observe complexity through
the number of tasks that the person is assigned. The level of complexity can be
assessed from consideration of the observable number of tasks and from the person’s
performance on an IQ test. For retrospective analysis it is nearly impossible to
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assess the Morale/Motivation/Attitude of a worker without citing the behaviors
that are used to indicate these internal states. We cannot observe the importance
a person places on safety, but we can observe how the person complies with safety
rules. Compliance is an observable metric used to assess the attitude toward safety.
The use of information itself is not a PSF, but it is a measurable indicator of
morale, motivation, and attitude. Several other factors are also visible manifesta-
tions of underlying PSFs. There are many PSFs that cannot be directly measured,
but it is possible to measure certain metrics that indicate the state of an unob-
servable PSF. PSF sets should be explicitly associated with behaviors that are not
actually Performance Shaping Factors, but are visible metrics that indicate the state
of the underlying PSF. See [46] for discussion of additional metrics and behaviors
that can be used to assess the state of PSFs.
3.3.7 Summary of Fundamental Properties of PSF Sets
• HRA methods must clearly define their unit of analysis (person versus team).
Given the current state of HRA, analysts should focus on improving factors that
influence the performance of a single persons before attempting to model the team
as a whole.
• Analysis should consider only those PSFs that directly impact the individual’s
performance. PSFs that contribute to the failure modes of other workers do not
affect the individual; the only effect is through the failure.
• Events must be parsed into sub-events consistently based on established rules.
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• PSFs must be defined orthogonally, i.e., they must be separately defined entities.
• PSFs should be value neutral to leave room to expand the way they are measured,
e.g., “ Adequacy of Procedures” vs “Procedures Less Than Adequate.”




Definitions of Proposed Performance Shaping Factors
The PSF hierarchy introduced in section 3.2.2.1 was created to provide a
structured way to combine PSFs as necessary to for different types of analysis. The
PSF set has been developed to be suitable for both quantitative and qualitative
HRA applications. All of the PSFs on the hierarchical list of PSFs presented in
this section may not be possible to include in quantitative analysis. The hierarchy
provides flexibility to use the same set of PSFs for different applications; it can be
used for computer modeling which requires every factor to be explicitly identified,
and also for manual error analysis and HEP calculations as in many HRA methods.
The combination of the IDAC structure, the HERA PSF details, and infor-
mation from expert workshops has resulted in a detailed, structured set of PSFs
for use in HRA. The PSFs reflect the orthogonal structure of PSFs in IDAC which
reduces overlap between the PSFs while still permitting natural dependencies to be
included. The PSFs in the hierarchy are reflective of many PSF sets currently used
in HRA and of expert information from literature and the NRC workshops.
During analysis of the HERA data it became apparent that teamwork and
organizational factors were at the root of many of the human errors. However, not
all human errors were organizationally based. For this reason the Work Processes
PSF has been broken down into organizational and personal components.
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Humans are a part of teams, which are part of organizations. Organizational
culture exists outside of each human, but each human also exists outside the orga-
nization. Safety culture cannot fully account for the behavior of every member of
the organization because each person retains free will and personal work practices.
However, there is an influence of the organizational culture on the human work
practices, and human work practices may also influence organizational culture.
One of the shortcomings of the Good Practices PSFs (see [39], B is the blurring
of the line between individual and organization. The new set of PSFs contains
Work Practice elements that parallel each other in the organizational and human
sections. Both humans and organizations can display poor work behaviors, but
they are not necessarily related. In most cases safety culture will influence both
sets of work processes, but in the end the human and the organization must each
be held responsible for their behaviors. Differentiating between organizational and
personnel work conduct will allow HRA analysts to better address the source of
problems.
Specific behaviors associated with work processes have been explicitly linked
to the set of PSFs. The behaviors themselves are not PSFs, but they are visible
manifestations of an invisible PSF. Standard HRA methods do not differentiate
between the behaviors that demonstrate proper or improper work practices.
Knowledge, Experience, and Training is one PSF in HERA. We have separated
this into two PSFs, one for training and one for experience or other knowledge.
The Training PSF represents the specific knowledge that is expected to be taught
to workers by the utility. The Knowledge and Experience PSF includes the basic
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knowledge one can be expected to possess before being hired at an NPP. It also
includes the skill of the craft knowledge obtained through time in one’s profession.
In post-event analyses it is difficult to differentiate between lack of knowledge and
lack of knowledge due to training. In the HERA analysis the source documents are
interpreted at face value and no assumption is made about training unless training
is specifically mentioned.
The PSF framework proposed is organized with respect to which aspect of
the system is responsible for the PSF, i.e., the root cause or a place in the system
where defenses could be built. Most PRA models are intended to identify and
correct problems before they negatively affect the plant. An inadequate procedure
may be the direct cause of an operator error, but procedures are maintained by the
organization, so the procedural inadequacy is the “fault” of the organization.
The PSFs presented each have 2 different facets: the objective aspects of the
scenario and the perceived aspects of the scenario. The objective view is the out-
sider view of the situation. This is what we capture in HERA now, based on expert
opinion. The perceived view is the workers view of the situation (which is not neces-
sarily correct). Simulator experiments are currently the best way to gather data that
includes worker perception since analysts can interview operators. However, in post-
event analysis it is very difficult to differentiate between the perceived conditions
and the real conditions. The use of simulators could enable analysts to differentiate
between perceived and real conditions, but current HRA models are not equipped
to evaluate them differently. The framework provided here is designed with both
current and future uses in mind. Future data-collection efforts should separate per-
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ceptions from realities to enable future models to capture these relationships; the
models presented in this dissertation will assume that there is no difference between
perception and reality.
4.1 Organization-based Factors
The organization-based PSFs refer to the factors that are defined by or are
under the control of the organization. In the span of a single operational event,
these factors are generally static, but they are likely to change over a longer pe-
riod of time (e.g., several months or years). The organization-based PSFs include
the organization’s attitudes and certain organizational behaviors that influence the
performance of workers. Safety culture and management have a wide impact on all
plant personnel. Management behaviors such as scheduling and staffing shape per-
sonnel performance because they are directly related to the number and type of tasks
assigned to workers, the composition of work teams and the qualifications of per-
sonnel. The organization-based PSFs differ from the machine-based PSFs because
the organization has primary responsibility for these factors. HSI is machine-based
because it is a static system that is designed and constructed once and is unlikely
to change significantly throughout the life of the plant. In contrast, procedures can
be updated relatively easily and frequently by the organization.
The resources PSF includes the procedures and tools provided by the organi-
zation. It also includes other information resources that should be provided to per-
sonnel. This can include maintenance records and databases, log books, etc. While
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the specific part of the organization that is responsible for the various resources may
change, the impact on behavior is that the necessary tools and information are not
provided to the worker. On a broad level, the organizational programs can also be
seen as organizational resources. The programs-based PSFs include the non-physical
resources provided through training programs in addition to other plant programs
not identified in the data sources.
4.1.1 Training Program
Utilities must ensure that personnel have the correct knowledge to perform
their jobs successfully and safely. One part of the utility job is to ensure that per-
sonnel have important aptitude and skills before being hired (i.e., proper staffing),
and the utility must also continuously train employees to ensure that their knowledge
and skills are up to date and relevant.
Training refers to the knowledge and experience imparted to the personnel
by the utility. Training includes the content of training courses, the scheduling
of training courses, and the frequency of training. Personnel must be trained on
how to properly use necessary tools and must be prepared to deal with emergency
situations. Training must contain correct information and must be broad enough
to provide personnel with the knowledge to deal with dynamic problem situations.
Training differs specifically from knowledge in that the same training is provided to
all crews and crew members, but the information retained from training may differ.
This retained information is where training becomes knowledge, and this knowledge
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is different for every crew member.
In some HERA events it is impossible to determine why there was a lack of
knowledge, only that the person did not possess the necessary knowledge for the task.
These cases are not labeled as training issues - they are knowledge issues. However,
in certain cases it is explicitly stated that training led to the knowledge problem, in
which case training issues are indicated. Because of the close relationship between
training and knowledge, they are linked in the model with training contributing to
knowledge, but leaving room for other influencing factors as well. Examples of LTA
Training are:
• The simulator’s high pressure steam dump system model did not match the
actual plant response: HPSD system response in the simulator was ten times
slower than in the plant.([49], XHE12)
• Construction personnel had not received training on fire fighting or emer-
gency procedures (including training on when to initiate a fire alarm). ([50],
XHE23)
4.1.2 Corrective Action Program
The Corrective Action Program (CAP) is the organizational approach to cor-
recting known deficiencies. The CAP covers the organization’s willingness to fix
problems, including the priority it places on problems and the compliance with reg-
ulatory requirements [14]. The CAP PSF encompasses the quality of the CAP, root
cause development, and also how the organization deals with personnel who raise
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concerns. The CAP is related to the organization’s safety culture; organizations
with poor safety culture will not place the same emphasis on correcting problems
as would organizations with positive safety culture. The CAP is also related to the
human-based Compliance behavior; CAP is the organizational equivalent of human
work practices related to detecting and resolving problems.
In many HRA methods, the CAP is part of the broad work processes PSF.
Examples of Less Than Adequate (LTA) Corrective Action Program include:
• While maintenance personnel corrected set points in previous installation, no
action was taken to ensure that the mistake was not repeated. ([51], XHE3)
• Management was aware of continuing problems with CTG 11-1. CTG 11-1
had been overhauled in 1996, underwent major maintenance in 1997; After
1999 CTG 11-1 failed maintenance performance criteria of less than 3 failures
in 20 demands. 14 failures related to CTG 11-1 were observed between De-
cember 2000 and the time of this event. Management was aware of continuing
problems with CTG 11-1 but did not establish interim corrective actions to
ensure that unit started on demand. ([51], XHE1)
• Corrective actions were focused on addressing the symptoms and maintaining




We recognize that the Training and corrective Action Programs are not the
only programs that impact human error probabilities. The Other Programs PSF is
included to acknowledge this and to ensure completeness in the second level of the
hierarchy. Additional programs can be added to the hierarchy here.
4.1.4 Safety Culture
Safety Culture (safety climate [53]) characterizes the organizational attitude,
values, and beliefs toward worker and public safety [12, 19]. According to the IAEA,
safety culture is an assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and
individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance [54].
The safety culture is typically set by management and trickles down through
the ranks to affect performance at all levels. An organization with a positive safety
culture takes effort to maintain safety even when it might adversely impact produc-
tivity or profits. Different organizations and even groups within organizations, have
different priorities with regard to safety and productivity [15]. In a NPP, safety
culture encompasses the quality assurance of equipment, etc. [10].
Safety culture is at the root of many system-wide failures. Less than adequate
safety culture is frequently observed in the data simultaneously with LTA states of
other organizational elements in sub-events. Safety culture cannot be independent
of any aspect of performance and thus its effect propagates through the model.
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Safety culture itself is not inherently observable. However, we can observe
ways in which safety culture is implemented. The safety policies [15], the way
management prioritizes tasks, and the way workers comply with procedures are
more visible elements that can be linked to safety culture. Examples from the data
include:
• Management routinely exceeded the recommended time between preventative
maintenance tasks. ([51], XHE1)
• Management favored production over safety. There was immense pressure on
production, so concerns were analyzed away and postponed. ([52], XHE18)
4.1.5 Management Activities
Management is defined as the personnel at the upper layers of the organiza-
tion. The management is not expected to communicate frequently with the people
responsible for performing daily maintenance and operations duties. Management
can be interpreted as an abstract authority, “the man” that leads a group or orga-
nization without being directly involved in all aspects of day-to-day operations. It
is the management that sets expectations for the plant, oversees hiring, and most
strongly influences safety culture throughout the plant. There can be several layers
of management within a single plant or utility. In this framework the definition of
management is relative to the person performing the action. Management must be
at least one layer removed from the actor and does not frequently interact with the
actor.
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An example of LTA management is:
Management was aware of continuing problems with CTG 11-1 but did not
establish interim corrective actions to ensure that unit started on demand.
([51], XHE1)
In this example, the operational staff is not responsible for ensuring that the equip-
ment works properly. The maintenance staff are not responsible for scheduling
corrective actions – this requires coordination between departments and is handled
at the management level; therefore this is a management failure.
Staffing and Scheduling are two aspects of Management. They are both man-
agement behaviors, but they act as PSFs for individuals throughout the plant.
4.1.5.1 Staffing
Staffing refers to the way that the organization hires and assigns tasks to per-
sonnel [15, 55]. It is an organizational responsibility to ensure that the personnel
they hire have the knowledge necessary to perform their jobs. It’s also an organi-
zational responsibility to assign appropriate numbers personnel to tasks, to ensure
that teams have members with complimentary skills, and to ensure that teams have
had appropriate opportunities to train together [12, 56]. Staffing must balance the
organization’s interest in keeping costs low, preventing errors, and ensuring that
they have a continuous workforce (e.g., training new workers before experienced
workers reach retirement). This requires consideration of the number of experts
versus inexperienced staff that are placed on a task.
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Staffing issues can impact personnel performance in several ways. LTA Staffing
may cause personnel to be assigned too many tasks, certain staff to carry the ma-
jority of the task load, or personnel to work without sufficient rest time between
shifts. Staffing can also include team issues wherein the organization rearranges
crews without giving them ample opportunity to train together before being placed
in operating situations. Staffing also considers inappropriate hiring decisions that
result in personnel without the necessary skills being assigned unfamiliar tasks. Ex-
amples of LTA Staffing include:
• Both [plant] units were faced with a backlog of maintenance tasks which
suggests that they needed additional staff. Task was likely a low priority task
due to overwhelming number of tasks for maintenance staff. ([57], XHE3)
• This particular crew had trained together only on startup activities. The
crew had attended a teamwork building session, but not all as members of this
crew. This staffing arrangement affected crew communications, teamwork,
and stress during this event. Previous training had not established consistent
procedure usage for stopping a cooldown under the event conditions. ([58],
XHE4)
4.1.5.2 Task Scheduling
Task Scheduling refers to how the organization plans and distributes tasks to
personnel. Task scheduling encompasses activity planning and scheduling [10, 12,
15], resource allocation [14], and ordering (prioritization) of planned tasks [11]. Task
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prioritization by the organization should not be confused with the personal Priori-
tization behavior of individual workers. The organizational prioritization problems
occur over a longer time scale and multiple people are involved in the planning and
decision making directly or through a review process. Personal prioritization prob-
lems usually occur over a shorter time period (e.g., during an emergency situation)
and involve a single individual making the decision. Organizational Task Scheduling
is most salient for maintenance work because typically maintenance work can be
planned unlike operational emergency tasks.
Task scheduling can be related to staffing issues, including cases where inade-
quate number of staff is available to complete tasks, so tasks cannot be completed
in expected time. In the HERA database task scheduling can be indicated as fre-
quent task rescheduling, inadequate scheduling of test and surveillance activities,
or assigning too many tasks to an employee or team. In the latter case, there is a
strong relationship between Task Scheduling and Staffing. While Staffing and Task
Scheduling do not have a direct causal relationship, the high correlation between the
two can be explained because the same management influences both PSFs. Schedul-
ing also includes the way the organization prioritizes tasks, such as in HERA event
[59]. Examples include:
• Plant owners delayed repairs to TSC DG system; information suggests that
this was deprioritized due to overwhelming number of repairs necessary at
IP2 and IP3. ([59], XHE2)
• Fermi has a policy that allows preventative maintenance to be performed up
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to 25% later than recommended time. Scheduling of preventative mainte-
nance was inadequate. ([51], XHE1)
4.1.6 Workplace Adequacy
Workplace Adequacy refers to aspects of the plant environment that can be
changed by the organization. This includes aspects of workplace layout [10], en-
vironmental stress [60] and workplace configuration [14]. In the HERA database
this is captured as a Conduct of Work PSF detail “Housekeeping LTA”. Workplace
Adequacy generally refers to the quality of the office environment and thus differs
from HSI, which refers to fixed plant equipment. An organization cannot change
the dimensions of an access panel (HSI) or the weather (work environment), but the
organization can control where procedures are stored and when broken light bulbs
are changed. If workers feel that the necessary tools or procedures are too far away,
or if tools are locked in a cabinet that can only be accessed by a supervisor, workers
are more likely to use workarounds that could result in error.
An example of LTA Workplace Adequacy is:
RO reported difficulty reading procedures due to insufficient lighting. Light
bulbs had not been replaced in available reading lamps. (Hypothetical example)
4.1.7 Problem Solving Resources
The Problem Solving Resources PSF is a factor that consists of the necessary
procedures, tools, and information required to perform a task. Operators and main-
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tenance personnel are typically limited to use the resources at hand to complete
tasks. Problem Solving Resources is a generic category that includes the different
types of resources necessary to successfully perform most tasks in an NPP.
4.1.7.1 Procedures
Personnel actions are often prescribed in a set of Procedures. This leads us
to consider two PSFs relating to the available procedures: Procedure Quality and
Procedure Availability. Procedures are explicit, step-by-step instructions for per-
forming a task. Personnel are instructed to follow procedures without deviation.
Hypothetically there should be no error made if the procedures are followed to the
letter. However, procedures are often imperfect and can lead staff to make errors.
LTA Procedure Quality can be broadly defined as any condition where a procedure
exists but is insufficient to ensure that the job is completed correctly. This could
include procedures that are vague, wordy, or incorrect as well as procedures that
are poorly written, organized, or formatted [11, 15, 61]. LTA Procedure Availability
is the situation where procedures for the task at hand do not exist or are not acces-
sible. This could include unanticipated conditions or conditions where a procedure
is only partially relevant because different conditions exist.
An example of insufficient procedures contributing to error is:
Preventative maintenance procedures for the fuel oil pump did not require per-
sonnel to check the arcing horn clearances. Also did not state clearance dimen-
sions required for arcing horn. ([51], XHE4).
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An example of incorrect procedures contributing to error is:
Adherence to modification process during installation (XHE1) resulted in inap-
propriate set points remaining in CECO [A plant-specific maintenance database].
([51], XHE3)
Both of these elements feed the Procedures PSF because ultimately they have
a similar effect: personnel do not know what to do next, or personnel do not realize
that they should do something. Given the amount of data currently available, we
cannot do quantitative analysis at the quality vs. availability level for procedures
and it is necessary to lump them together as Procedures to maximize data.
4.1.7.2 Tools
Tool Availability and Tool Quality refer to the physical tools provided to work-
ers by the organization. Proper tools (including number and type) must be available
to ensure that personnel do not have to develop work-arounds or postpone tasks due
to LTA tools. For previously scheduled tasks (e.g., preventative maintenance), tools
must be made available when needed; that is, management should not schedule
simultaneous tasks that involve the use of the same limited quantity tools. Tools
must also be in working order, including proper calibration [11, 15, 22, 61].
As digital systems become increasingly common the tool availability cate-
gory can be used to include the availability of software systems (e.g., maintenance
databases). This category does not include lack of information necessary to make
decisions, only the tools necessary to implement actions. HSI is not a tool; tools are
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not a fixed part of the system and are generally more portable than HSI.
Tool availability does not refer to cases when the correct tool is available but
an incorrect tool has been selected, because this is an individual knowledge or work
practice problem. Likewise, poorly designed HSI or lack of necessary information
are not tool problem; these are problem solving resource issues, but they are not
tools. Examples include:
The licensee only had enough tools to drain one TDAFW at a time, which
forced them to decide which unit to work on first. ([62], XHE0.11)
4.1.7.3 Necessary Information
Information Availability and Information Quality refer to necessary informa-
tion about the system or task that is pertinent to the work. Information can include
log books from previous shifts, vendor manuals for parts, HSI output, or communi-
cation with other personnel. The Information Availability and Information Quality
is intended to capture information that is exclusive of the procedures or tools.
This PSF indicates only that there was missing information given to the per-
sonnel. The reasons for the missing information, be it lack of communication or
missing vendor manuals, are captured in other PSFs. For example, this category
does not necessarily capture all malfunctioning parts of HSI, but it does include cases
where malfunctioning HSI makes it impossible to obtain necessary information; in
this case both HSI and Information Availability would be LTA and thus there is a
causal relationship between them in the model. As a PSF, Information Availability
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captures the impact of malfunctioning HSI – if the HSI is malfunctioning, but the
information is not necessary, then the broken HSI has no impact. It is the lack of
information from the HSI that causes problems, and thus HSI is a factor that influ-
ences the availability of information, which in turn influences human performance.
One example of LTA information is:
CECO [maintenance database] information had not been updated to contain
proper low voltage trip set points for CTG. ([51], XHE3)
4.2 Team-based Factors
A team can be described as any group of people expected to work together
to complete a task. In the plant context, team members are expected to interact
directly either in person or in writing. Members of the same operating crew or the
same maintenance shift are certainly a team, but members of different operating
crews can also be considered a team because the offgoing crew is expected to pass
certain information to the oncoming crew. The defining characteristic of the team
is that people work together to achieve a common goal.
4.2.1 Communication
Communication refers to the ability of team members to pass information to
each other. Communication can be verbal or in writing, but it does not refer to
the ability of the human to interact with the machine. Communication allows team
members to have knowledge of a shared situation [63].
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Communication is broken down into Communication Availability and Com-
munication Quality. Complete lack of communication is LTA availability – there
was no information passed. With LTA quality of information, some information is
passed, but it may be partial information or incorrect information. Untimely com-
munication has the same effect as lack of communication – the information is not
communicated when necessary. While LTA quality versus LTA availability of com-
munication may have a slightly different effect on behavior, for the purposes of this
model we treat the two together as “Communication LTA” because in many cases
partial information, like no information, is still insufficient to perform the correct
actions.
Communication is related to the Information Availability PSF. The avail-
ability of information could be directly caused by LTA communication, but other
organizational factors could cause correlation between the two. One such example
is a case where poor safety culture allows portions of the HSI to remain broken
thus denying operators necessary information. In this case communication does not
directly affect the availability of information, but the poor safety culture likely also
affects communication. Likewise, communication does not always cause lack of in-
formation. Poorly communicated information may not impact the scenario if the
information does not alter human performance. Examples include:
• Set points were previously corrected (HS1), but this information never reached
the CECO database. ([51], XHE3)
• The off-going crew failed to communicate the status of the ESW system to the
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oncoming crew; this would have highlighted the importance of the alignment.
([64], XHE13)
4.2.2 Direct Supervision
Direct Supervision serves as the link between management and the team mem-
bers. In literature, direct supervision and management are collectively referred to as
leadership [15, 55, 56]. In the new framework, Direct Supervision has been separated
from Management because direct supervisors work with and assign tasks to person-
nel. The direct supervisor can be seen as a member of the team, albeit a member
with additional authority and responsibility. The supervisor sets a direction for the
team and influences the attitudes of the team members [18]. The supervisor has
the dual responsibility of setting goals for the group and also working with group
members to accomplish these goals [65]. In the HERA database information is col-
lected on inadequate supervision, either in the form of not enough direction or a
supervisor being overly involved in tasks as in the following example:
The SNSS was too involved in trying to restore CW pumps to be able to main-
tain his oversight and advisory roles. ([66], XHE12)
4.2.3 Team Coordination
Team Coordination refers to the overall interactions of the team, including
division of responsibilities and ability to work as a unit (teamwork) [15, 17, 12].
Communication and Direct Supervision are aspects of Team Coordination, but Team
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Coordination also goes farther and considers additional factors that contribute to
overall team performance. This includes planning and scheduling on the team level
and decisions made during team meetings. While poor communication could be
responsible for the poor coordination, there are additional factors that could lead to
poor coordination such as a lack of knowledge in the team or poor team interactions
wherein one member dominates the conversation or other members are unwilling to
speak up. In the HERA database team coordination is captured in context of the
adequacy of team interactions. One example is:
The relief-crew supervising operator failed to recognize that the reactor operator
who reported the decrease in the Train B ESWS bay level was plant qualified
and had the ability to recognize the level drop and appropriately understand
the safety significance. ([64], XHE14)
4.2.4 Team Cohesion
Team Cohesion refers to the way that team members interact with each other
[17]. It has been referred to as group morale [67], interpersonal attraction [55] and
team compatibility [56]. It is closely related to Team Coordination, as teams that are
less cohesive may not coordinate as efficiently as other teams. Members of cohesive
teams are able to work together within their roles to complete tasks effectively. Team
Cohesion includes group morale and group attitude toward the task. Mullen and
Copper [16] distinguish three facets of team cohesiveness: interpersonal attraction
of team members, commitment to the team task, and group pride and team spirit.
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One such interaction where a team was not cohesive can be seen in HERA
event [57], XHE3:
Management did not defer to the expertise of the system engineer. This is
characteristic of teams with an inappropriate balance of power.
4.2.5 Role Awareness
Role Awareness is related to how each team member perceives his/her duties,
responsibilities, and role as a team member. It is related to how the team divides
tasks and how team members interact [55, 68]. Workers in NPPs have defined roles
and it is necessary for every team member to comply with expectations of his/her
role. Role Awareness has two main functions: to ensure that tasks are completed
and to enhance team coordination.
Role Awareness requires workers to be aware of their place in the team and to
act according to the expectations of the role. Shift Supervisors have different duties
than Reactor Operators during an unplanned situation – if one member of the team
deviates from the expected role it can have a negative impact on teamwork and on
the evolution of the situation. Proper role awareness ensures that all necessary tasks
are completed and reduces conflict among team members. A team cannot properly
function without a leader, but a team also cannot function with too many leaders.
One example is:
The onsite and operations managers were above the shift managers, and it seems
that they were too involved in what was going on, assuming responsibility that
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they should not have. It is inferred that the roles and responsibilities of each
person were poorly understood by those involved ([62], XHE0.6).
4.3 Person-based Factors
Person-based PSFs are internal factors that affect each individual. The person-
based factors encompass the worker’s state of mind, temperament, and various in-
trinsic characteristics. People may act as a member of a team and an organization,
but every individual has a unique working style and unique perception of a situa-
tion. Organizational culture cannot fully account for the behavior of every member
of the organization because each person has unique internal factors.
The person-based PSFs include the person’s physical and mental fitness and
suitability for the task. Physical and psychological fitness have been treated as a
single PSF because it is very difficult to separate one’s physical abilities from one’s
psychological state, both in practice and by definition.
Psychological and physical abilities should not be confused with knowledge and
experience. Experience relates to the knowledge possessed by the worker, whereas
the PPA refer to the readiness of the worker to use that knowledge. Cognitive bi-
ases and abilities, including knowledge, are also unique personal factors. Unlike the
organization-based training PSF, which is generally uniform for personnel through-
out a department, knowledge and experience are unique to every person and are
therefore a person-based factor. Information from training is converted into knowl-
edge, but different people will always retain different information from training. The
84
retention of knowledge could also be related to other person-based factors including
attitude and morale.
In the span of an event, most of the person-based factors are static, especially
when compared with the stressor-based factors. Intrinsic characteristics, work style,
knowledge, and abilities are unlikely to change in the short-term of an event. The
person’s perception of the situation will change over the course of an event, but
the person’s intrinsic characteristics that affect how they form perceptions will not
change.
Many of the person-based PSFs are unobservable because they cover internal
states. Because of the difficulty of observing a person’s internal characteristics, it
is necessary to include behavioral indicators in lieu of actual PSFs. The way the
person prioritizes information may affect the state of the situation, but it is not an
influencing factor on that person’s current performance. However, the way the per-
son prioritizes information is an indicator of aspects of the personal work conduct.
In the current model, work conduct is the only PSF with explicitly associated behav-
iors, but future versions of the model may include behaviors for other unobservable
PSFs.
4.3.1 Attention
Attention refers to how the worker distributes the available cognitive resources.
It is comprised of attention to the current task and attention to the surroundings.
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4.3.1.1 Attention to Task
Attention to Task is the ability of the worker to focus on a task. Attention
can be affected by many external distractions and it can also be affected by internal
thoughts and distractions such as emotional state. Attention is influenced by the
number and complexity of tasks, communication with others, and background noise
and activity. Workers must properly balance attention to task and attention to
surroundings to ensure that they are focusing on the task at hand but not becoming
so involved in the task that they do not notice critical changes in the background.
An example of LTA Attention to Task is:
The Unit 2 supervisor was with the RO, focused on addressing the malfunction
of the channel N-31 Source Range indicator malfunction. His attention was not
on the BOP operator’s actions (inferred). ([58], XHE4)
4.3.1.2 Attention to Surroundings
Attention to Surroundings is involves being aware of the state of the environ-
ment, the actions of other workers, and other surroundings. This includes much of
the information that is registered passively while completing tasks. One such ex-
ample is noticing alarms – if an operator is completing a routine task, the operator
passively registers that there are no alarms ringing. However, once an alarm starts
sounding the operator will notice the change in background noise.
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4.3.2 Physical and Psychological Abilities
Physical and Psychological Abilities (PPA) refer to the mental and physical
resources available to the individual while in the workplace. This includes alertness,
sensory limits, and fitness for duty [12] and also to situations where the workers
physical ability falls outside of the normal range anticipated in the HSI design [69].
In the HERA database it is represented as “Fitness for Duty non-compliance,” “Cir-
cadian factors / individual differences,” or “Impairment”. PPA can be altered by
the use of alcohol and illegal or legal drugs, or the absence of necessary prescription
drugs. PPA an also be affected by the emotional state of the worker. A worker
can also be temporarily affected by physical things outside of work, such as fatigued
muscles from exercise or low blood sugar levels. PPA also includes the natural
abilities of the worker as influenced by circadian rhythms.
Psychological and Physical Abilities should not be confused with Knowledge &
Experience or Training. Training, knowledge, and experience relate to the knowledge
possessed by the worker, whereas the PPA refer to the readiness of the worker to
use the knowledge possessed.
Both physical abilities and psychological abilities have been included in this
PSF because it is difficult to separate entirely physical versus entirely psychological
responses. Psychological states can affect one’s physical performance and physi-
cal condition can affect one’s psychological state. The constant interplay between
physical and psychological states allows for the argument that they cannot be dif-
ferentiated and at the core they have the same effect.
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4.3.2.1 Fatigue
Fatigue relates to the physical and mental weariness resulting from too little
sleep or too much work. It’s the basic state of feeling “worn out.” Fatigue relates
directly to the Physical and Psychological Abilities PSF, because fatigued workers
may have reduced physical capability and slower or less effective cognitive responses
[70]. Fatigue can be affected by work hours, work breaks, shift rotation, and night
work [15, 22]. One example is:
Worker had just switched to working the night shift and complained of sleepiness
toward the end of the shift. (Hypothetical Example)
4.3.2.2 Alertness
Alertness is related to the “awakeness” of the worker as it relates to responding
to planned or unplanned demands. It refers to the amount of attention available to
be distributed among the tasks. Reduced alertness can affect the cognitive abilities
of the worker. An example of decreased Alertness is:
Persons working the night shift experience decreases in cognitive abilities and
alertness, even if they are accustomed to the shift. It is inferred that the time
of day contributed to the error. ([64], XHE9)
4.3.3 Morale/Motivation/Attitude
Morale, Motivation, and Attitude (MMA) together refer to style [68], tempera-
ment [71], personality [11, 56], and intrinsic human variability [72]; in the remainder
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of the dissertation this PSF is referred to as MMA or Attitude. These character-
istics manifest as willingness to complete tasks, the amount of effort a person is
willing to put into tasks, and the state of mind of the worker [73, 13]. Just like
each organization has a different values and motivators, people also have unique
underlying influences. Morale, Motivation, and Attitude can be affected by external
factors such as Organizational Culture, Teamwork, and Resources, but each person
will internalize these factors differently leading to varying MMA even among team
members.
“Personal Work Practices” are included in many HRA methods as a PSF, but
they are not actual PSFs, rather they are behaviors that indicate morale, attitude
or intrinsic characteristics of the person that prescribe the way they behave. Since
it is extremely difficult to measure attitude, especially in retrospective analysis, it
is necessary to include specific work practice behaviors as metrics of attitude. The
behaviors identified during review of the HERA data are problem solving style,
information use, prioritization, and compliance.
4.3.3.1 Problem Solving Style
Problem Solving Style refers to the way which people and teams approach a
problem. It includes the way that people communicate with each other as well as
the non-vocalized thought processes. It is related to hastiness behavior ( “quick way
of working” [68]). People may adapt different problem solving styles based on the
composition of the group. Examples of different problem-solving strategies can be
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found in [41].
Woods et al. identify five different problem solving styles in [74]. They include
the vagabond, hamlet, fixation prone (garden path), inspector plodder, and expert
focuser. The vagabond jumps from issue to issue without satisfactory resolution
of any issue. The hamlet looks at each situation from multiple viewpoints and
considers many possible explanations of observed findings. The fixation prone person
persists on a certain issue or activity. The inspector plodder exhibits very thorough
consideration of evidence and possible explanations via explicit chains of reasoning
and then narrows in on possibilities). The expert focuser is adept at seeing and
focusing in on the critical data from the current context so that he/she is always
working on the most relevant part of the situation.
An example of LTA Problem Solving Style is:
This decision reflected the operating crew’s lack of the ’big picture.’ They were
focused on RCS temperature and pressurizer level to the exclusion of other
important issues, such as pressurizer pressure and bulk temperature. ([75],
XHE7)
4.3.3.2 Information Use
Information Use does not necessarily shape performance, but it is an indicator
of a factor that does shape performance. The Work Practices PSF in many HRA
methods is largely unobservable and subjective. For retrospective analysis it is
nearly impossible to assess the “work practices” of a worker without citing the
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behaviors that indicate the person’s work style.
The Information Use behavior relates to how well people use the information
presented to them. Information use can relate to both written information and
information from the HSI. It is important to recognize how the human uses infor-
mation, because if the HSI is providing the correct output in a visible place, but
the human does not look at it, it is not a system failure, it is a failure of personal
work practices. Inadequate Information Use may entail information that is present
but not properly used or failure to access any/all available sources of information.
Information Use is linked to Bias because people may exhibit bias toward or against
certain information sources. Examples include:
• Indications of RCS temperature and pressure were available in the control
room to identify the cause of the pressurizer level drop, but the crew did not
adequately use this information.([59], XHE13)
• Operators did not refer to any procedure during their investigation of the
depressurization, but instead relied on their recall of procedures and plant
behavior. ([76], XHE1)
• Personnel had access to vendor manual specifying set point volt per cell
requirements but did not reference it.([51], XHE2)
4.3.3.3 Prioritization
Prioritization is how an individual chooses to order tasks, including situations
where conflicting goals must be prioritized. Like Information Use, it is a behavior
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and not a PSF, but it is another observable aspect of personal work practices.
Workers are typically assigned a number of tasks at the same time and often the
worker must decide how to prioritize the tasks. In NPPs tasks should be prioritized
by safety significance, but this does not always happen. Some tasks may be de-
prioritized due to time concerns, difficulty of the task, or other internal motivations.
Naturally, Prioritization is subjective and it may be related to Knowledge and
Experience, as experienced personnel may be more familiar with the plant and may
be able to prioritize tasks more accurately. One case of LTA Prioritizationis:
Crew attention was inappropriately diverted from the primary systems to the
balance of the plant. They were more concerned with restoring CW pumps and
avoiding a turbine trip than properly controlling the reactor during the rapid
downpower transient. ([66] XHE12)
4.3.3.4 Compliance
Like the other aspects of personal work processes, Compliance is an observable
indicator of the PSF. Compliance refers to how well people follow directions or
adhere to policies established by the organization or the industry.
Compliance provides insight into the employee’s work practices. It demon-
strates how seriously the person takes the rules. Worker compliance can be influ-
enced by the Organizational Culture; a lax organization will engender lax compliance
among its workers. One example is:
Operators did not follow the steps listed in the procedure and failed to shut
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down the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. Operators executed some steps in
section 1 of the procedure, but not all required steps. Step 1.7 stated, If RWCU
is NOT running and Control Rod Drive (CRD) System is NOT required for
vessel inventory, SHUTDOWN CRD system. The RPV water level was being
adequately maintained by a combination of HPCS, RCIC and feedwater, so the
CRD system should have been shut down in accordance with the procedure. In
contrast to the procedure requirement, the Operators failed to execute Step 1.7
and shut down the CRD system. ([77], XHE4)
4.3.4 Knowledge and Experience
Knowledge is the worker’s understanding of the system design, purposes, ele-
ments, functions, and operations, in relation to the workers responsibilities, position,
and the specific activities or tasks being undertaken [11, 14, 25, 78]. Experience is
the accumulation of information and knowledge gained through training and in-
teractions with the system [68, 79, 80]. It is difficult to separate knowledge from
experience because knowledge is often acquired through experience, but less ex-
perienced personnel are not necessarily less knowledgeable than their experienced
counterparts.
The Knowledge and Experience PSF is related to training, as knowledge is
gained through training, but the training is not fully responsible for knowledge. One
major difference between Knowledge and Experience and Training is that Knowledge
and Experience differs for every member of a crew, but all members undergo the
93
same Training. Information from training is converted into knowledge, but different
people may retain different information from identical training courses. Knowledge
and Experience also relates to Staffing, because proper staffing will ensure a proper
knowledge and experience before training and a proper balance of expertise on work
teams. Examples of Knowledge and Experience include:
• Operators did not understand the cause of the ADVs and TBVs staying
open.([75], XHE6)
• Licensee failed to recognize that the SIAS reset function was safety related
and seismic category-1, and incorrectly concluded that logic system functional
testing was not required. ([75], XHE3)
4.3.5 Skills
The Skills PSF is closely related to job-related knowledge and experience.
Skills refer to the abilities of the worker to do ’work of the craft,’ necessary task-
related abilities that require little cognitive effort. LTA skills can result in time
delay for necessary actions or reduced work quality [15, 12, 60]. One example of
LTA Skills is:
Worker did not have the technical prowess to align indicators to the necessary
level of precision. (Hypothetical example)
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4.3.6 Familiarity with Situation
Familiarity with Situation refers to the similarities the worker perceives be-
tween the situation and the worker’s general industry knowledge and previous expe-
riences [80]. Familiarity with Situation includes the IDAC PSF “Memory of Recent
Diagnoses, Actions, and Results,” which refers specifically to familiarity with the
system at hand [67]. The familiarity PSF overlaps with Knowledge and Experience
and Bias. Workers with more experience likely exhibit familiarity with more situ-
ations and remember more past diagnoses than inexperienced operators. However,
workers with familiarity with many situations may also exhibit bias toward certain
conclusions based on previous experience despite indicators to the contrary.
Lack of familiarity can occur when unanticipated situations arise, including
situations that were not covered in training or situations that were dismissed as
impossible. Familiarity with a situation is more complicated, because people with
more familiarity with a system may diagnose and solve system problems faster.
However, people very familiar with a situation may not consider indicators that
make the situation unique. It may also impact teamwork because familiar personnel
may discount the concerns of less experience team members. One example is:
Operators were unfamiliar with the icing phenomenon and did not know how
to deal with it properly, repeated problems with icing on the ESW system;
inferred high stress. ([64], XHE16)
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4.3.7 Bias
Bias is the tendency of humans to make conclusions based on selected pieces
of information and the exclusion of information that does not agree with the conclu-
sion. Bias may appear as confirmation bias, i.e., looking only for information that
supports one’s hypothesis, belief bias, i.e., selecting information to to reinforce one’s
own personal beliefs, and averaging bias, i.e., regression toward the mean [81, 82].
Bias may be demonstrated by operators attempting to reinforce their own suspi-
cions while ignoring information to the contrary. Bias may result from previous
experiences, specific training, etc. Bias refers specifically to situations where the
worker disregards some available information in an attempt to seek out information
to confirm his/her theory. One such example is:
The relief-crew supervising operator had interpreted that the Train ’B’ ESWS
operability was not challenged because he believed that the ESWS discharge
pressures had not changed. Based on this mindset, he discounted the signif-
icance of the operator’s report of decreased Train B ESWS intake bay level.
([64], XHE14).
4.4 Machine (design)-based factors
Machine-based PSFs refer to the system as designed by the manufacturer. All
of the mechanical and electrical components of the system are part of the machine
system, but the building is also included in the “machine” because it is designed
along with the components of the mechanical system. The machine-based PSFs
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consider the entire system as purchased, which for the most part cannot be modified
without significant cost and effort.
Machine-based PSFs can be distinguished from situation-based PSFs because
machine-based PSFs are the static physical (and software) parts of the system
that are generally unchanging over the course of an event. This also differentiates
machine-based PSFs from organizational PSFs by defining who has control over the
part; the design of the containment building is something that the organizational
cannot influence because it has been previously designed. However, the lighting in
the containment building can be controlled by the organization because the organi-
zation, not the designer, has responsibility for changing light bulbs. However, if the
containment building does not have enough lights by design, it is a machine-based
problem.
4.4.1 Human-System Interface
The Human-System Interface PSF covers how information is communicated
between humans and the machines. The HSI PSF is not limited to the operator
interaction with the control panel. It refers to the way that any worker interacts
with the system, including maintenance workers. It includes ergonomics, usability,
and physical access.
There are two ways that humans interact with machines: providing input and
receiving output. Humans interact by giving input to the machine in ways such as
turning a dial or entering a command on a keyboard. The HSI should be designed
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to maximize the ability of the human to provide input to the machine. The HSI
PSF considers arrangement of equipment / layout of the system [61, 60]. Poorly
designed HSI could include inaccessible displays, difficult-to-turn dials, or tasks that
require contorting the body to be completed.
Humans also interact with machines to get information (machine output).
This includes reading analog and digital output. Humans must be able to get to the
physical location of the output device, and they must also be able to clearly read the
output. Inaccurate labels, display range, or markings could prevent the human from
getting the correct output [11, 61, 60]. If the human is able to access the device and
chooses not to, it is a personal work practices issue, not an HSI problem. Examples
of LTA HSI are:
• No fire alarm lights were readily visible to the plant operators. The fire
alarm panel was not located so as to be easily seen and noticed by the plant
operators. ([83], XHE4)
• The maintenance activity was being performed in tight quarters.
4.4.2 System Responses
The System Responses PSF refers to the system feedback, or specifically the
the difference between the responses given by the system and the responses expected
by the worker. The System Responses PSF is related to the Complexity PSF because
inadequate or unexpected system responses can create ambiguous situations which
are then more difficult to interpret than situations with straightforward system
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responses. Examples of the Perceived System Response PSF in literature include
feedback [22] and expectancy set [60]. An example from data is:
Operators were confused by the contradictory indications of the 241Y bus sta-
tus. It was not immediately clear that the bus undervoltage protection circuitry
had suffered a fuse failure. Operators also had to deal with the reactor trip,
the fluctuating RPV water level, entering abnormal procedures, and equipment
that would not perform as expected (RHR). ([77], XHE3)
4.5 Situation-based Factors
Situation-based PSFs are characteristics of the scenario that are likely to af-
fect human performance. These characteristics are external to the human and the
system, and they tend to be dynamic. Situation-based factors differ from machine-
based components because the system factors can change during the scenario. These
changes can be due to natural causes, e.g., weather, or can be due to actions executed
earlier in the scenario. A non-working piece of hardware is not a situation-based
factor unless it is a failure that occurred during and is repaired by the end of the
scenario. Situational factors include the way the scenario is evolving due situational
complexity, the number of simultaneous tasks, the status of the machine and the
work environment.
Many of the situation-based PSFs are closely related to the stressor PSFs.
Human perception is the dividing line between situational and stressor PSFs. While
task complexity is subjective depending on the worker, it is still possible to estimate
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the relative complexity of a situation from the perspective of the “average” worker;
there are scenarios which can be clearly labeled more complex. An SGTR event
may seem simple to very experienced personnel and complex to less experienced
workers, but an SGTR event coupled with broken SG level indicators will always be
more complex than an SGTR event with properly functioning indicators. It is this
objective complexity that is captured by situation-based PSFs.
4.5.1 External Environment
External environment is the characteristics of the scenario external to the per-
son that cannot be controlled or modified by any person/group. Environmental
factors can include excessive high or low temperature or humidity, noise, poor light-
ing or other external weather factors [84]. Work environment refers not only to the
external conditions as they affect the human’s performance, but also to the ways
in which environment may affect the accessibility of certain parts of the system.
In control room activities the environment is usually controlled, but during severe
situations they can be affected by fire or radiation [22]. In maintenance scenarios
the environment typically has more impact because maintenance can be subjected
to different weather conditions outside or in sections of the plant. An example is:
Work took place in containment, a radiation environment. Concerns for dose
likely contributed to the decision to take no action for the leaking flange. ([52],
XHE20)
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4.5.2 Hardware & Software Conditions
Hardware & Software Conditions (Conditioning Events) are the external events
or latent machine failures that contribute to scenario evolution [15, 61]. These con-
ditions may result in abnormal, ambiguous or conflicting system output [25]. Condi-
tioning Events increase cognitive effort due to conflicts between the observed system
or conflicting system output [85].
Less-than-adequate hardware or software conditions may be the result of ma-
chine aging, inadequate maintenance etc. [14]. The HERA database captures condi-
tioning events Complexity section in several PSF details, including “loss of function-
ality of multiple systems,” “presence of multiple faults” or “unavailability of multiple
systems due to maintenance.” Conditioning events differ from the expected system
responses PSF because conditioning events refer to the mismatch between system
output and “normal” system operation, whereas expected system responses refer to
an inaccurate mental model developed by the worker. One example is:
22 steam generator feedwater pump (SGFP) tripped unexpectedly; ADVs and
TBVs malfunctioned and did not respond as designed, remaining full open,
causing an uncontrolled RCS cooldown. ([75], XHE6)
4.5.3 Task Load
Task Load refers to the actual task demand assigned to a person in terms of
the number and type of tasks (varying complexity, importance, fault tolerance, etc).
These tasks can be simultaneous or in sequence. The duration of tasks must also be
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considered, because having many long tasks may result in even greater stress than
having many short tasks. Task load is a component of the perceived workload [15].
It typically applies in cases where there are too many tasks assigned to one person,
but there may be cases where having too few tasks can lead to errors due to worker
complacency. Task Load is related to the Task Scheduling PSF because effective
task scheduling will ensure that workers are not overloaded with scheduled tasks.
Task Load can also be impacted by unplanned or emergency events. The number of
tasks is relevant to errors because high task load could result in workers rushing to
complete tasks without quality checks. It can also influence the stress level of the
worker. For example:
Between the time that the reactor operator announced that the ESW system
alignment needed to be reviewed and shift turnover, operators had to deal
with multiple equipment problems: the auxiliary boiler tripped, five control
rods failed to fully insert, requiring emergency boration, and the turbine driven
auxiliary feedwater pump was declared inoperable due to failed packing in the
inboard shaft packing gland. It is inferred that the state of the ESWS alignment
had slipped from the crews’ minds. ([64], XHE12)
4.5.4 Time Load
Time Load is similar to Task Load, but it adds the element of perception of
time to the number of tasks; this time perception can affect worker stress beyond
the stress of having too many tasks [86]. In Time Load situations, the worker is
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expected to complete a specific task or a number of tasks in a certain time. If time
load is LTA, the worker perceives the time limit to be too short and this perception
can affect the stress level of the worker. Like Task Load, Time Load may also have
infrequent cases where too much time could contribute to error. Errors can occur
during LTA Time Load situations because workers may rush through tasks, skip
quality checks, limit communication and teamwork, or fail to complete tasks. Time
Load is difficult to assess in retrospective analyses. Time load should be interpreted
from the perspective of the ”average” worker or a worker at least one professional
level above an entry-level position. Some examples are:
• The RO was projecting a sense of urgency regarding the RCS cooldown, and
the BOP operator felt pressured by this. ([58], XHE5)
• The SS instructed the operator to perform the alignment without procedural
guidance for expediency; there was pressure to perform the alignment quickly.
([64], XHE7)
4.5.5 Other Loads
Other Loads refers to the tasks beyond those necessary for the work at hand.
Tasks directly relevant to the work are Task Load factors, but other tasks, including
things like communication are considered other loads. Other Loads can be considered
any routine tasks that are not necessarily covered in training. For retrospective
analyses it is difficult to differentiate between Task Loads and Other Loads, so these
are likely to be merged into a single PSF for many analyses. For some simulator
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applications or in depth qualitative analyses the other loads can be addressed as
either Non-task Load or Passive Information Load.
4.5.5.1 Non-task Load
These Non-tasks Loads can be differentiated from Task Loads by treating tasks
as things that are designed and trained for, and non-tasks are things that are neces-
sary to complete one’s work but are generally outside the scope of training. While
communication may be a work-relevant task, it may be non-essential in the main-
tenance of simple parts. These work-relevant non-task loads include interfering
activities [60].
4.5.5.2 Passive Information Load
The Passive Information Load includes the information and cues presented
by the external world [22]. A high passive-information load can lead to stimulus
overload [87]. These stimuli including indicators, alarms, environment and other
parts of the background.
4.5.6 Task Complexity
Task Complexity refers to the cognitive and physical demands of the task at
hand. Task Complexity considers the difficulty of diagnosing and executing work, the
amount of knowledge required to complete the task, the number of steps required
to complete the task, the precision required, and the ambiguity of the situation.
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Complexity also includes the mental and physical effort required to execute the
selected problem solving strategy for the task (see [41] for nine general problem
solving strategies).
Complexity from the perspective of the actor is difficult to judge during a post-
event analysis. While actor experience will impact the perception of complexity, the
analysis in HERA are based on expert judgment. Without dependence on experts
complexity can be judged from the perspective of an actor with a minimum number
of years post-training experience in the job role, or based on the qualifications
necessary to advance past an entry-level position. The step complexity measure
[88] can also be used to calculate the complexity of performing a procedure step.
An example of complexity captured in HERA is:
Operators received ambiguous feedback due to rapid changes in availability of
offsite power. ([89], HS2)
4.6 Stressor-based Factors
Stressor PSFs are the demands of the situation as perceived by the person.
The external loads manifest in the person as tension or arousal [22] that may disrupt
or facilitate performance. The IDAC model [67] includes four types of stress: pres-
sure, conflict, frustration, and uncertainty. Urgent matters that require immediate
attention result in a feeling or pressure. Multiple incompatible goals result in conflict
stress, while the perception of a blocked goal leads to frustration. Inability to fully
understand and plan an appropriate response to situation results in uncertainty.
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The different types of stress differently influence worker performance. Large
demands could result in a worker feeling pressure and increasing the internal re-
sources (e.g., attention) used to meet the demand. Individuals may respond to
conflict stress by changing certain goals or obtaining additional external resources.
They may respond to frustration caused by blocked goals by altering the goals or
the methods used to achieve the goals. They may respond to uncertainty by atten-
tion to gather additional information or other resources to better understand and
respond to the situation.
It is important to emphasize the role of perception in this category the loads
are objective characteristics of the situation, but the perception of the loads is what
makes them a stressor. Individual perception serves as the filter that turns situa-
tional characteristics into an internalized load. The subjective loads can increase
based on the perception of the objective difficulty of diagnosing and executing work,
the amount of knowledge required, the number of steps required, and the ambiguity
of the situation. The number of alarms flashing is objective, but the perception of
the alarms is what creates stress. The perception of the alarms can vary between
personnel and can also vary within the same person depending on the state of other
PSFs. Each person performs an individual situational assessment and forms indi-
vidual perceptions of situational severity and urgency. The inclusion of perception
as a major aspect of the stressor PSFs limits the definitional orthogonality of the
this PSF group. Personal characteristics covered in the person-based PSFs will
always have some amount of influence over how a person perceived situational de-
mands. Likewise, the perception of the situation cannot be completely independent
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of objective situation-based factors.
4.6.1 Perceived Situation Severity
The Perceived Severity of the Situation is a personal assessment of the magni-
tude of the impact of the situation and its potential consequences. Possible outcomes
could adversely affect the worker(s), the plant, or the general public. Perception of
severity could be influenced by attitude, but attitude may also be affected by the
personal assessment of severity.
In NPPs, scenarios are generally interpreted to have a potential negative im-
pact. This means that severity can only be assessed in relation to increasing or
decreasing the potential for negative impact. Severity is measured on a spectrum
from marginal to extremely severe cases. The Perceived Severity PSF does not
necessarily have a positive aspect where there are potential extremely desirable out-
comes. The most desirable outcome is that there is no negative impact. There
are very few ways to have a significant positive impact the personnel, public, or
the plant; there are really only non-negative outcomes. A “positive” impact on the
general public would be to have no impact at all, i.e., to avoid any negative impact.
A worker is not going to take an action that dramatically improves the plant or
helps the public – a worker is going to prevent negative impact; positive outcomes
in NPPs are the absence of any negative outcome. One example of a severe situation
is:
Plant trip recovery and dealing with heavy smoke and possible fire. ([83],
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XHE6)
4.6.2 Perceived Situation Urgency
Much like the severity of the situation, the Perceived Situation Urgency is a
personal assessment of the situation. It is an assessment of how quickly an undesired
outcome is approaching and affects the perceived Time Load. Perceived urgency
indicates how close the worker believes the system is to the state of failure. A
similar concept in literature is the rate at which the situation moves towards the
moment at which negative consequences materialize [69]. One example of Perceived
Situation Urgency is:
The RO was projecting a feeling of urgency, which put pressure on the other
crew members.([58], XHE4)
4.6.3 Perceived Decision Responsibility
Perceived Decision Responsibility is the perceived responsibility and account-
ability that a worker has to make decisions or actions. Individuals must consider
the impact that the decision will have on the plant, the public, and also themselves
when implementing a decision. Individuals may have to weigh several impacts and
make the optimal decision, including where the blame will be placed if failure oc-
curs. An individual may take a different course of act depending on his or her sense
of responsibility. Individuals may exhibit more or less risky behaviors if they have
to account for the actions later [69]. A decision that is made based on a procedure
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would have a different perceived decision responsibility than a decision based on the
operators own knowledge.
One example of this can be seen in the IDAC analysis of a HI-HI Intermediate
Range Monitor Scram at Monticello [42]. The Shift Manager had to make the
decision between shutting down by switch mode or inserting control rods notch
by notch. Shutting the plant down notch by notch is the plant policy (to reduce
wear and tear on the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms). The Shift Manager had
an informal conference with the Plant Manager and the Site Superintendent before
making the decision.
Shift Manager responsibility load was high:
1. He wanted the decision of shutting down the reactor to be taken collectively.
2. Selection between available shut down options was based on plant policy,
not plant needs. ([42], Monticello 2-5)
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Chapter 5
Methodology for Development of a Causal Model of Performance
Shaping Factors
Causal models are present in many aspects of Probabilistic Risk Analysis
(PRA), but models play an especially important role in Human Reliability Analy-
sis because of the invisible nature of human cognition. This chapter introduces a
methodology to develop a data-informed causal model of the relationships among
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). The final product of this methodology will
be a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) which visibly displays the relationships among
the PSFs and which links these PSFs to error.
A causal model is a diagram consisting of nodes (i.e., the variables or PSFs)
and directed arcs (i.e., causal influence between nodes); a BBN is a specific type of
causal model. Bayesian analysis offers a framework to analyze and combine multiple
types of data and has previously been used in PRA applications with limited data
[90]. The BBN offers the flexibility to update the analysis by adding different pieces
of information to the model as they become available. This is especially beneficial for
HRA, since HRA data comes from many different sources. Bayesian analysis has a
long history of use in various industries; these industries fall across the risk spectrum,
including ecology [91, 92], food safety [93], national security [94], criminology [95],
etc.
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The methodology proposed in this chapter can be used to develop a data-
informed causal model. Due to the subjective nature of HRA, there are no bench-
marks that can be used to validate a model. HRA analysts generally rely on expert
opinion to develop models. The data-informed approach to modeling uses expert
opinion, and it uses data to add another level of validity beyond expert models. The
methodology presented is not limited to use with the HERA database. It can be
applied to any data set that contains assessments of the state of PSFs.
5.1 Bayesian Belief Network Overview
5.1.1 BBN Structure
In a BBN, each variable is represented as a single node. Relationships are
indicated with directed arcs. The nodes must be defined in such a way that each
node is a distinctly defined entity, even if it is causally influenced by other elements.
For example, Procedure Adequacy can be broken down into Procedure Availability
and Procedure Quality. In a BBN we can define three separate nodes and we can
logically connect them to indicate that Procedure Adequacy is influenced by both
availability and quality of procedures.
The first step in development of the causal model is to identify the variables to
be included as nodes in the model. This is not a trivial task since the variables in the
model must be distinctly defined. The second step is to identify the relationships
(arcs) between the variables. The arcs are used to represent a causal relationship
between two variables, with the arrowhead indicating the direction of the influence.
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Figure 5.1: Sample BBN diagram for five nodes
In Figure 5.1 there are five nodes. Node a is a root node; it has no arcs pointing
into it. Node e is an end node; it has no arcs pointing out of it. Nodes b, c, d each
have one parent node and node e has two parent nodes. Nodes a, c, d each have one
child node and node b has two children.
5.1.2 BBN Quantification
Once all relationships among BBN nodes are indicated by arcs, each node
is assigned a marginal or conditional probability table. These probability tables
contain all known information concerning the state of the system based on both
expert opinion and available data. In a BBN each node is assigned a probability
distribution based on the possible states of its parent nodes. Once each probability
distribution is set, the initial model is complete. As new information becomes
available (e.g., evidence about the state of one node), the probabilities of all nodes
in the model can be automatically updated based on the evidence.
Each node in a discrete BBN has a finite number of possible states. Many
BBNs use binary nodes, where 0 and 1 represent the positive and negative states
of the node. The sum of the marginal probabilities of all states within the same
node must equal 1.0. Each possible state of a root node is quantified with the
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marginal probabilities of the states. In Figure 5.1, node a would be the only node
quantified with marginal probabilities. Assuming that a has two possible states, the
probabilities would be Pr(a) = p and Pr(a) = 1− p.
Nodes with one or more parents are quantified with conditional probability
tables. The size of the conditional probability table depends on the number of
parents. The conditional probability table will contain values for every possible
combination of states of the node and its parents. For a binary node with n parents,
the conditional probability table will contain (2(n+1)/2) columns. Each column in





Table 5.1: Conditional probability table for node b with single parent a
The conditional probability table for node b is displayed in Table 5.1. The
conditional probability tables for c, d will be the same size as Table 5.1. The table
for node e will have 8 columns. The reader is referred to the references for additional
information about conditional probability in Bayesian networks [96, 97, 98].
Conditional probabilities can be populated by using expert opinion, data, or a
combination of both. The method used to develop our model is presented in section
5.4. Additional methods can be found in a special issue of Reliability Engineering
and System Safety dedicated to quantifying BBNs [99].
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Figure 5.2: The basic elements of a causal model including directed arcs between
PSF, metric, and error context nodes.
5.1.3 Analyst Use
The fully quantified BBN represents the prior knowledge for an analyst. To use
the model, the analyst will make observations (set evidence) about certain nodes and
examine the impact on specific nodes of interest. By setting evidence, an analyst is
proving new information to inform the model. This produces updated probabilities
for all nodes in the model.
Analyst evidence is often the observation of a particular state of a node. The
analyst sets the evidence in the BBN and the network updates probability of each
node based on both prior observations and new evidence. For nodes where there is
no evidence, the network relies on the prior probability. Once the BBN is complete,
it can be incorporated into a PRA by linking BBN nodes to other risk models.
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5.2 Model Development Procedure
Development of the causal model of PSF interactions is a multi-step process.
This section presents the procedure for creating a PSF model with limited discussion
of the quantitative techniques used in the procedure. Additional details about the
quantitative techniques are presented in Section 5.3. The procedure presented in
this section can be applied to create different causal models with varying degrees of
specificity depending on the PSFs selected. Applying the entire methodology will
result in a causal model like the one displayed in Figure 5.2.
5.2.1 PSF Set
The PSFs that can be included in the model depend on the quality and quan-
tity of available data and expert information. The PSF hierarchy presented in
Chapter 3 is designed to accommodate various amounts of information. The hi-
erarchy can be collapsed to create base models and then expanded as additional
information becomes available. Early PSF models will use a smaller set of PSFs,
while models created with more information can include a greater number of PSFs.
Selecting the PSF set is the most resource intensive step in the methodology,
but it is also the most important. Careful selection of the PSF set is necessary to
produce a valid model. The PSF set must meet the fundamental criteria presented
in Chapter 3. The analyst should screen the initial PSF set to verify that these
criteria are met.
The choice of which PSFs to include in the model can be done based on expert
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judgment or it can be done through a systematic, iterative process wherein quanti-
tative analysis is performed and the PSF set is refined, based on the quantitative
results, until a suitable set is selected.
PSF selection begins with correlation analysis on the full PSF set 1. Ways to
refine the PSF set include merging similar PSFs (e.g., Procedures and Tools become
Resources, dividing a PSF into more categories (e.g., Procedures becomes Procedure
Availability and Procedure Quality) or eliminating the PSF entirely. With the PSF
set presented in Chapter 3, it is suggested to start the analysis at the bottom level
of the hierarchy and then to collapse the hierarchy one PSF at a time.
The analyst should examine the correlation results to identify correlations that
are erroneous (e.g., correlations exceeding |0.95| tend to be erroneous in the HERA
data)2. Depending on the correlation technique used, the correlation set can be
further refined based on significance values or sensitivity analysis. See Section 5.3
for discussion of correlation techniques that can be applied to data from the HERA
database.
Once outliers are identified and removed, factor analysis (FA) is used to further
refine the PSF set. It is left to the analysts to determine which FA model and
1PSFs that are present in fewer than 10% of the sub-events are likely to produce erroneous factor
analysis results [100] and could require expert judgment to be placed in the model. Similarly, PSFs
that are present in more than 90% of the sub-events may require expert judgment or additional
parsing before they can be placed in the model. It may be beneficial to eliminate these PSFs before
running the quantitative analysis to reduce the computational burden.
2What is seen as erroneous will vary based on the data set and the analyst. The intention of this
step is to allow analysts to remove known outliers without devoting computational resources.
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technique is most suitable for their data. Choice of software package is also left to
the analyst. However, software must be able to allow analysis to continue even if
Heywood cases occur, i.e., correlations exceed |1.0| [101]. While Heywood cases are
undesirable, they are useful for our analysis because they point to specific limitations
in a data set or model. Heywood cases can be eliminated by adding data, by trying
a different factor model, or by eliminating outliers.
The analyst should examine the FA results and identify the PSFs producing
Heywood cases. The PSF with the largest spurious correlation should be revised
by merging it with another PSF, dividing it into more PSFs, or eliminating it from
the quantitative part of the analysis. After removing the largest Heywood case, the
factor analysis is repeated. This process is repeated, removing one Heywood case at
a time and then running a new FA, until factor results are free of Heywood cases.
Once all Heywood cases are removed, the analyst may wish to perform significance
tests to determine if the factor model is suitable for the final PSF set. If the most
significant factor model differs from the factor model used to refine the data set (i.e.,
if there is a different numbers of factors), it is advisable to repeat the entire process
with the new factor model; this ensures that the final PSF set is based on the most
significant factor model.
5.2.2 Directed Arcs
Once the set of PSFs has been finalized, the initial structure of the model is
developed by using correlation analysis. Each PSF becomes a node in the model
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and arcs are drawn between variables with correlations > |m|. For analysis of the
current data, m = 0.3; this correlation cut-off value may be adjusted for different
data sets.
The direction of the arc is based on expert information. This information may
come from literature, current models, or direct expert elicitation. For models that
contain both data-driven and expert informed nodes, it is advisable to differentiate
between the arcs rooted in the data and the arcs rooted in expert judgment. Solid
arcs should be drawn between nodes with correlations exceed |m| or where direct
logical relationships exist. Dotted arcs should be drawn where expert opinion is used
to identify relationships. If no clear logical relationship between two PSFs exists,
but the correlation exceeds |m|, the nodes may have a common parent node, or they
may be part of the same Error Context.
5.2.3 Error Contexts
One difficulty associated with the use of correlation results is that without
further analysis, we cannot differentiate between orthogonally defined categories
and truly independent categories. Correlation results suggest only that two specific
PSF groups have been observed together in the human error events analyzed in
HERA. Correlations do not offer insight into why relationships exist among PSF
groups. High correlation may indicate that the nodes are not orthogonally defined,
that two nodes have a causal relationship, or that the nodes have a common parent
or child node (see 5.3.2.3). High correlation may also indicate that the PSFs have
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a synergistic effect on error, i.e., they form part of an Error Context.
Error Contexts (ECs) are patterns of variance identified by factor analysis;
each factor (eigenvector) retained forms one EC. Patterns of variance identified
through FA are traditionally labeled “latent variables.” However, in this disserta-
tion, these patterns are interpreted in a novel way. Since we are analyzing only
human failure events (XHEs) from HERA and IDA, the observed patterns can be
viewed as visible manifestations of the context underlying the error. This interpre-
tation is justified for factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. An eigenvalue greater
than 1.0 indicates that its eigenvector accounts for more than its proportional share
of variance [102]. Each factor3 is a group of PSFs that contributes more to human
performance errors than would each PSF if acting alone; the whole (factor) is greater
than the sum of its parts (PSFs).
PSFs with high correlation and no apparent causal relationship may be part
of the same EC. Each EC is added to the model as a node. It is advisable to use
different colors or shapes to differentiate between EC nodes and PSF nodes to reduce
the likelihood of model misinterpretation. Arcs are drawn from each PSF to each
EC with a factor loading > |n|. For our analysis n = 0.3; again this correlation
cut-off value may be adjusted for different data sets. ECs can subsume some of the
correlation-based arcs. The analyst should examine the arcs between PSFs that are
also linked to the same EC. Arcs between PSFs may be removed if they are part of
the same Error Context and the analyst determines that they have a weak causal
3The number of factors retained varies, but one common rule is to retain only factors with eigen-




Model quantification entails populating a full probability table for each node.
The methods used to convert correlation into conditional probability are discussed
in Section 5.4.
5.3 Quantitative Analysis Techniques
5.3.1 Tetrachoric Correlation
To create the base structure of a model it is necessary to determine how the
nodes of the model relate to each other. The relationships between the nodes in
the model are determined based on the correlation of the PSFs. Correlation gives a
quantitative measure of similarity between two variables – the amount of variance
from the common area between them – thus garnering an initial understanding of the
variable relationships. The degree of correlation is indicated by a number between
-1 and 1. A correlation of 0 indicates complete independence between the variables,
and a correlation of 1 indicates a perfect increasing linear relationship.
Several different correlation techniques can be used to develop a pair-wise
correlation matrix. For normally distributed data, Pearson product moment cor-
relations can be obtained using most commercial software packages. If data is not
normally distributed, product-moment correlation values are not valid. Discrete
data is not normally distributed, but the underlying process creating the data may
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be. For discrete data representing a latent continuous variable, polychoric correla-
tion should be used [103, 104]. The fundamental assumption underlying polychoric
correlation is that discrete data is representative of an underlying normally dis-
tributed model and that somewhere in the model there are thresholds where the
variable changes states.
When using binary data such as the data from IDA and the HERA database,
tetrachoric correlation, a specific case of polychoric correlation, should be used.
Tetrachoric correlation cannot be used for binary data sets that violate the assump-
tion of an underlying continuous distribution, as shown in Figure 5.3. One example
is gender; gender is not normally distributed, a person is either male or female, and
therefore tetrachoric correlation cannot be used on such data. However, most hu-
man behavior is not truly discrete and therefore so tetrachoric correlation is suitable
for human behavior modeling.
In tetrachoric correlation the location of the threshold is estimated by applying
a probit function to the data. The probit function is the inverse cumulative distri-
bution function (cdf) of the standard normal distribution; it calculates the location
of the threshold based on the amount of the curve to the left of the data [105]. It has
been suggested that the continuity assumption underlying tetrachoric correlation is
important, but the form of the underlying distribution is not necessarily restricted
to a normal distribution due to the similarity between tetrachoric correlation and
Item Response Theory [106, 107, 108]. The reader is referred to [100] for straight-
forward discussion of tetrachoric correlation and the requirements with regards to
normality.
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Figure 5.3: Two types of dichotomous measured variables. On the left is a graph of
a truly discrete system. On the right there is a continuous variable which has been
discretized based on the selected thresholde. Tetrachoric correlation can be used to
analyze the data that produce the graph on the right, but is not suitable to analyze
the data that form the graph on the left.
Determining tetrachoric correlation is a computationally intensive task. Poly-
choric and tetrachoric correlations can be calculated by using the %POLYCHOR
macro for SAS [109] or the polychor option in the polycor package in R [110]. The
polycor package can also be used to calculate polyserial correlation [111] between
one discrete and one continuous variable.
5.3.2 Factor Analysis
Factor analysis can be used to discover relationships among multiple PSFs and
between PSFs and error. The basic assumption of FA is that there are underlying
influences in the data, and that these underlying influences manifest in patterns of
variance that move together.
Factor analysis identifies underlying patterns (influence) and defines these pat-
terns mathematically. For this reason it has been widely used in a number of fields
for many years. According to Cattell [112] “its most valuable functions lie in the
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biological and behavioral sciences, where a great array of phenomena are multiply
determined and where the conceptual independent variables are not easily located
and agreed upon.”
Broadly, FA is a family of multivariate techniques used to identify relation-
ships among the variables and to identify underlying or latent influences. This is
accomplished through evaluation of patterns of variance in the data. Variance is
effectively a measure of deviation (variation) or spread of the data. In simple terms,
variance is the difference between the values of individual data points and the mean
of the data. In terms of human action, variance is the difference between observed
behavior and expected or average behavior. Students typically examine the mean
and standard deviation of test scores to determine an objective measure of their
performance relative to classmates. The standard deviation is simply the square
root of the variance of the test scores.
Exploratory FA can be used to analyze the structure of a set of variables;
it is intended to be used for development of hypotheses about data. The theory
behind exploratory factor analysis is that variance in the observed data is created
not only by several measured variables, but also by invisible factors that impact
the variables. That is, each variable is the linear combination of of its underlying
individual influences [I] and a number of common influences [C], plus error (see
Figure 5.4). The sum of these underlying factors results in the observable variable.
FA maps the original data onto a matrix of reduced size. The new matrix ex-
plains the same amount of variance as the original matrix, but the variance explained
by each factor is greater than the variance explained by the original variables. The
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Figure 5.4: Exploratory FA treats each variable as the product of underlying indi-
vidual influences [I] and communality (common influences) [C].
reader is referred to the references more detailed information and discussion of the
many different FA methods [102, 113, 114].
For discrete data, such as that in the HERA database, a maximum likelihood
(ML) approach is not recommended. The ML approach is likely to result in a ma-
trix that is not positive definite because of the small sample size and the use of
polychoric correlation. In our analysis we use the more robust Minres (MINimum
RESiduals) technique [115]. The Minres FA technique is an unweighed least squares
method that seeks to minimize the sums of squares of the residual matrix, so the
suggested factors explain the maximum amount of variance in the correlation ma-
trix. This is an iterative process wherein factors are estimated based on the initial




Communality refers to the non-unique parts of a variable, or the amount of
variance it has in common with other variables (center portion of Figure 5.4). This
indicates how much of the construct’s variance could be due to underlying factors,
and sets the maximum possible amount of variance that can be accounted for by
common factors. In exploratory factor analysis, communality estimates replace the
(1.0) values along the diagonals of the correlation matrix. This replaces the perfect
correlation each variable has with itself, with an estimate of the magnitude of the
common influences affecting that variable.
Determining communality is not as straightforward as finding correlation val-
ues. An analyst must provide initial values and the FA can be run iteratively, with
updated communality estimates provided from the prior iteration. There are several
different ways to estimate initial communality values [102]. If iterative FA is used,
the choice of communality value mainly affects the speed of model convergence.
5.3.2.2 Number of Factors
FA will provide n factors for an n x n correlation matrix. These factors will
account for 100% of the variance in the sample, just as the original variables did.
However, not all of these factors will be meaningful or capture a large percent of
variance. Determination of the number of factors is as critical as developing the
factors. Given the choice, it is preferable to err on the side of too many factors
rather than too few, to reduce the chances of searching for relationships where
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there are none. Several different FA stopping rules have been proposed. The choice
of stopping rule is subjective and is largely based on analyst preference. Popular
stopping rules are introduced in the sections below. The best results are obtained
by using several stopping rules and comparing the outcome.
The Kaiser-Guttman rule is one of the most popular techniques for deter-
mining the number of factors. It includes all factors with eigenvalues greater than
1. An eigenvalue is a property of linear transformation that indicates the amount of
variance explained by a factor. An eigenvalue can be associated with each specific
matrix or factor. An eigenvalue greater than 1 means that the factors accounts for
more than its proportionate share of the original variance. The proportionate share
of variance each factor is responsible for is determined by the factors loadings of its
component variables.
In a scree test, the eigenvalues of the factors are plotted by factor number.
The plot is examined for a discontinuity in the pattern. The idea behind a scree
test is that important factors will have high eigenvalues (thus explaining relatively
large amounts of variance); when the plot starts to level off we’re left with residual
variance due to error and random noise. Different sources argue that the factor at
the cut-off point should or should not be included in the solution. It is important
to look at the factor loadings and the interplay between the factors to determine
which factors to keep. Ultimately the number of factors is decided by the analyst.
Parallel analysis is similar to the scree in test in that it assumes eigenvalues
from data with underlying factors should be greater than eigenvalues from random
data. Parallel analysis is performed by generating a matrix of random numbers
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equal to the size of the original set. The eigenvalues of the sample data and the
random data are compared, and factors with eigenvalues greater than those observed
in random data are retained.
5.3.2.3 Interpretation
Interpretation is the most critical step in any FA. An analyst must give mean-
ing to the factors to transform them from abstract numerical concepts to meaningful
constructs. There are numerous combinations of factor analysis techniques and FA
stopping rules, and there is no single correct technique for any application. The
correct technique is the one that produces the results that make the most sense.
Analysts should explore several different factor models to determine which factors
best fit their application. Without interpretation, the factors are simply patterns in
data.
The first step in interpretation should be to examine the factor loading pat-
terns, starting with the first factor. The first factor accounts for the most variance,
the second factor accounts for the second most variance (i.e., of the remaining vari-
ance after subtracting the first factor) and so on. Analysts typically set their own
minima based on data, but a commonly suggested rule is that only variables loaded
above |.40| on a factor should be included as part of that factor. When evaluating
the factors it’s equally important to consider what is in the factor as what is not.
In a data set there are several explanations for observed patterns of variance.
Assuming that there is no overlap between any of the PSFs that would affect the
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Figure 5.5: Possible causal relationships between two PSFs (A and B) and an out-
come (X).
variance, all observed variance must be due to some kind of relationship between
the PSFs. Figure 5.5 contains graphical representations of three potential causal
relationships between PSF A, PSF B, and outcome X (i.e., error). In Figure 5.5a
PSFs A and B are independent of each other, but they both directly influence the
outcome; they have a common child node. In Figure 5.5b, PSF B directly influences
the outcome, and PSF A indirectly influences the outcome through PSF B. In this
relationship we expect to see the variance move together because A causes (or is a
condition for) B. In Figure 5.5c A and B may or may not influence the same child
node, but they still vary together because they share a parent node.
Interpretation of factor results provides preliminary groups of Error Contexts
for specific work tasks. All sub-events used in this analysis are XHE events, i.e.,
known failures. We are adapting FA to interpret these underlying influences as
visible manifestations of failure rather than invisible human performance. The per-
tinent information here is that use of FA will result in groups of PSFs that lead to
human performance errors.
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5.4 Assessment of BBN Model Parameters
While some experts suggest that quantification is should be postponed un-
til the graphical structure of the model is considered robust [99], for HRA is it
advisable to treat model quantification as part of an iterative approach to model
development. A generic iterative model-development process consists of developing
an initial framework, quantifying it, analyzing model fit, and refining probabili-
ties, until resources run out or higher model accuracy cannot be obtained due to
information limitations.
Given a well-populated database, conditional probability tables for the BBN
can be developed automatically. In fact, both the network structure and the con-
ditional probabilities can be automatically “learned” given sufficient data [97, 116].
Automatic quantification requires a large sample size and often imposes distribu-
tional assumptions on the data. Each variable relationship must be represented
properly in the data sample; there cannot be missing data due to unobservable or
infrequent variables [99]. Variables could be underrepresented in the data due to
difficulty measuring them or limited opportunities to collect data on specific subsets;
any missing values must be filled in by experts before automatic quantification can
be realized [117, 118].
Assessment of conditional probability becomes more complicated when one
must rely on a small sample with no information about some of the variables. There
are few methodologies that specifically address how to quantify a BBN based on
factor analysis results. We have identified two promising methods that can be used
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with HERA-style data to quantify the final model.
5.4.1 Regression Approach
Almond [119] provides guidance on how to transform factor analysis results
into conditional probabilities. Almond suggests that it is possible to fully quantify
a BBN using 2 matrices: a Q-Matrix to determine the graphical structure of the
model and a correlation matrix to quantify the relationships in the model. The
correlation matrix referred to is the matrix of correlations between variables and
factors (the factor loadings). The Almond model is developed for the domain of
educational testing, wherein latent proficiency (skills) are measured by performance
on various tasks.
The Q-Matrix contains the relationships between the observable variables and
the latent concepts in the model. It consists of columns representing different pro-
ficiency variables and row representing tasks. In a Q-matrix, each cell is assigned 1
or 0 with 1 indicating the task is relevant to the skill, otherwise the task is assigned
0. There is not a direct analog to proficiency test in the nuclear industry, but since
the primary role of the Q-matrix is to determine the structure of the model, our
tetrachoric correlation analysis is substituted for the Q-matrix. The matrix of factor
loadings is used to quantify the model relationships among variables.
When comparing the Almond method to the HERA and IDA data, it is helpful
to view “error context” as proficiency and “sub-event” as the task. The Almond
model uses a set of observable tasks (e.g., student assessment tests) to predict the
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unobservable proficiencies of the student (e.g., aptitude for math). In our framework
we use a set of observable tasks (sub-events) to predict the existence of unobservable
error contexts.
There are four necessary inputs to be able to develop the model model:
• A set of variables (S) and latent factors (Y) to be included in the model.
• A set of marginal distributions P(S) for the variables S.
• A covariance matrix cov(Y).
• An estimate of the expected value of each factor µy of Y
Model quantification is achieved by developing a model regressing each node
on its parents. The intercept and residual standard deviation in each regression is
set to match the specified marginal distributions for the parent and child variables.
The regression model is then discretized to form conditional probability tables.
5.4.2 Linear Equations
Bonafede and Giudici [120] suggest a set of equations that can be used to trans-
form correlation values into joint or conditional probability tables. The approach
was designed with the intention of reducing the number of conditional probabilities
that must be assessed by experts by instead having them assess correlations, but it
can be applied in situations where the correlations are calculated from limited data.
We intend to utilize this to transform the tetrachoric correlations and the factor
loadings into probability tables.
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The method can be applied directly to quantify nodes with three or fewer
parents. The method can be generalized for nodes with more than three parents, but
the equation set becomes large due to the increasing number of possible interactions
among parent variables. Bonafede and Giudici were able to place auxiliary nodes
in their model to reduce the number of parent nodes using techniques suggested
in Jensen [121]. If possible, it is suggested to reduce the number of parents by
identifying independent groups of parents and splitting them from the others by
inserting dummy nodes.
For nodes with independent parents, it is possible to calculate conditional
probability (P (A|B)) directly by using the equations provided. For nodes with
dependent parents it is necessary to calculate joint probabilities (P (A ∩ B)) using
the equations provided in this section; these can be easily converted into conditional
probabilities.
The probability of the states of the variables is denoted as follows, where 0
denotes adequate and 1 denotes LTA:
For child C: P (C = 1) = c P (C = 0) = 1− c
For parent X: P (X = 1) = x P (X = 0) = 1− x
For parent Y: P (Y = 1) = y P (Y = 0) = 1− y
For parent Z: P (Z = 1) = z P (Z = 0) = 1− z
5.4.2.1 One Parent Case
For a BBN node C with a single parent X, the conditional probabilities can be
assessed using the equations in Table 5.2. Since there are no correlations between
parents, it is not necessary to use both sets of equations since(P (A ∩B)× P (B) =
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P (A|B).






c(1− c)x(1− x) where ρXC is the correlation between X and C.
Conditional probability Joint probability
α1x+ α2(1− x) = c j1 = ρXCM + xc
α1 − α2 = k j2 = c− ρXCM − xc
α1 + α3 = 1 j3 = x− ρXCM − xc
α2 + α4 = 1 j4 = 1− c− x− ρXCM + xc
Table 5.2: Equation systems for a child, C, with a single parent






5.4.2.2 Two Parent Case
The two parent case is more complex because there may be correlation between
both of the parents. For a case with two independent parents, the conditional
probabilities can be calculated using the left side of Table 5.3. For a case where the
parents are dependent, the joint probabilities can be calculated using the right side
of Table 5.3.














c(1− c)x(1− x)y(1− y)
and where:
x yes no
y yes no yes no
c
yes α1 α2 α3 α4
no α5 α6 α7 α8
5.4.2.3 Three Parent Case
The case for three parents is not as straightforward as for two parents because
of multiple possible combinations of parental dependency. For the situations where
all three parents are independent of each other, except that they have the same
child, the conditional probability table is calculated using the equations on the left
side of Table 5.4. However if any of the parents is dependent upon another parent,
the equations on the right side of Table 5.4 must be used.





c(1− c)x(1− x)y(1− y)z(1− z)
5.5 Summary of Model Building Procedure
This section summarizes the procedure for creating a quantified causal model















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cedure can be modified to create a mixed expert/data model by applying step 1 to
identify which variables can be included quantitatively and using expert information
to augment the model.
The current methodology assumes that PSFs have two states (Adequate vs.
Less Than Adequate (LTA)) because this is the form of current data. Given addi-
tional levels of discretization, the methodology will start by identifying and merging
similar PSF states (e.g. totally inadequate, partially inadequate) for each PSF and
then proceed to identifying and merging similar PSFs. Suggested threshold values
are based on the currently available data and may be adjusted as additional data
becomes available.
1. Determine which PSFs 4 will be included in quantitative analysis.
(a) Start with the expanded PSF hierarchy (Table 3.2) and collapse the PSFs:
i. Identify PSFs that are LTA in fewer than 10% of the sub-events. Merge these
PSFs with one or more PSFs at the same level of the hierarchy, or collapse
the category.
ii. Identify PSFs that are LTA in greater than 90% of the sub-events. Expand
these PSFs into one or more sub-levels.5
4For the sake of brevity, the terms “PSFs” is used to represent all elements in the hierarchy (i.e.,
PSFs and behaviors/metrics)
5For PSFs that cannot be expanded based on the current structure, the structure will need to be
modified by identifying additional additional metrics or behaviors or by adding sub-levels of the
PSF.
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iii. Run correlation analysis on PSF set. Identify outliers (PSFs producing
several correlations > |0.95|). Merge with one or more PSFs.
iv. Run factor analysis on PSF set. Identify PSF producing the largest Hey-
wood case and merge with one or more PSFs. Repeat this step until all
Heywood cases are eliminated.
2. Draw directed arcs between PSFs with (correlations > |0.3|).6
(a) Direction of the arc is based on expert information about the direction of
causality.
(b) Arcs may be omitted between the PSFs if the correlation is judged to be the
result of parent, child, or EC relationships in the model.
3. Identify ECs and draw arcs between PSFs and ECs
(a) Run several FA models on PSF set.7
(b) Apply FA stopping criteria to determine appropriate number of factors.
(c) Include each factor as an EC in the final model. Draw arcs from each PSF
included in the factor to the EC node.
4. Populate marginal and conditional probability tables.
(a) Use methods suggested in Section 5.4 or use direct expert elicitation.
6Appendix C provides R code for calculating tetrachoric correlations using the polycor package.
7Appendix C provides R code for Principal Axes and Minres factor models ranging from 1-5 factors.
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Chapter 6
PSF Model Development and Insights
This chapter presents a set of models that were developed using the method-
ology introduced in Chapter 5. Three different models were created to demonstrate
the flexibility of the methodology and its ability to meet different research goals.
The models include a high level (“6-Bubble”) model for the major aspects of the
socio-technical system, a Mixed Expert and Data Model (“MEDM”) with interac-
tions among over 30 of the PSFs and behaviors, and a quantified (“9-Bubble”) model
that contains a reduced set of PSFs linked to Error Contexts. The 6-Bubble model
was created to maximize insight gathered from the data. The model was formed
by aggregating all of the data to produce the most statistically significant results
possible from the current data. The MEDM was created to display causal relation-
ships among the full set of PSFs and to demonstrate how the methodology can be
used to combine expert judgment and data into one model. The 9-Bubble model
was created to provide a quantitative model of the relationships among PSFs and
to link the PSFs to error; this model form is intended for use in HEP calculations.
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Figure 6.1: The interactions among the six aspects of the socio-technical system.
6.1 6-Bubble Model
The 6-Bubble Model contains the six major elements of the socio-technical
system. The 6-Bubble Model is presented in Figure 6.1; for this model, the hierarchy
was collapsed into the 6 top level groups. Lines are based on expert information from
the US NRC Workshops [44]. There are sufficient data to make statistically valid
conclusions about the 6-Bubble model, although under-representation of certain
factors in HERA leaves considerable room for error in the analysis. We ran both
tetrachoric correlation and factor analysis on the six PSF groups. However only
correlation results are presented here because the FA did not converge for any factor
model with fewer than six factors. This suggests that the six PSF categories are
generally independent, as expected.
Table 6.1 displays the tetrachoric correlation coefficients among the six PSF
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Machine Team Organization Situation Stressors Personal
Machine 1
Team -0.06 1
Organization -0.06 -0.21 1
Situation 0.35 0.47 0.06 1
Stressors -0.15 0.42 -0.13 0.19 1
Personal -0.10 0.31 0.07 0.10 0.32 1
Table 6.1: Correlations among the high-level PSFs. The results suggest that the
groups are largely orthogonal and independent, with some exceptions discussed in
the text.
groups. Correlation values below |0.30| suggest that the PSFs tend to be indepen-
dent in the data. Definitional orthogonality is one of the necessary aspects that
defines independence, so the number of low correlations observed suggest that the
6-group PSF framework is orthogonally defined for the majority of the categories.
Five of the correlation values are large enough to merit further discussion: Machine–
Situation, Team–Situation, Team–Stressors, Team–Person, and Stressors–Person.
The stressor PSFs are largely based on personal perception, and the person-
based PSFs play a significant role in the way that individuals perceive loads. This
close relationship ensures correlation between the two PSF categories. However, the
stressor and person categories can still meet the condition for definitional orthog-
onality; the PSFs in the categories may interact, but they are distinctly defined
entities.
The team-based PSF category has a non-trivial correlation with several other
PSF categories. There are multiple explanations for this behavior. Team factors are
likely to be correlated with the person-based factors because a team is composed
of individuals, and therefore the individual characteristics of the team members
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affect the team. For example while communication is categorized as team-based,
each member has a unique inherent personal communication style, and these styles
combine together to form the team-based communication. However, we can state
that by definition the communication must occur between two or more people, so
while the inherent characteristics of each person do play a role, there cannot be
communication without multiple individuals, i.e., a team. It follows logically that
there is a correlation between team-based and stressor factors because personal
characteristics influence both elements.
The high correlations between team-based factors and other PSF categories
may also be an indicator of the strong role that teams play in commercial nuclear
power. For most operations and maintenance tasks there is either direct teamwork
or some level of review to ensure that tasks are completed correctly. The team has
a significant role in almost every aspect of commercial power and it is natural that
the team would correlate with many aspects of the socio-technical system.
The highest correlation observed is between team-based factors and situation-
based factors. It is important to note that the data included only human error events
that had an impact on the plant, i.e., the correlation between human error and the
values in Table 6.1 is 1.0. During normal operating conditions the operating crew
plays a generally passive role, monitoring indicators of the system state. However,
during abnormal situations the crew shifts to an active role in controlling the plant.
The data suggest that poor teamwork alone is not sufficient to produce an error.
This is logical because humans do not have the opportunity to make an error that
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impacts the plant if they are not affecting the state of the plant. Team-based factors
may have a significant influence on human performance, but they do not become
important to the plant until the team is asked to interact with the plant. The high
correlation between the machine-based factors and situation-based factors can be
explained in a similar way. The machine design does not become salient until a
situation requires personnel to interact with the machine.
6.2 Mixed Expert/Data Model
The Mixed Expert and Data Model (MEDM) includes nodes and relationships
based on both data and expert opinion. The model is presented as Figure 6.2
The data-derived part of the model is based on results from tetrachoric correlation
analysis. The goal was to include all of the second-level PSFs and several third-level
PSFs and behaviors/metrics from the PSF hierarchy (see Chapter 4) in the model.
The procedure presented in Section 5.2 was modified to exclude factor analysis
because the data set was too small to permit factor analysis on a large variable
set. The iterative process of running quantitative analysis, examining results, and
refining the PSF set was performed, but the quantitative analysis was limited to
tetrachoric correlation.
A correlation table containing the reduced PSF set is presented as Table 6.2.
Some of the correlations produced among the full set PSFs were erroneous (as large
as |0.999|) and were removed from the table. A correlation of |0.999| is so close to
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|1.0| that one must be suspicious of the results. Many of the PSFs with correlations
of |0.999| also had numerous correlations above |0.8|, which suggests that there
were not sufficient data to produce valid results for the PSF. A review of the data
used to create the correlation table found that the PSFs exhibiting erroneously high
correlations were all PSFs that occurred in fewer than 10% of the events. Each of
these PSFs was removed from the quantitative analysis.
The PSFs in Table 6.2 became nodes in the data-based portion of the model.
In Figure 6.2, these PSFs are represented by nodes with a solid border. PSFs
that could not be included in the quantitative analysis due to data limitations are
included as nodes with a dashed border.
Causal relationships between nodes are indicated with arrows. Solid arrows
were drawn between nodes when correlation exceeded |0.3| and the experts deter-
mined that a causal relationship could exist between the nodes. Arrows were not
drawn between PSFs with correlations exceeding |0.3| when the experts determined
that there was not a causal link. Dashed arrows were drawn between PSFs that
have a causal relationship according to the experts, but which did not correlate in
the quantitative analysis. Relationships among the dashed nodes and between the
dashed nodes and solid nodes were developed by experts and are therefore repre-
sented by a dashed arrow. Several dashed nodes have solid arrows pointing to a child
node; these nodes have a logical relationship by definition. One example is Procedure
Quality to Procedures ; a solid arc was created between them because by definition
the quality of the procedures is one aspect of the adequacy of the procedures in
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general. The child node completely encompasses the parent node by definition.
Some behavioral indicators and other metrics were included in the model as
rectangles. The included metrics are not designed to be comprehensive; they are
included only to demonstrate how metrics fit into the model. The behaviors and
metrics can be observed more easily than the associated PSFs. For example, a
supervisor can observe the compliance behavior of a worker more easily than the
attitude of the worker. In a quantified BBN, the goal is to set evidence (observe
the state of one or more nodes) and see how the evidence affects the rest of the
model. The metrics/behaviors offer a more concrete, observable factor for invisi-
ble processes, which helps different analysis set evidence more uniformly and thus
increases analysis reproducibility. Likewise, a utility may not be able to identify
a problem with everything encompassed by the word Staffing, but the utility can
observe situations where an inadequate number of personnel were assigned to a task.
6.3 9-Bubble Model
6.3.1 PSF Set
Our original intention was to develop a large model containing all of the PSFs
in the second and third levels of the hierarchy. However, due to limited data we were
unable to produce valid, convergent factor analysis results on the entire PSF set. The








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model Node Included PSFs
Training Training
Org. Culture Safety Culture, Management Activities, Corrective Action Pro-
gram
Resources Procedures, Tools, Necessary Information
Team Communication, Team Coordination, Team Cohesion, Direct Su-
pervision, Role Awareness
Attitude Morale/Motivation/Attitude, Bias, Attention
Knowledge Skills, Knowledge and Experience, Familiarity with Situation,
Physical & Psychological Abilities
Machine Human-System Interface, System Responses
Loads/Perceptions Task Load, Time Load, Other Loads, Perceived Situation Sever-
ity, Perceived Situation Urgency, Perceived Decision Responsi-
bility
Complexity Task Complexity, Hardware & Software Conditions
Table 6.3: The 9 PSFs used in the final causal model
the hierarchy, discussed in Section 5.2. In order to retain information from the data,
PSFs were merged together instead of completely eliminated whenever possible.
The final PSF set contains the 9 elements that had sufficient data to be in-
cluded in the model and that provided convergent factor groupings with correlations
below |1.0|. The correlations among these 9 PSFs are suitable to quantify a causal
model, and the factors output by FA are also suitable to be included in the model.
The PSF set is presented in Table 6.3. The remainder of Section 6.3.1 provides
justification for merging PSFs to create the 9 PSF set.
Training had sufficient data to be retained as a PSF and no other PSFs were
merged with it.
Staffing, Scheduling, and Compliance were collapsed into Management Activ-
ities. The Management Activities PSF was then merged with Safety Culture and
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Corrective Action Program to form one PSF for organizational attitude/culture.
Both Management Activities and the Corrective Action Program demonstrate how
the highest members of the organization set priorities. These behaviors demonstrate
the management attitude toward Safety Culture. Safety Culture becomes visible in
additional ways throughout the plant, but the safety message comes from the top.
Procedures, Tools, and Necessary Information were merged into the Resources
PSF. Different resources tend to be more relevant in different plant tasks (e.g., tools
are typically used in maintenance tasks), but the resources serve the same purpose.
In many control room situations the procedures are the “tool” required. Most
resources are provided by the organization, although necessary information can be
provided by other team members (e.g., logbooks). However given data limitations
we chose to treat all of the resources as an organizational PSF because the majority
of data pointed to organizational responsibility for resources.
The Team PSF is comprised of Direct Supervision, Role Awareness, Commu-
nication, Team Coordination, and Team Cohesion. Role Awareness was merged
with Direct Supervision because the majority of HERA events where role awareness
was an issue involved inadequate role awareness on the part of the direct supervisor.
This can be seen in the HERA analysis [62]:
The onsite and operations managers were above the shift managers, and it seems
that they were too involved in what was going on, assuming responsibility that
they should not have. It is inferred that the roles and responsibilities of each
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person were poorly understood by those involved.
and also in HERA analysis [66]:
The SNSS was too involved in trying to restore CW pumps to be able to main-
tain his oversight and advisory roles.
Morale/Motivation/Attitude, Bias, and Attention were combined into the At-
titude node in the model. Biased behavior or intentional inattention can be an indi-
cator of a worker’s underlying attitude. Bias can also result in improperly assigning
attention. In retrospective analysis it is often difficult to differentiate between lack of
attention and intentional disregard of certain information. The personal behaviors
Compliance, Prioritization, Information Use, and Task Order are used as metrics
of Attitude.
Skills, Knowledge & Experience, and Physical & Psychological Abilities were
combined into the Knowledge PSF, because all three PSFs refer to the internal
resources available to each individual. Familiarity with Situation was also included
in this node because familiarity is partially the result of increased experience.
HSI was combined with System Responses to form the Machine PSF. Both
PSFs relate to how the human perceives and interacts with the machine; HSI refers
to the physical system design whereas System Responses refers to the person’s men-
tal model of the system. There were no other PSFs suitable to be merged with HSI
or System Responses. These PSFs were particularly underrepresented in the data,
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in part due to the difficulty of assessing them from LERs.
Other Loads was combined with Task Loads because in most retrospective
analyses it is difficult to distinguish between task and non-task loads. The idea of
task vs. non-task is depends on which task a person is “supposed” to be completing
at the moment. It is especially difficult to differentiate between these loads in situ-
ations where personnel are expected to complete multiple tasks at once. Task Load
was combined with Time Load and Other Loads because all three PSFs represent
aspects of the stressors affecting the worker. Perception of Urgency, Perception of
Severity, and Perception of Decision Impact were initially merged into Perception
of Situation. Since Perception of Situation acts as a stressor it was combined with
the loads to form the Loads/Perceptions node.
Hardware & Software Conditions was merged into Complexity because de-
graded machine conditions tend to increase the complexity of a scenario
Environment could not be included in the analysis individually and did not
sufficiently correlate with other PSFs to be combined with any other PSFs.
6.3.2 Quantitative Analysis
After reducing the set of PSFs to a set that produced convergent factor analysis
results with correlations below |1.0|, we examined the correlations to determine



























































Org. Culture 0.151 1
Resources 0.274 0.029 1
Team 0.373 -0.025 0.094 1
Attitude 0.036 0.152 0.006 0.094 1
Knowledge 0.042 -0.116 -0.086 -0.073 -0.434 1
Machine 0.089 -0.384 -0.029 0.179 0.004 0.072 1
Loads/Perceptions 0.514 -0.254 0.17 0.449 0.305 0.076 0.319 1
Complexity 0.331 -0.319 0.343 0.354 0.082 0.100 0.205 0.463 1
Table 6.4: Tetrachoric correlation values used to develop the structure of the 9-
Bubble Model
6.4. The raw data used to create this model are included as Appendix D
There are some correlations that cannot be explained by a causal relationship
between the PSFs. For example, Complexity shows high correlation with Team. To
explore these relationships, we ran several exploratory factor analyses on the 9 PSFs
and compared the results. The analysis results shown in Table 6.5 are the output
of an unrotated, Minres factor analysis. This selection was made because Principal
Factor Analysis (PFA) produced results with factors with correlations exceeding
|1.0| for some PSFs. Minres factor analysis is an iterative process that develops the
factors by minimizing the sums of squares of the residual matrix.
We ran PFA and Minres factor models for between 1 and 5 factors. We selected
the 4 factor model based on the eigenvalues of the resulting factors and the shape
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Table 6.5: Factor analysis results for the 9 PSF groups
EC1 EC2 EC3 EC4
Training 0.67







Complexity 0.41 0.35 0.34
Eigenvalues 2.58 1.63 1.27 0.98
of the scree plot. The screen plot showed discontinuity after the fourth factor. For
the PFA, the first four factors had eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The fourth factor
in the Minres results has an eigenvalue of 0.98, but we elected to retain this factor
based on the scree plot and the PFA eigenvalues. In both PFA and Minres FA, the
four-factor model had a highest p value of the five models tested.
When interpreting the factors, the order of the factors is important. Factor 1
explains the most variance. Factor 2 explains the most variance when the variance
explained by factor 1 is removed, and so on. This makes the first factor the most
important/significant factor in the data. These factors are interpreted as Error
Contexts (ECs)
6.3.3 Model Structure
The model contains a node for each PSF and each EC. Arcs were drawn
between PSFs with correlations above |0.3| with a causal relationship supported by
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Figure 6.3: The “9-Bubble” model
expert information. Relationships that can be explained causally are explained in
this section. Relationships that do not have an obvious causal link are explained in
Section 6.3.4. The model is presented as Figure 6.3.
There are numerous causal arcs into Loads/Perceptions. There are high corre-
lations between Loads/Perceptions and Training, Team, Machine, Complexity, and
Attitude. Each of these correlations has been interpreted as a causal contributor to
Loads/Perceptions because they all directly affect the way personnel perceive the sit-
uation. This is because perceptions and loads are the worker’s personal assessment
of the scenario, including the machine, the team, and the situation. Intrinsic worker
attitude also causally contributes to the individual’s loads and perceptions because
the characteristics that manifest as attitude also affect individual perception.
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The causal arrow from Knowledge to Attitude represents a negative corre-
lation. The arrow implies that adequate knowledge contributes to less than ade-
quate personal attitudes, or that LTA knowledge contributes to adequate attitudes
among personnel. This can be seen in situations where experienced personnel use
work-arounds (non-compliant attitude) to deal with a situation. Less experienced
personnel may not know as much about the system and therefore may not be able
to develop work-arounds for the system. They must rely on available resources
and tend to approach a situation more cautiously to compensate for their reduced
knowledge.
This effect is observed in HERA event [76], where an experienced worker vi-
olated emergency operating procedures that require reporting system state to the
US NRC:
The shift supervisor relied on his memory of determination/notification require-
ments rather than check any procedure ([76], XHE8).
A less experienced worker may have avoided making this error, because LTA knowl-
edge about the situation would force the worker to consult the procedure.
The causal arcs from Organizational Culture to Machine and from Organiza-
tional Culture to Complexity represent a negative correlation. The negative corre-
lation here could be partially due to the effect of safety culture on the HERA data;
organizations with good Organizational Culture tend to be more willing to report
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problems with the machine or may more accurately report the complexity of a sit-
uation. So the causal arrow in the model does not necessarily imply that adequate
Organizational Culture causes inadequate machinery or complexity, rather that ad-
equate Organizational Culture causes increased reporting of inadequate machinery
and complex situations. Additionally, organizations with inadequate machinery
must be more attentive to the machinery and thus benefit from a positive organi-
zational culture. As additional data becomes available, further analysis should be
done to determine the nature of the relationships indicated by these links, or if this
link is the result of underrepresentation of machine factors in the data.
The causal arrow from Resources to Complexity is logical, because lack of
resources results in additional complexity. This can be seen in situations where there
are inadequate procedures. Inadequate procedures may contribute to complexity in
several ways. When there are no procedures for a situation, the required actions
are knowledge based. Knowledge-based actions are more complex than rule-based
actions. Extremely complex situations are also more likely than routine situations
to be outside the scope of procedures. However, we cannot draw a causal arrow from
resources to complexity based on this logic, because the complexity of the situation
doesn’t necessarily cause the lack of procedure.
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6.3.4 Error Contexts
The first error context is the set of Training, Team, Loads/Perceptions, and
Complexity. The PSFs contributing to this EC have the most significant impact
on error because this is the most significant. The first factor’s eigenvalue is much
larger than the eigenvalues of the other factors; it accounts for the greatest amount of
variance in the sample. The relationships among these PSFs suggest several things
about how errors occur in NPPs. The inclusion of Hardware & Software Conditions
(merged into the Complexity node) as one of the contributors is significant since
humans typically do not have the opportunity to commit an error if they are not
interacting with the plant. During normal operating conditions the plant operates
with minimal human intervention. Operators monitor plant conditions until an
abnormal occurrence, i.e., a conditioning event, that requires the operating crew or
maintenance personnel to interact with the plant.
The relationship between Hardware & Software Conditions and Complexity is
a causal relationship – a degraded machine state typically causes the situation to
become more complex. One example of a conditioning event increasing situation
complexity can be seen in [122], where an EDG trip occurred during a LOOP event.
Other influences that affect Complexity include Teamwork and Training. A well-
functioning team can reduce the perceived loads and the situation complexity by
efficiently organizing and dividing tasks. Training can contribute to the proper
functioning of the team and also contributes to personnel knowledge, which affects
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how a person perceives the load and the complexity of the situation.
The second error context is Organizational Culture, Attitude, and Knowledge.
The LTA states of Organizational Culture and Attitude are positively correlated
with the EC, and LTA Knowledge is negatively correlated with it. This suggests
that LTA Knowledge is not a contributor to this “type” of error. Rather there is not
inadequate knowledge; we can’t say that the people are particularly knowledgeable,
but they do not lack necessary knowledge. The combination of adequate Knowledge
with LTA Attitude suggests that the attitude of the worker plays a major role in
errors committed by experienced personnel. The data support the theory that work-
ers with less knowledge or experience tend to compensate for their inexperience by
working more carefully. Experienced personnel are prone to making mistakes due
to carelessness or poor work practices, including compliance and prioritization be-
haviors. Poor work practices are rarely limited to one member of an organization;
rather, LTA Organizational Culture creates an environment that allows worker at-
titudes to decline.
The third error context is Organizational Culture, Attitude, Loads/Perceptions,
and Complexity. The fact that both Loads and Complexity load on this factor is
logical – a more complex situation will increase perceived loads. Likewise, the
number of simultaneous tasks (actual loads) can also increase complexity. Attitude
plays a role in how situations, especially complex situations, are translated into
perceived loads. Organizational Culture has a negative correlation with this PSF,
which suggests that this factor is linked to adequate organizational culture. This
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is likely because the second error context (which has a higher eigenvalue and thus
explains more of the variance) absorbs most of the situations where Organizational
Culture is LTA.
The fourth error context is Resources and Complexity. This is the least im-
portant factor, which suggests that inadequate resources are not seen alone in many
errors. Again this EC is linked to Complexity, which is logical because complex
situations may be unfamiliar to personnel and thus personnel rely on the resources,
especially procedures, more heavily.
To summarize, the first error context is created by the combination of LTA
Team and Hardware & Software Conditions. LTA Training, Loads/Perceptions, and
Complexity PSFs are included in this error context because they are causally linked
to the conditioning events and the team. The second error context is adequate
Knowledge, LTA Attitude, and LTA Organizational Culture (which allows the LTA
attitude to exist). The third error context is a combination of LTA Attitude, Loads,
and Complexity ; it most applicable in situations where Organizational Culture is
adequate. The fourth error context is LTA Resources and Complexity.
HSI does not loan on any of the factors and therefore does not appear in
an error context. This is logical because of the generally unchanging nature of
HSI; workers accept the system as it is designed. Operators tend to compensate
for system shortcomings, e.g., they develop workarounds to deal with bad display.
Maintenance workers also develop workarounds, e.g., a worker who must enter a
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narrow space between display panels might turn sideways to avoid bumping into a
panel.
The quantitative analyses support many relationships already theorized to
exist. It is interesting to note that Complexity loads on the first, third, and fourth
factors, which suggests that complexity is an important contributor to human error.
Complex situations may include failures of multiple system components, failure
masking (e.g., failed sensors that obscure hardware failures), and unanticipated plant
conditions. These complex situations may be outside the scope of worker training
and available procedures, so worker behavior shifts from rule-based to knowledge-
based, which increases the likelihood of error.
6.3.5 Model Parameters
Conditional probability tables were developed for the 9-Bubble Model by ap-
plying the appropriate equations from Section 5.4.2. All of the probabilities are
conditional on the error and a risk significant scenario (RSS),
P (PSFs|(Error ∩RSS))
Marginal probabilities for each PSF were determined from the 158 XHE events used
in the analysis. Using the data provided in Appendix D, the marginal probability
of each state (k) of PSF i was assessed using the relative frequency of the state:






For root nodes, the marginal probabilities fully specify the conditional proba-
















For nodes with one, two, or three parents, the conditional probabilities are
assessed using marginal probability of the child and each parent, and the equations
provided in Section 5.4.2. The marginal probabilities for all1 parent and child nodes











1The marginal probability of Machine LTA used to develop this table was set to 50% because there
was not sufficient data to populate the conditional probability table based on the data.
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Org. Culture LTA Adeq.
Resources LTA Adeq. LTA Adeq.
Complexity
LTA 0.62 0.50 0.57 0.52
Adequate 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.48
The Loads/Perceptions PSF has five parent nodes. The conditional probabil-
ity table for Loads/Perceptions has 32 columns, but it cannot be calculated using
the equation set in Section 5.4.2 because of the number of parents. The conditional
probability table can be populated through use of expert judgment or through ad-
dition of model nodes to reduce the number of parents. Since the model is based
on such limited data, the number of parents could change when additional data is
added. We have elected to give Loads/Perceptions a uniform distribution equal to its
marginal probability distribution until more data becomes available. The marginal
probability of LTA Loads/Perceptions is 0.41.
Conditional probability tables for the Error Context nodes will have to be
assessed using expert judgment until there is more data about the PSFs affecting
human success events. The HERA database has the framework to collect this data,
but the current success data is not suitable for analysis because the retrospective
information sources provide very few details about non-error events. Quantification
of the EC nodes is discussed further in Section 6.5.
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6.4 Model Validity
The models presented in this chapter are quantified based on the available
data. They are intended to demonstrate the proposed methodology and illustrate
the type of insights that can be obtained through the process. The models presented
in this dissertation should not be used to make definitive statements about the PSF
relationships. Rather, the models provide guidance on how to gather additional
data to improve the quality of the probability estimates.
The available data do not meet ideal conditions for statistical analysis due
to the limited quantity of data and the form of the data. All of the available
data sources treat the PSFs as a binary variables, either adequate or LTA. Many
commonly used tests of model significance (e.g., χ2 analysis) assume multivariate
normality in the data, and binary data violates this assumption.
It is commonly recommended that there be at least (10 × n) data points to
run factor analysis, where n is the number of variables. For the Mixed Expert/Data
Model, this requires over 300 data points, but there are only 158 data points avail-
able. For the 9-Bubble model, there may be sufficient data quantity, but the data
quality leaves much to be desired. There are large data gaps, especially in HSI,
Environment and Physical & Psychological Abilities. These PSFs tend to be under-
represented in the data due to the low frequency of occurrence and/or reporting.
For polychoric correlation it is common to perform a G2 test, which is similar
163
to a χ2 test [123]. However, it is not possible to perform this test for tetrachoric
correlation because there are too few degrees of freedom to permit model testing.
It has been suggested that it is not necessary to perform these significance tests if
the form of the available data sufficiently justifies the use of tetrachoric correlation
[100].
We ran goodness-of-fit tests on the factor models as part of the analysis. While
the factor analysis is and the goodness-of-fit tests are subject to the limitations
discussed above, there were several indicators of significance for the 4-factor model.
For the factor analysis results, the p value for the Minres 4-factor (i.e., 4 Error
Context) model is |p = 0.015|, which is significant at the α = 0.01 level2. The 2-,
3-, and 5- factor models did not produce statistically significant p values. Among
the various factor models, the 4-factor model also had the lowest ratio of χ2 vs.
degrees of freedom. According to Hatcher, it is common to seek a model with a
relatively small chi-square value rather than a non-significant chi-square value, due
to the complexity of factor analysis models. For a model with df degrees of freedom,
the model may be acceptable if (χ2/df) ≤ 2 (see [124] for further discussion of the
significance of this ratio). This ratio was equal to 2.0 for the 4-factor model; this
was the lowest ratio of the models tested.
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of these models is to illustrate
2In factor analysis, the null hypothesis is that the model is an adequate representation of the original
correlation matrix. The null hypothesis is accepted if p > α,
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the type of insights that can be gathered through the model development process and
to provide a road map for future model development and data collection. Despite
the many limitations of the data, the 4-factor model is significant. However, this
is not necessarily the final model. As additional data sources appear, it may be
possible to run more significance tests on the data. Bayesian statistical techniques
could be used to eliminate the need for significance testing. Additional research
directions are discussed in Chapter 7.
6.5 Application in Quantification of Human Error Probabilities
One application of the model is to improve estimates of Human Error Proba-
bilities (HEPs). In this section we will show how the notion of Error Contexts (ECs)
introduced in Section 5.2.3 can be used in to quantify HEPs.
One expression that can be used to quantify the probability of a Human Failure






where S= PRA Scenario (essentially defined as a specific sequence of events after
an accident initiator), and Ci= Specific “context” i.
This equation provides a conceptual link between qualitative and quantitative
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parts of HRA. It is possible to use this equation to relate the new models to the
current HRA methods such as SPARH [24].
Under some specific modeling assumptions and abstractions, each Ci can be
described via a set of context factors, Fij (context factor j for context i):
Ci ≡ {Fi1, Fi2, . . . , Fin} (6.3)
Examples of Fij are: a specific crew (out of several possible teams), elapsed time in
scenario, a specific PSF, or specific operator action. Using context factors as a way




p(HFE|Fi1, Fi2, . . . , Fin)× p(Fi1, Fi2, . . . , Fin|S) (6.4)
We note that often Fij = Fj for several i, because some factors (e.g., Proce-
dures) remain constant throughout the course of an entire event.
Recall that the ECs from factor analysis imply higher likelihoods of association
with human error compared to other combinations of PSFs. These were marked as
EC1, EC2, EC3, and EC4.
3 The set is shown in the BBN in the lower left corner of
Figure 6.4. The tree on the right hand side of the figure explains how ECs can be
used to describe various human response outcomes during an accident (A). Given an
accident (A), and considering only two of the four ECs for simplicity, the presence
3We remind the reader that additional data and analysis may identify new patterns and/or addi-
tional error contexts.
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Figure 6.4: Possible effects of Error Contexts on occurrence of HFE given an accident
of EC1 or EC2 may have an impact on occurrence and likelihood of human error
(E).
This picture is a conceptual link between the observed PSF patterns (ECs)




p(ECi|E,A)× p(E|A) + p(ECi|E,A)× p(E|A)
(6.5)
Where:
• P (E|ECi, A) = the probability of error given a specific Error Context ECi, in
accident type A;
• P (ECi|E,A) = the likelihood of observing Error Context ECi given an error event
E;
• P (E|A) = probability of error E in accident type A.
The above equation enables one to modify a “generic” or “nominal” error
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probability for a specific error context. This equation would be used in the same way
as the SPAR-H equations: an analyst observes the state of several PSFs. However,
underlying this equation are the powerful modeling concepts and the understanding
of interdependencies that are not captured in current HRA methods.
Quantities P (ECi|E,A) and P (ECi|E,A) can be obtained through event data
collection and analysis, using the PSF hierarchy and the ECs identified according
the methodology of this dissertation. The current databases have the capacity to
gather this type of data if more detailed sources of information are used. Ideally
P (E|A) could also estimated based on data. In the interim however, the nominal




This dissertation introduced a methodology for building Bayesian Belief Net-
works of the causal influences among PSFs linked to human error. Three models
were produced to illustrate the methodology and its various applications. In addi-
tion to the methodology, the dissertation contains a new PSF hierarchy designed
specifically for causal modeling. The PSF hierarchy is suitable to be used in both
qualitative and quantitative analysis, which will enable multiple HRA methods to
use the same PSFs to enable better information sharing.
The PSF hierarchy is intended to be used in next-generation HRA analyses
and modeling. The combination of the IDAC structure with the HERA PSFs de-
tails has allowed us to produce an orthogonally defined, structured PSF hierarchy.
The hierarchy can capture various types of information about natural interdepen-
dencies among PSFs, while the orthogonality reduces artificial dependency created
by overlapping PSF definitions.
We added specific behaviors and metrics rooted in the data to the PSF set.
Some current HRA methods do not differentiate between improper work conduct
and the behaviors that demonstrate improper work conduct. These behaviors and
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metrics are not PSFs, rather they are visible manifestations of unobservable PSFs.
Behaviors and metrics must be closely linked to PSFs to increase consistency of
interpretation by HRA experts.
During analysis of the data it became apparent that team and organizational
factors were at the root of many of the human errors. However, not all human errors
were organizationally based. For this reason certain PSFs have been broken down
into organizational and personal components. One of the shortcomings of some HRA
methods is the blurring of the line between individual and organization. The new
set of PSFs contains behavioral elements that parallel each other in the organiza-
tional and human sections. Both humans and organizations can display poor work
behaviors. In most cases safety culture will influence both sets of work processes,
but in the end the human and the organization must each take responsibility for
their behaviors. Differentiating between organization and personnel work conduct
will allow HRA analysts to better address the source of problems.
Since HRA is a discipline that involves understand the human operator it is
very difficult to create and validate a model. Models are largely based on expert
opinion and there are no HRA benchmarks that can be used to validate these models.
We have created a modeling approach that uses available data to ’validate’ the
model. Using both expert opinion and available data in the same model provides a
level of validity greater than any current HRA model.
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7.1 Research Impact
This research is the first application of the data provided in the HERA database.
Since the database is still under development at the US NRC, the quantity and qual-
ity of data is limited. However, we were able to use the available data to gather
insights about PSFs and also about HRA data collection.
The US NRC is currently modifying the HERA structure as part of an SRM
project. We have provided feedback to the NRC about the HERA data coding pro-
cess and the current HERA structure. Some of the insights about the data collection
process have already been implemented in the HERA structure and additional in-
sights are addressed by the NRC. Over 50 PSF details have been removed from
the original set due to overlap with other PSFs or vague definitions. The NRC is
currently working to implement a more orthogonally defined set of PSFs with a
hierarchical structure.
7.2 Model Applications
There are several possible applications for causal models of relationships among
PSFs that are linked to human error.
1. The model could be integrated into HEP calculations using the methodology
outlined in Section 6.5, to provide more informed HEP estimates by considering
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interdependencies among PSFs instead of treating them as independent entities.
2. The model can be used to assess the benefits of different risk reduction efforts
before they are implemented.
3. The model can be used for informed error management, e.g., to understand
and compensate for known weaknesses in the system while long term actions
are planned.
4. The model can be used to identify potential variables to manipulate in simulator
training or data collection experiments.
The BBN provides a natural framework to assess the benefit of alternative risk
reduction strategies or to provide more informed error management. Analysts can
use the BBN to record the known state of a PSF and then update the probabilities
of the other nodes in the model. Similarly, the analyst can compare different risk
mitigation efforts by making observations in the model and seeing how they affect
the likelihood of human error. In both situations the analyst can then see which
PSFs have the most significant change in probability. Analysts can model different
combinations of PSF states to see which system elements have the greatest impact
on overall system risk and then identify risk-significant system weaknesses before
they result in errors. By evaluating which model nodes have the most significant
probability changes, the analyst can better direct their resources at system elements
that have the greatest risk impact.
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7.3 Future Research Directions
The insights gathered during the data analysis and methodology development
offer many possible paths for future research. The PSF hierarchy could be expanded
to deeper levels. PSF causal models could be developed for different types of error.
Model development is an iterative process, so many of the identified weaknesses
of the current models can be addressed in future research. Many of the limitations
affecting the entire field of HRA, need to be addressed as part of deeper examination
of how the HRA methods relate to each other/could work together.
7.3.1 Data Collection
Many of the data collection problems that limit current HRA will continue to
limit advance in HRA until sources of data are improved. The recommendations in
this section specifically relate to the HERA database because it is the only human
performance database in the nuclear industry, but future databases should also
address the following suggestions.
• The HERA structure should be evaluated against the fundamental principles in-
troduced in Section 3. Short term efforts should include:
– Continuing SRM efforts to redefine PSFs to that they are more orthogonal;
– Imposing a hierarchical structure on the HERA PSFs to allow data to be ag-
gregated at different levels;
173
– Including behaviors and metrics along with the list of PSFs to improve consis-
tent scenario interpretation;
– Collecting PSF data on a non-binary scale or providing guidance on the thresh-
old between adequate and LTA.
• The HERA database needs to be populated with more data so that more statistical
significance can be attached to analysis results.
– Data collection needs to expand beyond current scope of events. Ideally, it
should include errors committed during start up, shutdown, and refueling sce-
narios.
– The number of analysts coding HERA events should be increased to produce
greater data volume, but also to reduce bias introduced by using a small pool
of analysts.
• Need to screen events before coding to evaluate the potential usefulness of the
analysis. Some historically significant events (e.g., the fire at Brown’s Ferry in
the ’70s [50] may not be salient for analysis of current plants due to significant
changes in the nuclear industry as the result of the event.
• Need HRA databases developed to gather current information
7.3.2 Data Analysis
• Use Bayesian Factor Analysis techniques to develop Error Contexts that contain
PSFs with limited information
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– Even if the HERA database is populated with substantial data in the coming
years, it is unlikely that all of the PSFs will be accurately represented in the
database. We know that reduced fitness for duty contributes to error, but we
very rarely see reduced fitness for duty problems reported in any publicly avail-
able sources. There are also limited opportunities to report less than adequate
environment in the control room
– Since HERA data will never meet the ideal requirements for factor analysis, it
is advisable to perform Bayesian Factor Analysis (BFA). BFA captures uncer-
tainty about factor scores and places fewer constraints on the structure of the
input data than traditional FA techniques. BFA provides a natural framework
for combining expert and statistical analyses. It allows for the incorporation of
different sample sizes and information types through the use of data-informed
model weighting parameters [125, 126].
• Address dependency between sub-events within the same event.
– Cascading Factor Analysis could be applied to recognize the dependency be-
tween sub-events by treating sub-events as part of a sequence.
• Address model-fit of the linear factor analysis model to determine how error con-
texts interrelate.
– Consider using a non-linear model
– Consider Latent Class Analysis model
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7.3.3 Model Development
• While we believe that the same set of PSFs can be used to describe operator and
maintenance personnel performance, the way the PSFs interact may be different.
In the future it would be beneficial to see develop models for different types
of human error (e.g., error of commission, error of omission), task types (e.g.,
maintenance, operations), information processing phases (e.g., decision, action),
personnel (e.g., operators, management).
• Expand the model to include errors committed by teams/groups (e.g., error in
decision made by whole group)
• Consider the effect of worker perception of “observable” PSFs may affect perfor-





As part of this research the author worked with April Whaley and Pat McCabe,
from the Idaho National Laboratory, to learn the HERA coding process and to code
several new event analyses into the HERA database. A portion of one of these
events is presented in this section. The event is “Fermi 2 – Northeast Blackout
LOOP,” [51]. The entire Worksheet A is provided, followed by one human failure
(XHE) Worksheet B and one human success (HS) Worksheet B. The remainder of
the event can be found in the HERA database [2].
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HERA, Rev. 10/19/2007 A-1
Human Event Repository & Analysis (HERA) Worksheet, Part A 
 
Coder: KMG 2nd Checker:     Ops Review: PHM HF Review:     
Date: 18 March 2008 Date:       Date: 4/14/2008 Date:       
 
Section 1:  Plant and Event Overview 
Document identifying plant and event information. 
 
1.  Primary Source Document: LER 341-2003-002-01 2.  Other Source Document(s): IR 341-2003-08; IR 341-
2003-009; IR 341-2003-010; ASP 341-2003-002 
3.  Plant Name: Fermi 2 4.  Plant Type: BWR  PWR  Other:       
5.  Plant Operating Mode: 1 5a. Plant Power Level: 100% 
6.  Event Type:  
 Initiating Event  Common Cause 
Event Declaration: 0: None 
6a. Event Date / Time: August 14, 2003; 16:10.  Unusual Event declared at 16:22 
6b. Event Description: Loss of electrical load and reactor trip due to Northeast blackout. 
7.  Affected Function(s):       
8.  Affected System(s):       
9.  Affected Component(s):       
10. Source: 
 LER  ASP Analysis 
CCDP / ∆CDP: 2E-5 
 IR  Other        
 Simulator Study    
Experiment Information:       
Scenario:       
Variant:       
Crew:       
11. Similar to other events:  Yes  No   
Comment: See related 08-14-03 Northeast blackout event at Ginna 
 
Section 2:  Event Summary / Abstract 
Write a brief summary of the event, or copy in the event abstract.  Discuss aspects of the event that are important from a 
HRA perspective.  See Coding Manual for guidance. 
 
On August 14, 2003, at approximately 1610 hours, the Reactor Protection System initiated an automatic 
reactor scram from 100% power as a result of a Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure. The TCV 
closure was caused by a turbine trip signal initiated by the main turbine-generator protective control 
system upon sensing electrical grid voltage fluctuations. A Loss of Offsite Power occurred as a result of 
the regional electric grid disturbance that affected several eastern and central states and portions of 
Canada and that led to blackout conditions in a large portion of the United States. 
 
All safety related systems operated as expected in response to this event. All control rods fully inserted 
into the reactor core. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level decreased and the Reactor Core 
Isolation Cooling system was manually started to restore RPV level; however, the High Pressure Coolant 
Injection system automatically started when RPV water level reached the setpoint for Level 2. Primary 
containment penetration isolations associated with RPV Level 3 and 2 setpoints occurred as expected . 
All Main Steam Isolation Valves closed and all four Emergency Diesel Generators started and energized 
their pertinent emergency loads. Nine Safety Relief Valves lifted and reseated. Combustion Turbine 
Generator (CTG) 11-1 did not initially start in response to this event. 
 
Human performance issues were identified as the root cause of the failure of CTG 11-1 to start.  Maintenance personnel 
made an error when installing CTG 11-1 because they did not follow the proper modification process.  Error was repeated 
during subsequent replacement as well.  Additional work independent of this error performed on CTG 11-1 also 
contributed to the failure.  This error was due to inadequate procedural guidance for specific maintenance tasks. 
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HERA, Rev. 10/19/2007 A-2
Section 3:  Key Human Performance Insights 
Outline key deviations from nominal performance, important observations about human performance, and causes. 
 
Latent faults: 
CTG 11-1 inverter set point was not adjusted when part was installed. 
Effect: CECO was not updated 
 
CTG 11-1 CECO not updated. 
Effect:  Error was repeated. 
 
CTG 11-1 set point error repeated 
Effect: CTG 11-1 failed to start on demand during Unusual Event. 
 
CTG 11-1 fuel oil pump arcing horn problems due to lack of procedures. 
Effect:  CTG 11-1 failed to start on demand during Unusual Event 
 
Key human faults: 
The set point error was repeated twice:  
The CTG 11-1 inverter set point was not adjusted when the part was installed; a maintenance personnel mistake.  This 
mistake was corrected 6 months later, but there is no information that implies that the personnel alerted others to this 
problem.  When the card was replaced several years later, the original set point mistake was repeated.  There is no 
available  information that discusses if the first mistake was discovered or corrected by chance.   
 
Factors contributing to inadequate maintenance could be related to licensee scheduling of preventative maintenance: 
Specifically, the licensee’s process of including a 25 percent grace period on most preventive maintenance tasks could 
allow a component to remain in service longer than the design basis lifetime, thus reducing the reliability of that 
component.  Implementation of a grace period could be a sign of greater organizational or staffing/workload problems.  
 
There is no indication that the errors related to the CTG 11-1 inverter set points are at all related to the CTG 11-1 fuel oil 
pump error. 
 
Corrective actions taken: 
Updated procedures for CTG 11-1 fuel oil pump maintenance to include arcding horn required clearance and instructions 
to check arcing horn 
 
Updated CTG 11-1 set point information in CECO. 
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HERA, Rev. 10/19/2007 A-3
Section 4:  Index of Subevents 
Provide a brief description of all subevents as well as subevent codes (XHE, HS, EE, XEQ, EQA, PS, or CI), date and time, work type and personnel involved (for 
all human subevents; see manual for codes), whether the subevent was pre-initiator (PRE), initiator (INIT), or post-initiator (POST), whether the subevent was 
active (A) or latent (L),and, if the subevent is an XHE, if it was an error of omission (O) or commission (C) or indeterminate (I).  Indicate the Human Action 
Category number for XHEs and HSs (see manual), indicate whether a HS is a recovery, indicate whether the XHE or HS receives Worksheet B coding, list any 
related subevents, both prior and following the subevent, any comments (e.g., why a subevent is not receiving Worksheet B coding, contributing performance 
shaping factors), and whether the subevent will be included on the graphical timeline.  See the coding manual for guidance on subevent breakdown and subevent 





























































































































XEQ1 2/15/1996   M-S PRE     CTG 11-1  classified as inoperable due to a large number of 
failures and poor reliability; failure to meet maintenance rule 
criteria.  A multimillion dollar project for major upgrades 
began. 
                  
CI1 1996 F M-S PRE     Originally, a motor generator (MG) set on station blackout 
combustion turbine generator (CTG) 11-1 was used to 
provide 120VAC control power and power to the exciter.  A 
decision was made in 1996 to replace the MG set with an 
inverter.  No documentation justifying the reason for the 
change existed. 
                  
XHE 1 1996 M M-M M-I PRE L O The inverter came from the vendor with factory set low and high inverter voltage trip set points based on a system that 
has a battery bank of 60 cells.  The low voltage set point is 
determined at 1.75 volts/cell thereby establishing a 105-volt 
low factory set point.  However, CTG 11-1 has a 56-cell 
battery bank, which required that the low voltage factory set 
point be changed to 98 volts.  The inverter was installed 
without changing the set points.  Installing the circuit card 
without properly adjusting the set point was the result of 
inadequate implementation of the modification process. 
5   XEQ1, CI1, HS2 See section 6. Worksheet B cluster includes XHE1 and XHE2.  
XHE2 1996 A 
 
M-I PRE L O Because the modification process was not used, the central 
component (CECO) information database that contains 
design basis information, particularly set point values, was 
not updated to reflect the correct set points. 
13   XHE1, CI1 Worktype - A and M See section 6. Worksheet B cluster includes XHE1 and XHE2.  
XEQ2 1997         PRE     CTG 11-1 returned to service after upgrades.  Then, CTG 
11-1 removed from service for 5 additional months for 
substantial maintenance. 
     XEQ1        




























































































































HS1 ~1997 M M-M M-I PRE     The inverter had the incorrect low voltage set points for about 6 months until the set point card S2A-167 was 
changed.  During this card replacement, personnel 
referenced the vendor manual and recognized the 1.75 
volt/cell requirement, counted 56 cells on CTG 11-1 and 
correctly adjusted the low voltage trip set point to 98 volts, 
installed the card and placed CTG 11-1 in service. 
5         Partial recovery of XHE1  
PS1 10/15/1999         PRE     CTG 11-1 returned  to service.                   
PS2 DECEMBER 
2000 
        PRE     CTG 11-1 maintenance rule performance criteria exceeded 
"less than 3 failures in the last 20 demands."  14 functional 
failures of CTG 11-1 recorded between 12/6/2000 and 
8/14/2003. 
                  
XEQ3 1/9/2001         PRE     CTG classified as failed due to maintenance rule.        PS2        
XEQ4 1/9/2001         PRE     The CTG 11-1 inverter set point card burned out.      PS2, XEQ3        
XHE3 8/22/2001 M M-M M-I S-P PRE L O The CTG 11-1 inverter set point card was replaced.  Since CECO did not contain the correct low voltage trip set points, the work package to replace the card did not include instructions to change the factory set low voltage trip set 
point of 105 volts to 98 volts.  The replacement set point 
card and inverter were set to a low voltage trip set point of 
105 volts, which was too high for the CTG 11-1 inverter set 
point requirement of 98 volts. 
5   XHE1, XHE2, CI1 Worktype - M and P See section 6.  
XHE4 5/30/2003 – 
8/14/2003 
M M-E S-P PRE L O Preventive maintenance on the CTG 11-1 DC fuel oil pump was inadequate in that the verification and /or adjustment of 
the arcing horn critical clearance dimensions was not 
specified or required.  There was no requirement to check 
the arcing horn clearances during preventive maintenance. 





        PRE     The CTG 11-1 DC fuel oil pump starter contactor began to 
stick open against its arcing horn.  The contactor was 
hanging up on the lower portion of an arcing horn (used for 
arc suppression drain) which prevented the contact from 
fully closing.  The contactor worked properly when last 
tested on May 30, 2003 and during all previous tests, but 
became inoperable at some point between May 30, 2003 
and August 14, 2003. 
     XHE4        




























































































































EE 1 8/14/2003; 
1605 
        PRE     On the afternoon of August 14, 2003, a regional electric grid 
disturbance occurred in several eastern and central states 
and portions of Canada that led to blackout conditions in a 
large portion of the United States.  At approximately 1605 
hours, plant operators noted voltage fluctuations on the 
grid. 
                  
EQA1 8/14/2003; 
1610 
        PRE     Continuing grid instability resulted in a turbine trip initiated 
by the main turbine-generator protective control system. 
     EE1        
EQA2 8/14/2003; 
1610 
        INIT     A Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure occurred and 
the Reactor Protection System (RPS) initiated a reactor 
scram as a result of the turbine trip.  All control rods fully 
inserted into the reactor core 
                  
CI2 8/14/2003   N-R POST     From the control room, the inspectors monitored plant 
conditions and operator actions to ensure that the plant was 
responding as designed, that all relevant procedures were 
being followed.  The inspectors walked down the control 
panels, reviewed various procedures, drawings, Technical 
Specifications, and other licensee documentation, and 
interviewed various plant personnel.  The inspectors 
reviewed the Transient Analysis Program report and 
compared plant response to the expected response as 
detailed in the UFSAR. 
                  
EE2 8/14/2003; 
1611 
        POST     At approximately 1611 hours, offsite power was lost.      EE1        
EQA3 8/14/2003; 
1611 
        POST     All Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed due to the 
loss of RPS power caused by the Loss of Offsite Power 
(LOSP) 
      EE2        
EQA4 8/14/2003; 
1611 
        POST     Three EDGs (11, 12 and 14) automatically started from 
standby and loaded as expected. 
                  HS2 8/14/2003; 1611 O O-C O-A POST     EDG 13 was out of service undergoing a monthly surveillance run (this entailed being loaded to the grid); 
however, the EDG went off-line at the loss of offsite power 
and operators transferred it from the test mode and lined up 
to its emergency mode of operation within one minute of the 
other EDGs. 
9                
PS3 8/14/2003;  1612         POST     LOSP caused the loss of Feedwater flow and a decrease in Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level.      EQA3        




























































































































HS3 8/14/2003; 1613 O O-C POST     The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started to restore RPV level. 9                EQA5 8/14/2003; 1615         POST     High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatically started when RPV water level reached the set 
point for Level 2. 
     HS3        EQA6 8/14/2003; 1615         POST     HPCI and RCIC were used to supply water to the RPV until they both tripped on Level 8.      EQA5        HS4 8/14/2003; 1618 O O-C POST     RCIC was then manually restarted and used for level control.  The operators noted a minimum RPV level of 112 
inches above the Top of Active Fuel.  Primary containment 
penetration isolations associated with RPV Level 3 and 2 
setpoints occurred as expected 
9                EQA7 8/14/2003; 1621         POST     Following MSIV closure, nine Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) lifted and reseated.  Peak RPV pressure was about 1140 
psig. 
      EQA3        CI3 8/14/2003; 1625 O O-C POST     Reactor pressure was then automatically controlled using the Low-Low Set mode of SRV A throughout the remainder 
of the event and recovery until the MSIVs were reopened 
and the main condenser was restored as a heat sink. 
     EQA7        




























































































































XEQ6 8/14/2003; 1625         POST     The operators attempted to start Combustion Turbine Generator [TG] (CTG) 11-1, to power the balance of plant 
(BOP) buses; however, the CTG failed to start due to the 
trip of a battery-powered inverter which provides power to 
the igniters used to start the CTG; An initial attempt to start 
CTG 11-1 using DC power from the batteries failed 
because the large voltage drop during the start sequence 
had dropped below 105 volts and the inverter tripped. 
 
The starting diesel was running and the CTG turbine shaft 
was spinning but the CTG was not firing.  Combustion 
Turbine Generator 11-1 was not firing because the inverter, 
which is used for powering the two igniters on the CTG, had 
lost power.  Several attempts to restart the inverter were 
unsuccessful.  
 
After the event, inspectors determined that CTG 11-1 failed 
to start during the loss of offsite power event because the 
inverter low voltage trip set point was set too high (see XHE 
3). 
     XHE1, XHE2, XHE3, XHE4, XEQ1, XEQ3, XEQ4, XEQ5 
       
CI4 8/14/2003; 1622 O O-S S-D POST     Unusual Event declared.            Worktype O and B  XEQ7 8/14/2003; 1655-1700         POST     With a shift manager’s authorization, two additional attempts were made to start CTG 11-1 using a  portable 
120VAC generator connected to the inverter, but the CTG 
tripped at partial speed due to a “loss of flame” and a 
“failure to ignite” signal.  These signals were generated 
because the contactor for an emergency fuel forwarding 
pump had failed (see XEQ 1). 
     XE5, XHE4        
HS5 8/14/2003; 1730 O O-C O-A POST     The sticking CTG 11-1 fuel oil pump contactor was detected and accounted for within about 35 minutes of the CTG 11-1 
start delay.  
6   XEQ5, XHE4 Partial recovery of XHE6  
HS 6 8/14/2003; 
1919 
B O-A M-S M-E POST     The CTG was locally started later that afternoon, around 1919 hours.  While holding the fuel oil pump contactor together by hand, the emergency fuel forwarding pump was started and a third attempt at starting CTG 11-1 was 
successful using an alternate source of starting power 
provided by a portable 120VAC generator. 
10   XEQ1, XEQ2, XEQ3, XEQ4, XEQ5 
Worktype  B, O, M. 
Recovery from XEQ6 
 




























































































































HS 7 8/14/2003; 1919+ O O-C POST     Restoration of electrical power continued in accordance with procedures. 13                
EE3 8/14/2003; 2230         POST     Offsite power was restored to the switchyard.               HS8 8/15/2003; 0153 O O-C POST     First emergency bus (10600) was switched to offsite power source and EDG 14 was shut down. 1                HS9 8/15/2003; 0412 O O-C POST     0412 Second emergency bus (10500) was switched to offsite power source and EDG 13 was shut down. 1   HS8        HS10 8/15/2003; 1332 O O-C POST     Offsite power was fully restored to the plant and all emergency diesel generators were shut down. 1                CI5 8/15/2003; 1348 O O-S S-D POST     Unusual Event was terminated.            ?  
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Section 5:  General Trends Across Subevents / Lessons Learned 
Part A:  General Trends  Not Applicable 
Indicate any strong, overarching trends or context across the subevents and provide a detailed explanation.  This section is optional and only used when an issue 
is seen repeatedly throughout the event, to highlight the trend that may not be readily evident from the separate Worksheet B coding. 
 
Trend Comment 
 Procedures (e.g., repeated failure to use or follow procedures)       
 Workarounds (e.g., cultural acceptance of workarounds contributes to 
multiple subevents) 
      
 Strong mismatch (e.g., between operator expectations compared to evolving 
plant conditions; between communications goals compared to practice; between 
complexity and speed of event compared to training and procedural support; 
between operator mental model and actual event progression) 
      
 Deviation from previously analyzed or trained scenarios       
 Extreme or unusual conditions       
 Strong pre-existing conditions       
 Misleading or wrong information, such as plant indicators or procedures       
 Information rejected or ignored       
 Multiple hardware failures       
 Work transitions in progress       
 Focus on production over safety       
 Configuration management failures including drawings and tech specs, such 
as incorrect room penetrations, piping or equipment configurations 
      
 Failure in communication or resource allocation       
 Other:             
 
Part B:  Lessons Learned  Not Applicable 
Explain any key lessons learned from this event and / or any key corrective actions taken as a result of this event.  
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Section 6:  Human Subevent Dependency Table 
Place only the XHEs that receive Worksheet B coding on the top row and in the left column of the pyramid table.  Check the appropriate boxes to indicate 
dependency between subevents.  See the coding manual for guidance on assigning dependency.  Provide explanation in the Comment table below to explain the 
factors that caused the subevents to exhibit dependency.  Common dependency factors are listed in the pyramid table.  Use additional sheets as necessary. 
 
Subevent 
Code XHE 1 XHE2 XHE3 XHE4                                                                   
XHE1                
XHE2 Common              
XHE3 Dependency Factors:             
XHE4             
                    
                   
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     











XHE1 XHE2  Failure to follow modification procedure in XHE1 implies that maintenance personnel were unaware of the need to change the set 
points, and without knowing that these need to be changed there would be no need to update the CECO information in XHE2. 
XHE2 XHE3  Since CECO information was not updated in XHE2, maintenance personnel did not know to update the set point in XHE3. 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
• Similar Task 
• Same person/people 
• Close in time 
• Same location/same equipment 
• No independent oversight 
• Same cues 
• Action prompts next incorrect action 
• Similar environmental conditions 
• Unreliable system feedback 
• Prior human failures on same equipment 
• Lack of intervening human success 
• Cultural dependency 
• Mindset 
• Work Practices 
• Other (explain) 
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Human Event Repository & Analysis (HERA) Worksheet, Part B 
 
Source Document: LER50-341-2003-002  Subevent Code: XHE1 
Description:  
Includes XHE1 and XHE2 
The inverter came from the vendor with factory set low and high inverter voltage trip set points based on a system that has 
a battery bank of 60 cells.  The low voltage set point is determined at 1.75 volts/cell thereby establishing a 105-volt low 
factory set point.  However, CTG 11-1 has a 56-cell battery bank, which required that the low voltage factory set point be 
changed to 98 volts.  The inverter was installed without changing the set points.  Installing the circuit card without properly 
adjusting the set point was the result of inadequate implementation of the modification process. 
 
Because the modification process was not used, the central component (CECO) information database that contains design 
basis information, particularly set point values, was not updated to reflect the correct set points 
 
Section 1:  Personnel Involved in Subevent 
Indicate which personnel were involved in the subevent.  Check all that apply. 
 
 Operations (OPS)  Plant Support Personnel  Security 
 OPS Supervisors  Administrative Support  Training 
 Control Room (CR) Operators  Chemistry  Shipping / Transportation 
 Outside of CR Operators  Emergency Planning / Response  Specialized Task Force 
 Technical Support Center (TSC)  Engineering  Work Control 
 Maintenance and Testing   Fitness for Duty  Licensing / Regulatory Affairs 
 Maintenance Supervision / Planning   Fuel Handling  Non-Plant Personnel 
 Mechanical   Health Physics  Contractor Personnel 
 Electrical  Procedure Writers  Manufacturer 
 I&C  QA / Oversight  NRC / Regulator  
 Management  Site-Wide  Vendor  
 Other:       
 
Section 2:  Plant Conditions 
Part A:  Contributing Plant Conditions 
Indicate plant conditions that contribute to this subevent, and / or influence the decisions and / or actions of personnel.  
Leave a detailed comment, with reference to the source document. 
 
Plant Condition Comment 
 Equipment installed does not meet all codes / requirements       
 Manufacturer fabrication / construction inadequate       
 Specifications provided by manufacturer inadequate       
 Documents, drawings, information, etc., provided by the manufacturer incorrect or 
inadequate 
      
 Substitute parts / material used do not meet specifications       
 Material used inadequate       
 QA requirements not used or met during procurement process       
 Post-procurement requirements not used / performed        
 Lack of proper tools / materials       
 Installation workmanship inadequate       
 Equipment failure / malfunction       
 System / train / equipment unavailable       
 Instrumentation problems / inaccuracies       
 Control problems       
 Plant / equipment not in a normal state       
 Plant transitioning between power modes       
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Plant Condition Comment 
 Loss of electrical power       
 Reactor scram / plant transient       
 Fire       
 Other:             
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate       
 
Part B:  Effects on Plant  Check to Exclude 
Indicate the effects of this subevent on the plant. 
1.  Affected Function(s): Human Performance [D] - Work Practices 
2.  Affected System(s): ACP 
3.  Affected Component(s): ACP: INV 
 
Section 3:  Positive Contributory Factors / PSF Details 
Indicate any positive factors beyond what is nominally expected that contributed to the subevent.  Check all that apply; if 
no details apply for a PSF category, check None.  Indicate whether the detail is selected based on evidence directly from 
the source or if it is coder inference.  Leave a detailed comment, with reference to the source document.  This information 
is used to calculate the Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) level in Section 5.  This table continues on the next page. 
 
PSF Positive Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
Available Time  More than sufficient time given the context  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Stress & Stressors  Enhanced alertness / no negative effects  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Complexity  Failures have single vs. multiple effects  Source     Inferred       
  Causal connections apparent  Source     Inferred       
  Dependencies well defined  Source     Inferred       
  Few or no concurrent tasks  Source     Inferred       
  Action straightforward with little to memorize and 
with no burden 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Experience & Training  Frequently performed / well-practiced task  Source     Inferred       
  Well qualified / trained for task  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Procedures & Reference 
Documents 
 Guidance particularly relevant and correctly 
directed the correct action or response 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Ergonomics & HMI  Unique features of HMI were particularly useful to 
this situation 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Fitness for Duty / Fatigue  Optimal health / fitness was key to the success  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Work Processes  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Planning / Scheduling  Correct work package development important to 
the success  
 Source     Inferred       
  Work planning / staff scheduling important to the 
success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Supervision / Management  Clear performance standards  Source     Inferred       
  Supervision properly involved in task  Source     Inferred       
189
HERA, Rev. 7/5/2007 B-3
PSF Positive Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Supervision alerted operators to key issue that 
they had missed 
 Source     Inferred       
  Pre-task briefing focused on failure scenario that 
actually occurred / discussed response plans that 
were directly applicable 
 Source     Inferred       
  Pre-task briefing alerted operators to potential 
problems in a way that made them alert to the 
situation that developed 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Conduct of Work  Quick identification of key information was 
important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Error found by 2nd checker, 2nd crew, or 2nd unit  Source     Inferred       
  Important information easily differentiated  Source     Inferred       
  Determining appropriate procedure to use in 
unique situation was important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Complex system interactions identified and 
resolved 
 Source     Inferred       
  Remembered omitted step  Source     Inferred       
  Difficult or potentially confusing situation well 
understood 
 Source     Inferred       
  Safety implications identified and understood in a 
way that was important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Acceptance criteria understood and properly 
applied to resolve difficult situation 
 Source     Inferred       
  Proper post-modification testing identified and 
ensured resolution of significant problem 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Problem Identification & 
Resolution (PIR) /  
Corrective Action Plan (CAP) 
 Good trending of problems was important in 
correct diagnosis / response plan revision 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Adaptation of industry notices / practices was key 
to correct diagnosis / response plan verification 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Good corrective action plan avoided serious 
problems 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Communication  Communications practice was key to avoiding 
severe difficulties 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Environment  Environment particularly important to success  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics 
 Extraordinary teamwork and / or sharing of work 
assignments was important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Exceptional coordination / communications 
clarified problems during event 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
 
Section 4:  Negative Contributory Factors / PSF Details 
Indicate any negative factors that contributed to the subevent.  Check all that apply; if no details apply for a PSF category, 
check None.  Indicate whether the detail is selected based on evidence directly from the source or if it is coder inference.  
Leave a detailed comment, with reference to the source document.  This information is used to calculate the Performance 
Shaping Factor (PSF) level in Section 5.  This table continues over the next three pages. 
 
PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
Available Time  Limited time to focus on tasks  Source     Inferred       
  Time pressure to complete task  Source     Inferred       
  Inappropriate balance between available and 
required time 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Stress & Stressors  High stress  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Complexity  High number of alarms  Source     Inferred       
  Ambiguous or misleading information present  Source     Inferred       
  Information fails to point directly to the problem  Source     Inferred       
  Difficulties in obtaining feedback  Source     Inferred       
  General ambiguity of the event  Source     Inferred       
  Extensive knowledge regarding the physical 
layout of the plant is required 
 Source     Inferred       
  Coordination required between multiple people in 
multiple locations 
 Source     Inferred       
  Scenario demands that the operator combine 
information from different parts of the process and 
information systems 
 Source     Inferred       
  Worker distracted / interrupted (W2 198)  Source     Inferred       
  Demands to track and memorize information  Source     Inferred       
  Problems in differentiating important from less 
important information 
 Source     Inferred       
  Simultaneous tasks with high attention demands  Source     Inferred       
  Components failing have multiple versus single 
effects 
 Source     Inferred       
  Weak causal connections exist  Source     Inferred       
  Loss of plant functionality complicates recovery 
path 
 Source     Inferred       
  System dependencies are not well defined  Source     Inferred       
  Presence of multiple faults  Source     Inferred       
  Simultaneous maintenance tasks required or 
planned 
 Source     Inferred       
  Causes equipment to perform differently during 
the event 
 Source     Inferred       
  Subevent contributes to confusion in 
understanding the event 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Experience & Training  Fitness for Duty (FFD) training missing / less 
than adequate (LTA) (F 124) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Training LTA (T 100)  Source     Inferred       
  Training process problem (T 101)  Source     Inferred       
  Individual knowledge problem (T 102)  Source     Inferred       
  Simulator training LTA (T4 103)  Source     Inferred       
  Work practice or craft skill LTA (W2 188)  Source     Inferred       
  Not familiar with job performance standards  Source     Inferred       
  Not familiar / well practiced with task  Source     Inferred       
  Not familiar with tools  Source     Inferred       
  Not qualified for assigned task  Source     Inferred       
  Training incorrect  Source     Inferred       
  Situation outside the scope of training  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Procedures & Reference 
Documents 
 No procedure / reference documents (P 110)  Source     Inferred       
  Procedure / reference document technical 
content less than adequate (LTA) (P 111) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedure / reference document contains human 
factors deficiencies (P 112) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedure / reference document development 
and maintenance LTA (P 113) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedures do not cover situation  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Ergonomics & HMI  Alarms / annunciators less than adequate (LTA) 
(H1) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Controls / input devices LTA (H2)  Source     Inferred       
  Displays LTA (H3)  Source     Inferred       
  Panel or workstation layout LTA (H4)  Source     Inferred       
  Equipment LTA (H5)  Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Tools and materials LTA (H6)  Source     Inferred       
  Labels LTA (H7)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Fitness for Duty / Fatigue  Working continuously for considerable number of 
hours 
 Source     Inferred       
  Working without rest day for considerable time  Source     Inferred       
  Unfamiliar work cycle  Source     Inferred       
  Frequent changes of shift  Source     Inferred       
  Problem related to night work  Source     Inferred       
  Circadian factors / individual differences (F 127)  Source     Inferred       
  Impairment (F 129)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Work Processes  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred       
Planning / Scheduling  Work planning does not control excessive 
continuous working hours (F 125)  
 Source     Inferred       
  Inadequate staffing / task allocation (W1 181)  Source     Inferred       
  Scheduling and planning less than adequate 
(LTA) (W1 180) 
 Source     Inferred Fermi has a policy that allows 
preventative maintenance to be 
performed up to 25% later than 
recommended time.  Scheduling of 
preventative maintenance was 
inadequate. 
  Work package quality LTA (W1 182)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred . 
Supervision / Management  Administrative assurance of personnel ability and 
qualification to perform work less than adequate 
(LTA) (F 120-122) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Inadequate supervision / command and control 
(O1 130) 
 Source     Inferred Supervisors were not aware of failure to 
follow modification process, or 
supervisors did nothing to correct this. 
  Management expectations or directions less than 
adequate (O1 131)  
 Source     Inferred       
  Duties and tasks not clearly explained / work 
orders not clearly given 
 Source     Inferred       
  Progress not adequately monitored  Source     Inferred       
  Inadequate control of contractors  Source     Inferred       
  Frequent task re-assignment  Source     Inferred       
  Pre-job activities (e.g., pre-job briefing) LTA (W1 
183) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Safety aspects of task not emphasized  Source     Inferred Management routinely exceeded the 
recommended time between preventative 
maintenance tasks. 
  Informally sanctioned by management  Source     Inferred   
 
  Formally sanctioned workarounds cause problem  Source     Inferred Licensee routinely allowed the 25% grace 
period. 
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred       
Conduct of Work  Self-check less than adequate (LTA) (W2 197)  Source     Inferred       
  Improper tools or materials selected / provided / 
used 
 Source     Inferred       
  Necessary tools / materials not provided or used  Source     Inferred       
  Information present but not adequately used  Source     Inferred Personnel had access to vendor manual 
specifying set point volt per cell 
requirements. 
  Failure to adequately coordinate multiple tasks / 
task partitioning / interruptions 
 Source     Inferred       
  Fitness for Duty self-declaration LTA (F 123)  Source     Inferred       
  Fitness for Duty non-compliance (F 128)  Source     Inferred       
  Control room sign off on maintenance not 
performed 
 Source     Inferred       
  Tag outs LTA (W1 184)  Source     Inferred       
  Second independent checker not used or 
available 
 Source     Inferred       
  Work untimely (e.g., too long, late) (W2 192)  Source     Inferred       
  Housekeeping LTA (W2 194)  Source     Inferred       
  Logkeeping or log review LTA (W2 195)  Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Independent verification / plant tours LTA (W2 
196) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedural adherence LTA (W2 185)  Source     Inferred  Maintenance personnel did not follow 
established modification process. 
  Failure to take action / meet requirements (W2 
186) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Action implementation LTA (W2 187)  Source     Inferred       
  Recognition of adverse condition / questioning 
LTA (W2 189) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Failure to stop work / non conservative decision 
making (W2 190) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Non-conservative action (W2 193)  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to apply knowledge  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to access available sources of 
information 
 Source     Inferred       
  Post-modification testing inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Post-maintenance testing inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Retest requirements not specified  Source     Inferred       
  Retest delayed  Source     Inferred       
  Test acceptance criteria inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Test results review inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Surveillance schedule not followed  Source     Inferred       
  Situational surveillance not performed  Source     Inferred       
  Required surveillance / test not scheduled  Source     Inferred       
  Incorrect parts / consumables installed / used  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to exclude foreign material  Source     Inferred       
  Incorrect restoration of plant following 
maintenance / isolation / testing 
 Source     Inferred       
  Independent decision to perform work around or 
circumvention 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred       
Problem Identification & 
Resolution (PIR) /  
Corrective Action Plan (CAP) 
 Problem not completely or accurately identified 
(R1 140) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Problem not properly classified or prioritized (R1 
141) 
 Source     Inferred Management was aware of continuing 
problems with CTG 11-1.  CTG 11-1 had 
been overhauled in 1996, underwent 
major maintenance in 1997; After 1999 
CTG 11-1 failed maintenance 
performance criteria of less than 3 failures 
in 20 demands.  14 failures related to 
CTG 11-1 were observed between 
December 2000 and the time of this 
event. 
 
 Operating experience review less than adequate 
(LTA) (R1 142) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Failures to respond to industry notices or follow 
industry practices 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Tracking / trending LTA (R1 143)  Source     Inferred Management was aware of continuing 
problems with CTG 11-1 but did not 
establish interim corrective actions to 
ensure that unit started on demand. 
  Root cause development LTA (R2 145)  Source     Inferred       
  Evaluation LTA (R2 146)  Source     Inferred       
  Corrective action LTA (R3 147)  Source     Inferred       
  Action not yet started or untimely (R3 148)  Source     Inferred       
  No action planned (R3 149)  Source     Inferred       
  CAP Programmatic deficiency (R4 150)  Source     Inferred       
  Willingness to raise concerns LTA (R5 151)  Source     Inferred       
 
 Preventing and detecting retaliation LTA (R5 
152) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Failure to resolve known problems in a prompt 
fashion 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Failure to maintain equipment in accordance with 
licensing basis  
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Audit / self-assessment / effectiveness review 
LTA (R1 144) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred       
Communication  No communication / information not 
communicated (C 160) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Misunderstood or misinterpreted information (C 
51) 
 Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Communication not timely (C 52)  Source     Inferred       
  Communication content less than adequate 
(LTA) (C 53) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Communication equipment LTA (C 162)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Environment  Temperature / humidity less than adequate (LTA) 
(H10 71) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Lighting LTA (H10 72)  Source     Inferred       
  Noise (H10 73)  Source     Inferred       
  Radiation (H10 74)  Source     Inferred       
  Work area layout or accessibility LTA (H10 75)  Source     Inferred       
  Postings / signs LTA (H10 76)  Source     Inferred       
  Task design / work environment LTA (F 126)   Source     Inferred       
  Fire / smoke  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics 
 Supervisor too involved in tasks, inadequate 
oversight 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Crew interaction style not appropriate to the 
situation 
 Source     Inferred       
  Team interactions less than adequate (W2 191)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
 
Section 5:  Performance Shaping Factors 
Assign PSF ratings for the subevent.  This section summarizes and assigns a PSF level (Insufficient Information, Good, 
Nominal, Poor) to the detailed performance shaping factor information indicated in Sections 3 and 4.  Leave a detailed 
comment, with reference to the appropriate details sections. 
 
PSF PSF Level Comment 
Available Time Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Stress & Stressors Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Complexity Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Experience & Training Insufficient Information 





Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Ergonomics& HMI Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Fitness for Duty / 
Fatigue 
Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Work Processes Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Overall work processes were poor.  See section 4. 
Planning / Scheduling Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Management policy of allowing a 25% grace period on preventative maintenance contributed to 




Good  Nominal  Poor 
Inadequate oversight of maintenance personnel.  Poor emphasis on safety. 
Conduct of Work Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Maintenance personnel did not follow established modification process or consult vendor 
manual. 
Problem Identification & 
Resolution (PIR) / 
Corrective Action Plan 
(CAP) 
Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
CTG 11-1 exceeded allowable failures on demand  for several years.  Management failed to 
implement preventative measures to ensure that CTG 11-1 would start on demand. 
Communication Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Environment Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics 
Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
 
Section 6:  Human Cognition 
Part A:  Human Information Processing 
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Indicate whether the error or success occurred in detection, interpretation, planning, action, a combination (check all that 
apply), or could not be determined from the source information. 
 
Step  Comment 
Detection: Detection or recognition of a 
stimulus (e.g., a problem, alarm, etc.) 
 Correct detection 
 Correct detection based on incorrect 
information 
 Incorrect detection 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Personnel did not detect that set point 
needed to be changed. 
Interpretation: Interpretation of the 
stimulus (e.g., understanding the meaning 
of the stimulus) 
 
 Correct interpretation 
 Correct interpretation based on incorrect 
detection 
 Incorrect interpretation 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Does not apply 
Planning: Planning a response to the 
stimulus 
 
 Correct planning 
 Correct plan based on incorrect interpretation 
/ detection 
 Incorrect plan 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Did not know they needed to update the 
set point, so they correctly did not plan to 
change it. 
Action: Executing the planned response 
 
 Correct action 
 Correct action based on incorrect plan / 
interpretation / detection 
 Incorrect action 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Did not know they needed to update the 
set point, so they correctly did not change 
it. 
Indeterminate  Indeterminate       
 
Part B:  Cognitive Level 
Indicate whether the human activity involved in this subevent was skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based, or could not 
be determined from the source information. 
 
 Activity Type  Comment 
 Skill-Based: Routine, highly-practiced task, carried out in a 
largely automatic fashion, with occasional conscious checks 
on progress. 
Correct  Incorrect       
 Rule-Based: Task requires application of memorized or 
written rules (e.g., if, then), with conscious thinking to verify 
if the resulting solution is appropriate. 
Correct  Incorrect       
 Knowledge-Based: Conscious, effortful thought and/or 
problem solving, often for a novel task or situation. 
Correct  Incorrect This action needec close attention to 
procedure and knowledge of interacting 
component (battery) 
 Indeterminate        
 
Section 7:  Error Type  Check to Exclude 
Code for XHE only.  Indicate the appropriate error type for any human errors (XHEs).  Leave a detailed comment, with 
reference to the source document.  This list continues on the next page. 
 
Part A:  Commission / Omission (Select one.) 
 Error Type Comment 
 Error of Commission: An incorrect, unintentional, or unplanned action is an error of 
commission. 
      
 Error of Omission: Failure to perform an action is an error of omission. Did not update set points 
 Indeterminate       
 
Part B:  Slip / Lapse / Mistake / Circumvention / Sabotage (Select all that apply.) 
 Error Type Comment 
 Slip or lapse: A slip or lapse is an unconscious unintended action or failure to act, 
resulting from an attention failure or a memory failure in a routine activity. In spite of a 
good understanding of the system (process, procedure, specific context) and the 
intention to perform the task correctly, an unconscious unintended action or a failure to 
act occurs or a wrong reflex or inappropriate instinctive action takes place.  If it is not 
possible to assign one of the subcategories below to indicate the type of slip or miss, 
then this code is assigned. 
      
 Response implementation error       
 Unconscious wrong action or failure to act, wrong reflex, wrong instinctive action       
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 Error Type Comment 
 Wrong action or lack of action due to omission of intentional check, insufficient degree 
of attention, unawareness 
      
 Strong habit intrusion, unwanted reversion to earlier plan       
 Continuation of habitual sequence of actions       
 Failure to act because focal attention is elsewhere, failure to attend to need for change 
in action sequence 
      
 Omission of intentional check after task interruption       
 Interference error between two simultaneous tasks       
 Confusion error (wrong component, wrong unit), spatial disorientation (wrong direction), 
check on wrong object 
      
 Omission of steps or unnecessary repeating of steps in (unconscious) action sequence       
 Task sequence reversal error       
 If appropriate, check the most applicable characterization of the slip: 
 too early   too late   too fast   too slow   too hard   too soft   too long   too 
short   undercorrect   overcorrect   misread 
      
 Mistake: A mistake is an intended action resulting in an undesired outcome in a 
problem solving activity: a person made a wrong action because he did not understand 
the system, the procedure, the specific context, the prescribed task, etc. Use this 
category if you cannot distinguish among the mistake examples listed below.  
      
 Misdiagnosis, misinterpretation, situation assessment error       
 Wrong mental model, wrong hypothesis       
 Failure to detect situation, information overload (indications not noticed, acted upon)       
 Use of wrong procedure       
 Misunderstood instructions / information       
 Lack of specific knowledge       
 Tunnel vision (focus on limited number of indications, lack of big picture)       
 Over-reliance on favorite indications       
 Not believing indications / information (lack of confidence)       
 Mindset / preconceived idea / confirmation bias / overconfidence (failure to change 
opinion, discarding contradictory evidence) 
      
 Over-reliance on expert knowledge       
 Circumvention: In spite of a good understanding of the system (process, procedure, 
specific context) an intentional breaking of known rules, prescriptions, etc., occurred 
without malevolent intention.  Use this field if it is clear that a circumvention applies but 
unclear which of the options below apply. 
      
 Administrative control circumvented or intentionally not performed       
 Required procedures, drawings, or other references not used Did not follow established modification 
process. 
 Intentional shortcuts in prescribed task sequence       
 Unauthorized material substitution       
 Situations that require compromises between system safety and other objectives 
(production, personal or personnel safety, etc.) 
      
 Intentional disregard of safety prescriptions / concerns       
 Sabotage: An intentional breaking of known rules, prescriptions, etc., occurred with 
malevolent intention. 
      
 Indeterminate       
 
Section 8:  Subevent Comments 
Provide any additional remarks necessary to complete or supplement the worksheet analysis for this subevent. 
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Human Event Repository & Analysis (HERA) Worksheet, Part B 
 
Source Document: LER50-341-2003-002  Subevent Code: HS1 
Description: The inverter had the incorrect low voltage set points for about 6 months until the set point card S2A-167 was 
changed.  During this card replacement, personnel referenced the vendor manual and recognized the 1.75 volt/cell 
requirement, counted 56 cells on CTG 11-1 and correctly adjusted the low voltage trip set point to 98 volts, installed the 
card and placed CTG 11-1 in service. 
 
Section 1:  Personnel Involved in Subevent 
Indicate which personnel were involved in the subevent.  Check all that apply. 
 
 Operations (OPS)  Plant Support Personnel  Security 
 OPS Supervisors  Administrative Support  Training 
 Control Room (CR) Operators  Chemistry  Shipping / Transportation 
 Outside of CR Operators  Emergency Planning / Response  Specialized Task Force 
 Technical Support Center (TSC)  Engineering  Work Control 
 Maintenance and Testing   Fitness for Duty  Licensing / Regulatory Affairs 
 Maintenance Supervision / Planning   Fuel Handling  Non-Plant Personnel 
 Mechanical   Health Physics  Contractor Personnel 
 Electrical  Procedure Writers  Manufacturer 
 I&C  QA / Oversight  NRC / Regulator  
 Management  Site-Wide  Vendor  
 Other:       
 
Section 2:  Plant Conditions 
Part A:  Contributing Plant Conditions 
Indicate plant conditions that contribute to this subevent, and / or influence the decisions and / or actions of personnel.  
Leave a detailed comment, with reference to the source document. 
 
Plant Condition Comment 
 Equipment installed does not meet all codes / requirements       
 Manufacturer fabrication / construction inadequate       
 Specifications provided by manufacturer inadequate       
 Documents, drawings, information, etc., provided by the manufacturer incorrect or 
inadequate 
      
 Substitute parts / material used do not meet specifications       
 Material used inadequate       
 QA requirements not used or met during procurement process       
 Post-procurement requirements not used / performed        
 Lack of proper tools / materials       
 Installation workmanship inadequate Previous installation (XHE1) was incorrect. 
 Equipment failure / malfunction       
 System / train / equipment unavailable       
 Instrumentation problems / inaccuracies       
 Control problems       
 Plant / equipment not in a normal state       
 Plant transitioning between power modes       
 Loss of electrical power       
 Reactor scram / plant transient       
 Fire       
 Other:             
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate       
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Part B:  Effects on Plant  Check to Exclude 
Indicate the effects of this subevent on the plant. 
1.  Affected Function(s): Human Performance [D] - Work practices 
2.  Affected System(s): ACP 
3.  Affected Component(s): ACP: INV 
 
Section 3:  Positive Contributory Factors / PSF Details 
Indicate any positive factors beyond what is nominally expected that contributed to the subevent.  Check all that apply; if 
no details apply for a PSF category, check None.  Indicate whether the detail is selected based on evidence directly from 
the source or if it is coder inference.  Leave a detailed comment, with reference to the source document.  This information 
is used to calculate the Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) level in Section 5.  This table continues on the next page. 
 
PSF Positive Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
Available Time  More than sufficient time given the context  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Stress & Stressors  Enhanced alertness / no negative effects  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Complexity  Failures have single vs. multiple effects  Source     Inferred       
  Causal connections apparent  Source     Inferred       
  Dependencies well defined  Source     Inferred       
  Few or no concurrent tasks  Source     Inferred       
  Action straightforward with little to memorize and 
with no burden 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Experience & Training  Frequently performed / well-practiced task  Source     Inferred       
  Well qualified / trained for task  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Procedures & Reference 
Documents 
 Guidance particularly relevant and correctly 
directed the correct action or response 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Ergonomics & HMI  Unique features of HMI were particularly useful to 
this situation 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Fitness for Duty / Fatigue  Optimal health / fitness was key to the success  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Work Processes  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred       
Planning / Scheduling  Correct work package development important to 
the success  
 Source     Inferred       
  Work planning / staff scheduling important to the 
success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Supervision / Management  Clear performance standards  Source     Inferred       
  Supervision properly involved in task  Source     Inferred       
  Supervision alerted operators to key issue that 
they had missed 
 Source     Inferred       
  Pre-task briefing focused on failure scenario that 
actually occurred / discussed response plans that 
were directly applicable 
 Source     Inferred       
  Pre-task briefing alerted operators to potential 
problems in a way that made them alert to the 
situation that developed 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
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PSF Positive Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Conduct of Work  Quick identification of key information was 
important to success 
 Source     Inferred Maintenance personnel realized that low 
set point must be adjusted. 
  Error found by 2nd checker, 2nd crew, or 2nd unit  Source     Inferred       
  Important information easily differentiated  Source     Inferred       
  Determining appropriate procedure to use in 
unique situation was important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Complex system interactions identified and 
resolved 
 Source     Inferred       
  Remembered omitted step  Source     Inferred       
  Difficult or potentially confusing situation well 
understood 
 Source     Inferred       
  Safety implications identified and understood in a 
way that was important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
  Acceptance criteria understood and properly 
applied to resolve difficult situation 
 Source     Inferred       
  Proper post-modification testing identified and 
ensured resolution of significant problem 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred       
Problem Identification & 
Resolution (PIR) /  
Corrective Action Plan (CAP) 
 Good trending of problems was important in 
correct diagnosis / response plan revision 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Adaptation of industry notices / practices was key 
to correct diagnosis / response plan verification 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Good corrective action plan avoided serious 
problems 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Communication  Communications practice was key to avoiding 
severe difficulties 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Environment  Environment particularly important to success  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics 
 Extraordinary teamwork and / or sharing of work 
assignments was important to success 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Exceptional coordination / communications 
clarified problems during event 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a positive factor. 
 
Section 4:  Negative Contributory Factors / PSF Details 
Indicate any negative factors that contributed to the subevent.  Check all that apply; if no details apply for a PSF category, 
check None.  Indicate whether the detail is selected based on evidence directly from the source or if it is coder inference.  
Leave a detailed comment, with reference to the source document.  This information is used to calculate the Performance 
Shaping Factor (PSF) level in Section 5.  This table continues over the next three pages. 
 
PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
Available Time  Limited time to focus on tasks  Source     Inferred       
  Time pressure to complete task  Source     Inferred       
  Inappropriate balance between available and 
required time 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Stress & Stressors  High stress  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Complexity  High number of alarms  Source     Inferred       
  Ambiguous or misleading information present  Source     Inferred       
  Information fails to point directly to the problem  Source     Inferred       
  Difficulties in obtaining feedback  Source     Inferred       
  General ambiguity of the event  Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Extensive knowledge regarding the physical 
layout of the plant is required 
 Source     Inferred       
  Coordination required between multiple people in 
multiple locations 
 Source     Inferred       
  Scenario demands that the operator combine 
information from different parts of the process and 
information systems 
 Source     Inferred       
  Worker distracted / interrupted (W2 198)  Source     Inferred       
  Demands to track and memorize information  Source     Inferred       
  Problems in differentiating important from less 
important information 
 Source     Inferred       
  Simultaneous tasks with high attention demands  Source     Inferred       
  Components failing have multiple versus single 
effects 
 Source     Inferred       
  Weak causal connections exist  Source     Inferred       
  Loss of plant functionality complicates recovery 
path 
 Source     Inferred       
  System dependencies are not well defined  Source     Inferred       
  Presence of multiple faults  Source     Inferred       
  Simultaneous maintenance tasks required or 
planned 
 Source     Inferred       
  Causes equipment to perform differently during 
the event 
 Source     Inferred       
  Subevent contributes to confusion in 
understanding the event 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Experience & Training  Fitness for Duty (FFD) training missing / less 
than adequate (LTA) (F 124) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Training LTA (T 100)  Source     Inferred       
  Training process problem (T 101)  Source     Inferred       
  Individual knowledge problem (T 102)  Source     Inferred       
  Simulator training LTA (T4 103)  Source     Inferred       
  Work practice or craft skill LTA (W2 188)  Source     Inferred       
  Not familiar with job performance standards  Source     Inferred       
  Not familiar / well practiced with task  Source     Inferred       
  Not familiar with tools  Source     Inferred       
  Not qualified for assigned task  Source     Inferred       
  Training incorrect  Source     Inferred       
  Situation outside the scope of training  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Procedures & Reference 
Documents 
 No procedure / reference documents (P 110)  Source     Inferred       
  Procedure / reference document technical 
content less than adequate (LTA) (P 111) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedure / reference document contains human 
factors deficiencies (P 112) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedure / reference document development 
and maintenance LTA (P 113) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedures do not cover situation  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Ergonomics & HMI  Alarms / annunciators less than adequate (LTA) 
(H1) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Controls / input devices LTA (H2)  Source     Inferred       
  Displays LTA (H3)  Source     Inferred       
  Panel or workstation layout LTA (H4)  Source     Inferred       
  Equipment LTA (H5)  Source     Inferred       
  Tools and materials LTA (H6)  Source     Inferred       
  Labels LTA (H7)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Fitness for Duty / Fatigue  Working continuously for considerable number of 
hours 
 Source     Inferred       
  Working without rest day for considerable time  Source     Inferred       
  Unfamiliar work cycle  Source     Inferred       
  Frequent changes of shift  Source     Inferred       
  Problem related to night work  Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Circadian factors / individual differences (F 127)  Source     Inferred       
  Impairment (F 129)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Work Processes  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Planning / Scheduling  Work planning does not control excessive 
continuous working hours (F 125)  
 Source     Inferred       
  Inadequate staffing / task allocation (W1 181)  Source     Inferred       
  Scheduling and planning less than adequate 
(LTA) (W1 180) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Work package quality LTA (W1 182)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Supervision / Management  Administrative assurance of personnel ability and 
qualification to perform work less than adequate 
(LTA) (F 120-122) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Inadequate supervision / command and control 
(O1 130) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Management expectations or directions less than 
adequate (O1 131)  
 Source     Inferred       
  Duties and tasks not clearly explained / work 
orders not clearly given 
 Source     Inferred       
  Progress not adequately monitored  Source     Inferred       
  Inadequate control of contractors  Source     Inferred       
  Frequent task re-assignment  Source     Inferred       
  Pre-job activities (e.g., pre-job briefing) LTA (W1 
183) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Safety aspects of task not emphasized  Source     Inferred       
  Informally sanctioned by management  Source     Inferred       
  Formally sanctioned workarounds cause problem  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Conduct of Work  Self-check less than adequate (LTA) (W2 197)  Source     Inferred       
  Improper tools or materials selected / provided / 
used 
 Source     Inferred       
  Necessary tools / materials not provided or used  Source     Inferred       
  Information present but not adequately used  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to adequately coordinate multiple tasks / 
task partitioning / interruptions 
 Source     Inferred       
  Fitness for Duty self-declaration LTA (F 123)  Source     Inferred       
  Fitness for Duty non-compliance (F 128)  Source     Inferred       
  Control room sign off on maintenance not 
performed 
 Source     Inferred       
  Tag outs LTA (W1 184)  Source     Inferred       
  Second independent checker not used or 
available 
 Source     Inferred       
  Work untimely (e.g., too long, late) (W2 192)  Source     Inferred       
  Housekeeping LTA (W2 194)  Source     Inferred       
  Logkeeping or log review LTA (W2 195)  Source     Inferred       
  Independent verification / plant tours LTA (W2 
196) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Procedural adherence LTA (W2 185)  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to take action / meet requirements (W2 
186) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Action implementation LTA (W2 187)  Source     Inferred       
  Recognition of adverse condition / questioning 
LTA (W2 189) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Failure to stop work / non conservative decision 
making (W2 190) 
 Source     Inferred       
 Non-conservative action (W2 193)  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to apply knowledge  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to access available sources of 
information 
 Source     Inferred       
  Post-modification testing inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Post-maintenance testing inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Retest requirements not specified  Source     Inferred       
  Retest delayed  Source     Inferred       
  Test acceptance criteria inadequate  Source     Inferred       
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PSF Negative Contributory Factor Source / Inference Comment 
  Test results review inadequate  Source     Inferred       
  Surveillance schedule not followed  Source     Inferred       
  Situational surveillance not performed  Source     Inferred       
  Required surveillance / test not scheduled  Source     Inferred       
  Incorrect parts / consumables installed / used  Source     Inferred       
  Failure to exclude foreign material  Source     Inferred       
  Incorrect restoration of plant following 
maintenance / isolation / testing 
 Source     Inferred       
  Independent decision to perform work around or 
circumvention 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Problem Identification & 
Resolution (PIR) /  
Corrective Action Plan (CAP) 
 Problem not completely or accurately identified 
(R1 140) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Problem not properly classified or prioritized (R1 
141) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Operating experience review less than adequate 
(LTA) (R1 142) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Failures to respond to industry notices or follow 
industry practices 
 Source     Inferred       
  Tracking / trending LTA (R1 143)  Source     Inferred       
  Root cause development LTA (R2 145)  Source     Inferred       
  Evaluation LTA (R2 146)  Source     Inferred       
  Corrective action LTA (R3 147)  Source     Inferred       
  Action not yet started or untimely (R3 148)  Source     Inferred       
  No action planned (R3 149)  Source     Inferred       
  CAP Programmatic deficiency (R4 150)  Source     Inferred       
  Willingness to raise concerns LTA (R5 151)  Source     Inferred       
 
 Preventing and detecting retaliation LTA (R5 
152) 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Failure to resolve known problems in a prompt 
fashion 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Failure to maintain equipment in accordance with 
licensing basis  
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Audit / self-assessment / effectiveness review 
LTA (R1 144) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Communication  No communication / information not 
communicated (C 160) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Misunderstood or misinterpreted information (C 
51) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Communication not timely (C 52)  Source     Inferred       
  Communication content less than adequate 
(LTA) (C 53) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Communication equipment LTA (C 162)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Environment  Temperature / humidity less than adequate (LTA) 
(H10 71) 
 Source     Inferred       
  Lighting LTA (H10 72)  Source     Inferred       
  Noise (H10 73)  Source     Inferred       
  Radiation (H10 74)  Source     Inferred       
  Work area layout or accessibility LTA (H10 75)  Source     Inferred       
  Postings / signs LTA (H10 76)  Source     Inferred       
  Task design / work environment LTA (F 126)   Source     Inferred       
  Fire / smoke  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
  None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics 
 Supervisor too involved in tasks, inadequate 
oversight 
 Source     Inferred       
 
 Crew interaction style not appropriate to the 
situation 
 Source     Inferred       
  Team interactions less than adequate (W2 191)  Source     Inferred       
  Other:        Source     Inferred       
 
 None / Not Applicable / Indeterminate  Source     Inferred Nothing in the source indicates that this 
was a negative factor. 
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Section 5:  Performance Shaping Factors 
Assign PSF ratings for the subevent.  This section summarizes and assigns a PSF level (Insufficient Information, Good, 
Nominal, Poor) to the detailed performance shaping factor information indicated in Sections 3 and 4.  Leave a detailed 
comment, with reference to the appropriate details sections. 
 
PSF PSF Level Comment 
Available Time Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Stress & Stressors Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Complexity Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Experience & Training Insufficient Information 





Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Ergonomics& HMI Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Fitness for Duty / 
Fatigue 
Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Work Processes Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
      
Planning / Scheduling Insufficient Information 





Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Conduct of Work Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Maintenance personnel correctly identified need to update set points. 
Problem Identification & 
Resolution (PIR) / 
Corrective Action Plan 
(CAP) 
Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Communication Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Environment Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
Team Dynamics / 
Characteristics 
Insufficient Information 
Good  Nominal  Poor 
Insufficient information. 
 
Section 6:  Human Cognition 
Part A:  Human Information Processing 
Indicate whether the error or success occurred in detection, interpretation, planning, action, a combination (check all that 
apply), or could not be determined from the source information. 
 
Step  Comment 
Detection: Detection or recognition of a 
stimulus (e.g., a problem, alarm, etc.) 
 Correct detection 
 Correct detection based on incorrect 
information 
 Incorrect detection 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Personnel correctly matched maintenance 
procedure requirements with actual 
hardware. 
Interpretation: Interpretation of the 
stimulus (e.g., understanding the meaning 
of the stimulus) 
 
 Correct interpretation 
 Correct interpretation based on incorrect 
detection 
 Incorrect interpretation 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Personnel correctly resolved setpoint 
calculation. 
Planning: Planning a response to the 
stimulus 
 
 Correct planning 
 Correct plan based on incorrect interpretation 
/ detection 
 Incorrect plan 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Personnel correctly planned response. 
Action: Executing the planned response 
 
 Correct action 
 Correct action based on incorrect plan / 
interpretation / detection 
 Incorrect action 
 Not Applicable / Insufficient Information 
Personnel correctly executed proper 
setpoints. 
Indeterminate  Indeterminate       
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Part B:  Cognitive Level 
Indicate whether the human activity involved in this subevent was skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based, or could not 
be determined from the source information. 
 
 Activity Type  Comment 
 Skill-Based: Routine, highly-practiced task, carried out in a 
largely automatic fashion, with occasional conscious checks 
on progress. 
Correct  Incorrect       
 Rule-Based: Task requires application of memorized or 
written rules (e.g., if, then), with conscious thinking to verify 
if the resulting solution is appropriate. 
Correct  Incorrect       
 Knowledge-Based: Conscious, effortful thought and/or 
problem solving, often for a novel task or situation. 
Correct  Incorrect Action required knowledge of related 
components in system. 
 Indeterminate        
 
Section 7:  Error Type  Check to Exclude 
Code for XHE only.  Indicate the appropriate error type for any human errors (XHEs).  Leave a detailed comment, with 
reference to the source document.  This list continues on the next page. 
 
Part A:  Commission / Omission (Select one.) 
 Error Type Comment 
 Error of Commission: An incorrect, unintentional, or unplanned action is an error of 
commission. 
      
 Error of Omission: Failure to perform an action is an error of omission.       
 Indeterminate       
 
Part B:  Slip / Lapse / Mistake / Circumvention / Sabotage (Select all that apply.) 
 Error Type Comment 
 Slip or lapse: A slip or lapse is an unconscious unintended action or failure to act, 
resulting from an attention failure or a memory failure in a routine activity. In spite of a 
good understanding of the system (process, procedure, specific context) and the 
intention to perform the task correctly, an unconscious unintended action or a failure to 
act occurs or a wrong reflex or inappropriate instinctive action takes place.  If it is not 
possible to assign one of the subcategories below to indicate the type of slip or miss, 
then this code is assigned. 
      
 Response implementation error       
 Unconscious wrong action or failure to act, wrong reflex, wrong instinctive action       
 Wrong action or lack of action due to omission of intentional check, insufficient degree 
of attention, unawareness 
      
 Strong habit intrusion, unwanted reversion to earlier plan       
 Continuation of habitual sequence of actions       
 Failure to act because focal attention is elsewhere, failure to attend to need for change 
in action sequence 
      
 Omission of intentional check after task interruption       
 Interference error between two simultaneous tasks       
 Confusion error (wrong component, wrong unit), spatial disorientation (wrong direction), 
check on wrong object 
      
 Omission of steps or unnecessary repeating of steps in (unconscious) action sequence       
 Task sequence reversal error       
 If appropriate, check the most applicable characterization of the slip: 
 too early   too late   too fast   too slow   too hard   too soft   too long   too 
short   undercorrect   overcorrect   misread 
      
 Mistake: A mistake is an intended action resulting in an undesired outcome in a 
problem solving activity: a person made a wrong action because he did not understand 
the system, the procedure, the specific context, the prescribed task, etc. Use this 
category if you cannot distinguish among the mistake examples listed below.  
      
 Misdiagnosis, misinterpretation, situation assessment error       
 Wrong mental model, wrong hypothesis       
 Failure to detect situation, information overload (indications not noticed, acted upon)       
 Use of wrong procedure       
 Misunderstood instructions / information       
 Lack of specific knowledge       
 Tunnel vision (focus on limited number of indications, lack of big picture)       
 Over-reliance on favorite indications       
 Not believing indications / information (lack of confidence)       
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 Error Type Comment 
 Mindset / preconceived idea / confirmation bias / overconfidence (failure to change 
opinion, discarding contradictory evidence) 
      
 Over-reliance on expert knowledge       
 Circumvention: In spite of a good understanding of the system (process, procedure, 
specific context) an intentional breaking of known rules, prescriptions, etc., occurred 
without malevolent intention.  Use this field if it is clear that a circumvention applies but 
unclear which of the options below apply. 
      
 Administrative control circumvented or intentionally not performed       
 Required procedures, drawings, or other references not used       
 Intentional shortcuts in prescribed task sequence       
 Unauthorized material substitution       
 Situations that require compromises between system safety and other objectives 
(production, personal or personnel safety, etc.) 
      
 Intentional disregard of safety prescriptions / concerns       
 Sabotage: An intentional breaking of known rules, prescriptions, etc., occurred with 
malevolent intention. 
      
 Indeterminate       
 
Section 8:  Subevent Comments 
Provide any additional remarks necessary to complete or supplement the worksheet analysis for this subevent. 
 




Appendix B demonstrates how the proposed PSF hierarchy relates to current
PSF sets. PSFs from the NRC’s Good Practices for HRA [39] are mapped onto the
new framework. A “PSF-superset” is also mapped onto the new framework. This
“PSF-superset” contains all PSFs identified during a workshop attended by over 20
international HRA experts [44].
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Proposed PSF Set NRC “Good Practices for 
HRA” PSF 










1.1. External Environment  Environment in Which the 
Action Needs To Be 
Performed 
Physical environment 
1.2. Hardware & Software 
Conditions 
Operability of the Equipment 
To Be Manipulated 
Facility/plant conditions; 
equipment state indication; 
erroneous info;  
1.3. Task Load Time Available and Time 
Required to Complete the Act, 
Including the Impact 
of Concurrent and Competing 
Activities; Workload 
Task requirements 
1.4. Time Load  Time availability 
1.5. Other Loads Distractions; parallel tasks 
1.5.1. Non-task Load Parallel tasks 
1.5.2. Passive Information 
Load 
Distractions 
1.6. Task Complexity Complexity of the Required 
Diagnosis and Response, the 
Need for Special 
Sequencing, and the 
Familiarity of the Situation 
Complexity 
1.6.1. Cognitive  









2.1. Perceived Situation: Stress  
2.1.1. Severity Risk 
2.1.2. Urgency Time Pressure, and Stress Risk, Perceived time available 
2.2. Perceived Decision:  Stress 
 
Risk 
2.2.1. Responsibility Personal risk 
2.2.2. Impact Risk 
2.2.2.1.  Personal Personal Risk 
2.2.2.2.  Plant Risk 








3.1. HSI Ergonomic Quality of the 
Human-System Interface 
(HSI) 
Ergonomics, HMI design, 
accessibility, and control 
3.1.1. Input Accessability and Operability 
of the Equipment To Be 
Manipulated 
 
3.1.2. Output Availability and Clarity of 
Instrumentation (Cues to Take 
Actions and Confirm Expected 
Plant Response) 
Plant info provided, Stimulus 
quality, 
3.2. System Responses Consideration of “Realistic” 















4.2. Direct Supervision Team/Crew Dynamics and 
Crew Characteristics 
Leadership, leadership style; 
supervision 
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4.2.1. Leadership Communications 
 
Protocols for communication 
and proc use; Protocols for 
communication and proc use 
4.2.2. Team Membership B.7 Team/Crew Dynamics and 
Crew Characteristics [Degree 
of Independence Among 
Individuals, Operator 
Attitudes/Biases/Rules, Use of 
Status Checks, Approach for 
Implementing Procedures] 
 
Monitoring; verification, crew 
dynamics 




4.4. Team Cohesion Crew dynamics 











5.1. Programs Suitability of Relevant 
Procedures and Administrative 
Controls 
 
5.1.1. Training Applicability and Suitability of 
Training/Experience 
Training, trained responses; 
practice 
5.1.1.1. Quality  
5.1.1.2. Availability  
5.1.2. Corrective Action 
Program 




5.1.2.1. Quality  
5.1.2.2. Availability  
5.1.3. Other Programs  
5.1.3.1. Quality  
5.1.3.2. Availability  
5.2. Safety Culture Questioning attitude; 
operational safety culture 
5.3. Management Work Practices  
5.3.1. Staffing Available Staffing/Resources Staffing; team/crew 
composition 
5.3.1.1. Number  
5.3.1.2. Qualification  
5.3.1.3. Team team/crew composition 
5.3.2. Scheduling Scheduling 
5.3.2.1. Prioritization  
5.3.2.2. Frequency  




5.4. Workplace adequacy  Physical environment, 
ergonomics, available resources 
5.5. Resources Suitability of Relevant 
Procedures and Administrative 
Controls 
Available resources 
5.5.1. Tools Need for Special Tools (Keys, 
Ladders, Hoses, Clothing Such 
as To Enter a Radiation Area) 
Tools, job aids 
5.5.2. Procedures Suitability of Relevant Procedural Guidance 
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5.5.3. Information pertinent to 
task 
Procedures and Administrative 
Controls 









6.1. Attention to: Special Fitness Needs, 
Consideration of “Realistic” 
Accident Sequence Diversions 
and Deviations 
 
6.1.1. Task  Attention; distractions 
6.1.2. Surroundings Situational Awareness 
6.2. Physical & Psychological 
Abilities 
Available cognitive resources; 
physical ability/stature 
6.2.1. Alertness Alertness 
6.2.2. Fatigue fatigue 
6.2.3. Impairment  
6.2.4. Sensory Limits Sensory Limits, Filtering 
6.2.5. Other  
6.3. Bias Familiarity of the Situation Anticipation sets, scripts, 
schema; Learned patterns; 
recency; conditioning; 
expectations, heuristics, 
informal rules,  mental models; 
conditioning; rules; common 
practice; past plant/industry 
performance 
6.4. Morale/motivation/attitude Special Fitness Needs Goals & Motivation 
6.4.1. Compliance Crew Characteristics Shortcuts 




Conflicting goals; Conflicts; 
Double bind; Scheduling, 
interruptions 6.4.2.2. Task order 
6.4.3. Information Use Implementation of procedure 
6.4.4. Problem Solving Style  
6.5. Knowledge & Experience Applicability and Suitability of 
Training/Experience; 
Familiarity of the Situation 
Experience; knowledge 
resources 
6.6. Skills Practice? 
6.7. Familiarity with Situation Familiarity of the Situation Experience, recency, familiarity 






Quantitative Analysis in R
Appendix C provides the computer code used to evaluate the models in R
[127]. The code runs a polychoric correlation analysis and then runs different sized
factor Minres and Principal Axes factor analysis models.
library(nFactors)
library(polycor) # Calls package to perform polychoric correlation
library(psych) # Calls package to perform Factor Analysis
options(digits=2) # Limits number of decimal places displayed
recodeddata<- data.frame(Training, SCMgmtCAP, Resources, Team, Attitude,
KnowSkillPPA, HSISysResponses, LoadsPercept, EventComplex)
#these are the variables in the 9-bubble model
NPSFs <- dim(recodeddata)[2]
#Obtains number of PSFs; used to determine size of correlation matrix
thenames <- list(names(recodeddata), names(recodeddata))
#Obtains list of PSF names
results <- matrix(0, NPSFs, NPSFs, dimnames=thenames)
#Creates empty (NPSFs x NPSFs) matrix for storing correlations
# this will get all of the polychoric correlations of the items
for(i in 1:NPSFs){
for(j in 1:NPSFs){





factor.pa(Corresults, nfactors=1, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "none",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
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#Two factor model:
factor.minres(Corresults, nfactors=2, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "none",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
#Three factor model:
factor.minres(Corresults, nfactors=3, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "none",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
#Four factor model:
factor.minres(Corresults, nfactors=4, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "none",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
#Five factor model:
factor.minres(Corresults, nfactors=5, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "none",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
#Four factor model, Varimax (orthogonal) rotation:
factor.minres(Corresults, nfactors=4, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "Varimax",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
#Four factor model, Promax (oblique) rotation:
factor.pa(Corresults, nfactors=4, residuals = FALSE, rotate = "Promax",
n.obs=158, min.err=0.001, digits=3, max.iter=5000)
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Appendix D
Raw Data Used to Develop the 9-Bubble model
This appendix contains the raw data used for the analysis and quantification
for the 9-Bubble Model. Each row of the table is a single sub-event. The identifying
information about the sub-events has been removed and replaced with a generic
sub-event number. A value of 1 signifies a Less Than Adequate (LTA) state of the






























































Sub-event 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 6 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 7 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 8 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 9 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 10 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 11 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 12 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 13 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 14 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 15 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 16 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
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Sub-event 17 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 18 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 19 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 20 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 21 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 22 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 23 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sub-event 24 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Sub-event 25 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 26 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 27 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 28 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 29 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 30 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 31 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 32 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 33 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 34 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 35 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Sub-event 36 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 37 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 38 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 39 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 40 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 41 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 42 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 43 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 44 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 45 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 46 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 48 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 49 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 50 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Sub-event 51 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 52 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 53 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 54 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 55 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 56 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 57 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 58 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
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Sub-event 59 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 60 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 61 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 62 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Sub-event 63 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Sub-event 64 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 65 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 66 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 67 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 68 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 69 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 70 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 71 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 72 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 73 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 74 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 75 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 76 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 77 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 78 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 79 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Sub-event 80 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 81 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 82 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 83 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 84 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 85 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 86 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 87 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 88 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 89 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 90 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 91 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 92 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 93 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 94 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 95 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 96 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Sub-event 97 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 98 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 99 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 100 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
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Sub-event 101 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 102 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 103 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 104 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Sub-event 105 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 106 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 107 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 108 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 109 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 110 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 111 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 112 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 113 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 114 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 115 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
Sub-event 116 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 117 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 118 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 119 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 120 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 121 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 122 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 123 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 124 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Sub-event 125 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Sub-event 126 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 127 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 128 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Sub-event 129 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
Sub-event 130 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 131 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 132 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 133 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 134 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 135 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 136 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Sub-event 137 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 138 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sub-event 139 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 140 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 141 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 142 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
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Sub-event 143 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Sub-event 144 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Sub-event 145 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sub-event 146 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Sub-event 147 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Sub-event 148 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Sub-event 149 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 150 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Sub-event 151 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 152 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sub-event 153 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Sub-event 154 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Sub-event 155 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Sub-event 156 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Sub-event 157 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Sub-event 158 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Sum 59 76 63 72 105 83 21 65 62
Table D.1: Raw data used to develop the 9-Bubble Model
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